President Jalal Talabani was confident that no American-Iranian war would take place, because both sides did not want it. Khamenei's Iran saw what happened to Saddam Hussein and his regime, when the American military machine pounced on him. The Iranian leadership is not suicidal and would not risk everything it has built. Furthermore, the chants of ‘Death to America' in the streets of Tehran are one thing, and the calculations of the leadership are another thing. Likewise, calculated provocation of the United States to extract recognition is one thing, and risking a war with America is another. America's shadow in the Middle East is heavy and firm. Whenever a country seeks to upset the balance of power and snatch leadership, it clashes with the American shadow. Countries that seek to do this know that they cannot expel America from the region. For this reason, they quarrel with it while gathering cards in preparation for negotiations, and in the hope that they can obtain America's recognition of their new role. Indeed, they seek to become America's great partners. The conversation with President Talabani at the People's Palace in Damascus in January 2007 dragged on, and the president accommodated more than one meeting. Talabani had visited Iran several weeks earlier, meeting with the Supreme Leader, the president, and other senior officials. I asked him about the outcome of his meetings regarding relations between Tehran and Washington, and he said that those he met conveyed to him their clear position stating, "Let America declare that it is ready, and we are ready to reach accord with it from Afghanistan to Lebanon." Talabani felt that I found this revelation odd, but he continued: I proposed to the Iranians to hold a meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad. Washington agreed and then Tehran agreed, on the condition that the meeting would be kept secret. Khalilzad came to the agreed venue in Dukan in Kurdistan 24 hours earlier, but the Iranians did not attend because then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told congressional leaders about the meeting. The Iranians did not object to the meeting, but they objected to the fact that the news was leaked to the media. Contrary to what has been reported in the media, American-Iranian meetings were not an impossible undertaking. In 2003, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, there were American-Iranian contacts in Geneva over the future of Iraq. These contacts stopped after Saddam Hussein's ouster, when Iran refused to hand over members of al-Qaeda that Washington claimed were stationed in Iran. There were also contacts and information exchange over Afghanistan. There are some events that were forgotten by the people of the region, on account of relentless developments in the Middle East. In 2003, after the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), where Paul Bremer was the absolute ruler, Iran sent to Baghdad a delegation from the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guard to congratulate the CPA – which was drafted in American ink without ignoring ‘Iran's friends.' Another significant event was when Arab leaders refrained from visiting occupied Iraq. Yet an airplane landed in Baghdad airport one day in 2007, carrying a difficult visitor, who was then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The visitor saw the U.S. tanks and asked about them, and was told this was just one base out of many for 170,000 soldiers in Iraq. The Iraqi authorities agreed with U.S. checkpoints that the latter would not intercept the Iranian president's motorcade. But a checkpoint stopped the convoy suddenly after it left the Green Zone. The Iraqis became concerned and rushed to find out what happened. The U.S. officer said that his soldiers wanted to have their picture taken with the visiting Iranian president, who laughed when they explained this to him. In days like these last year, I went to the home of President Talabani in Sulaimaniyah. He was deeply concerned by the Syrian developments. He was worried about Syria and its neighbors, in light of the escalation in sectarian clashes. He said Iran could not wash its hands clean of the fate of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Losing Syria meant losing its most important cards for negotiations with America. It also meant undermining its role in the region, which is more important to Iran than nuclear weapons. I asked him the same question I had asked him five years earlier. He replied by ruling out war. He said that he heard from the Obama administration a firm desire for a settlement with Tehran, and that he heard from the Iranians that they were ready for comprehensive negotiations with America, if it was willing to recognize the new realities in the region. The phone call between Barack Obama and Hassan Rohani reminded me of what Talabani, may he get well soon, had told me. The journey will not be easy and it might be delayed. Iran's actual demand is to be the great partner of ‘Great Satan' in the region, from Afghanistan to Lebanon. But the matter is not simple. Iran does not belong to the ‘majority' in the region to begin with. After the open-ended crisis in Syria and the escalating sectarian conflict in the region, which implicated the Axis of Defiance, the Iranian cards lost some of their luster and some of their strength. Meanwhile, Talabani's regret for Syria was reason for me to pause. Syria lost its stability and lost its own cards. It was once a player but now it is a playground.
