A few years back, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi publicly recognized that his imprisonment following the eruption of the “salvation revolution” at the end of June 1989, was a “play to reassure the world that the Islamists were now in prison.” He reminded me that he was ousted from power during the term of Gaafar Nimeiry, then dismissed from the Foreign Ministry of Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government on the eve of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir's coup. Later on, his disciples and Colonel Al-Bashir rebelled against him to prevent him from achieving what he referred to as being the “Islamic Civilizational Project,” as he returned to recent history to confirm the sensitivity toward such a project, saying: “When the Mahdist state was established in the nineteenth century, Britain came and Italy came. The Belgians arrived from the South and the French from Fashoda, followed by the Egyptians and the Ethiopians.” These statements were issued years ago, after which Al-Turabi was put in jail several times. Nonetheless, he was not alone. He was joined by many others, some of whom remained in exile for a long time while others stayed out of the sight of the security apparatuses. However, they were all present in the last elections in a new episode of the drama whose chapters have not ended after a quarter of a decade. The latter know in advance that the outcome of these elections will not change the political map, that the proclamation of the victory of Colonel Al-Bashir, the announcement by foreign observers of the falsification and interference exerted by the regime, the rejection of the electoral results by the opposition and the refusal of most of the latter group to partake in the next government will not change the doomed fate towards which the country is heading. This stage is neither crucial nor does it constitute a turning point. It is one of the articles of the Naivasha accord that was signed in 2005 under American pressures between the ruling National Congress and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement.” It is a step in a drawn up “roadmap” through which the Sudanese are being led toward undesired destinations both in the North and the South, i.e. the South of John Garang and not that of Salva Kiir, his companions, rivals and opponents. This roadmap became clear ever since the Americans and the Europeans insisted on seeing the staging of “multi-party elections” in Sudan for the first time since 1984. The latter, who are very concerned about the spread of democracy around the world, did not heed the requirements of democracy and did not listen to the objections of the opposition nor to the callers for patience in Darfur, all of whom were demanding the postponement of the elections until the provision of the basic security elements and the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced. Even American special envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, did not shy away from recognizing that “although flawed, the elections will be a step toward the enshrinement of a democratic framework for the lists of voters, the electoral authorities and the observers, which will consecrate the political decision-making process.” America is the main partner in the “game” and not a monitor keeping an eye on the integrity, neutrality and the healthy environment in which the Sudanese will pick their representatives. Moreover, the map has been clear ever since Al-Bashir threatened his opponents in the North and his partners in the South of doom and gloom if they were ever to consider a postponement or if they were to meddle in the measures drawn up to ensure his victory and that of his party. There is a joint interest between the Americans and the ruling party, despite the divergence between them. It is an ongoing “agreement of necessity” that has been in place ever since the eruption of the “salvation revolution” and is based on Washington's exertion of all sorts of pressures and sanctions and on Khartoum's cooperation despite all that is said about its rejectionism and non-cooperation. A quick look into the past would corroborate that reality. Indeed, when the National Islamic Front turned against Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government at the end of June 1989, the Islamists who were led by Dr. Al-Turabi concealed the image of the Al-Bashir-led coup. That day, the military threw the party leaders in prison, including Al-Turabi who was the architect and mastermind of the “revolution!” However, this did not last long while it seemed that the “Islamic Civilizational Project”, which was called for by the leader of the Islamic Front, raised the concerns of the Americans, the Europeans and the Sudan neighboring countries among Arab and African states. They were worried about the “exportation of the revolution” which prompted the blockade and the sanctions on the new regime in Khartoum. On the other hand, it did not take Al-Bashir a long time before he turned against Al-Turabi, which generated the estrangement that erupted between them in 1999 and entailed the imprisonment of the Sheikh of the coup after most of his disciples who became caught in the game of power were taken from him. Prior to that, the regime had succumbed to many demands by surrendering Carlos to the French intelligence in 1994 and four years later, by sending Osama Bin Laden off to Afghanistan. Moreover, following a fierce war with the Southerners, the regime - under international and regional pressures - engaged in negotiations with the leader of the Southern rebels, i.e. Garang. In 2005, these negotiations resulted in the Naivasha agreement which provided for the multi-party elections that were held last week and the right of the Southerners to decide their fate in next year's referendum. Throughout these stages, the regime acted on more than one front. It thus used all available weapons against its opponents on the domestic arena, whether by imprisoning them or sending them to exile, whereas the security apparatuses learned how to chase down the rivals and dismantle the syndicates and parties one after the other. In the meantime, the number of Sudanese refugees abroad multiplied and the internal arena was divested of its most reliable elements who would have been able to induce the required change. The conflict with the members of the opposition thus continued until the surfacing of the Darfur tragedies which Al-Bashir's party tried to attribute to foreign and internal sides while alluding to Al-Turabi. When the sanctions increased, the doors were opened before China, Malaysia and Indonesia for investments, especially in the oil sector, a move which has raised and is still raising the discontent of the Americans and the Europeans. Therefore, in order to ensure the survival of the regime, the National Congress Party relinquished its “Islamic project” and all the prohibitions that existed in the history of Sudanese politics. Today, the signs of the “deal” between the regime and its Southern partners on one hand and the foreign wishes to see the staging of the elections on the other, can be noticed. Indeed, despite all that was mentioned, President Al-Bashir did not earn legitimacy and is facing a major pressure tool represented by the international criminal court whose prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo accused him of having perpetrated war crimes in Darfur. Through his guaranteed victory, he would be able to regain a legitimacy that would facilitate his confrontation of the court which in turn will remain a brandished sword to deplete and blackmail him. Moreover, the insistence on staging the elections in the absence of the minimum level of conditions required by this political process, aims at setting the foundation for a calm referendum in the South of the country as it was clearly expressed by the United States and its European partners. It is no secret in this context that the Americans also wish to contain the influence of the Chinese in the dark continent, and that whether or not the South were to separate - and it will more than likely separate - the American oil companies will be the first to reap the fruits of the support provided to this province by Washington throughout the years. Therefore, this country's oil fields - most of which are in the South - will not be monopolized by China, its companies and investments. For their part, the Southerners played their role in this deal by withdrawing their candidate in form - i.e. Yasser Araman - from the race in the face of Al-Bashir, and headed to their elections to practice for the referendum over the determination of their fate. This self-determination issue is the most important chapter in this ongoing drama. In this context, Salva Kiir and a wide faction among the Southerners who suffered from the calamities of war, do not conceal their wishes to separate, unlike John Garang who believed there would be no future for the South outside of unity and that this unity could only be protected by a federal regime in which the authority and the wealth are divided in a just and equal way. Furthermore, he believed that the poverty belt in which hosts around half the Southern population around the capital, could alter the country's image, system and the relations between its ethnical and sectarian components in the future. The future of the South will remain the most exciting chapter in the Sudanese Drama, and although Al-Bashir expressed his willingness to accept the outcome of the referendum - as did all the parties - this acceptance of the separation will not be easy. This is why the ruling party, which will definitely be the winner, called on the parties of the opposition to partake in the next government, considering that Al-Bashir cannot handle the burden of the country's divisions after having been accused for years of being the one who forced the Southerners toward this option instead of proceeding with the vague federation formula. Moreover, this would prompt his Islamic supporters for whom he summoned prophets and angels through his media outlets, in order to fight alongside them during the war with the Southerners, to ask him about the thousands of victims, the tragedies and the displacements. For their part, the Northerners will not acknowledge a separation that may encourage other provinces to demand self-determination and secession, and that will entail the return of the ghost of civil war that never disappeared to begin with. On the other hand, while the war with Khartoum maintained the unity of the Southerners to a certain extent, the establishment of an independent state will trigger conflicts which will be much fiercer than the confrontations with the Northerners between their parties and clans. Moreover, while the new state will mainly rely on oil, it will have no other way but to reach an agreement with the North which enjoys the maritime routes and the infrastructure to exploit this wealth. This agreement will not be easy, as the wounds of the secession are still bleeding whereas the establishment of a state with no minimum level of infrastructure will turn it into a burden on its Western sponsors and neighbors. For their part, those who beneath the ashes of their unities have racial and tribal conflicts, would not like to see the establishment of a new state that would revive dreams and awaken ambitions. Therefore, the Sudanese must lower the ceiling of their expectations so that their country does not turn into another Somalia in the midst of their struggle for power and at the peak of the international race toward the dark continent.
