Beirut-It is a saddening question being asked by every Lebanese from various fields, social classes, political or sectarian affiliations, a question that concerns the hope of stability, even if temporary. “War or no war?” asks the Lebanese, adding, in a digression that seems to buy some fleeting reassurance, “before or after the summer?” Such a concern is not imaginary, nor is it a misplaced fixation. Certainly such a question is not asked for the sake of entertainment, but rather in order to organize family matters, schools, the means of traveling quickly, of saving enough money to survive without income, and also, for those with the ability to invest, to take long-term decisions. The reasons behind asking such a question are not purely domestic, nor are they exclusively regional or international. Such an obsession shared by most of the Lebanese stems from their fear of an Iranian-Israeli confrontation taking place on their soil because of the Iranian nuclear issue. Their fear is based on the loss of trust in the ability of US President Barack Obama to fulfill his promises and his aspirations to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflict, because of the obstinacy of the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu and its thwarting – with the support of the Israeli lobby in the United States – the efforts of the US President, who put forth the issue within the framework of the US's national interest. Their concerns over Syria's intentions in Lebanon still stand, especially after the meeting in Damascus which gave Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the opportunity to appear as if dictating the Iranian agenda on Lebanon, this alongside continued Iranian and Syrian support of armed Palestinian factions working inside Lebanon. Furthermore, there are the causes for concern resulting from local factors – most prominently Hezbollah's arsenal and the party's attempts to exclude simply putting forth this issue at the National Dialogue Table, as per the Doha Agreement which has been approved at the Arab level. However, such local, regional and international intertwining in fears of war is the same as that taking place in talk of hope in regional negotiations and national dialogue. Indeed, in the past few days have begun rounds of preliminary visits and regional decisions that seem as if buying time for all parties, but not buying guarantees of the success of negotiations or of wars not taking place. Four months seems to be the primary time span in mind, knowing that the decision of Arab foreign ministers to grant their blessing to the American initiative of launching indirect negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis pointed to granting negotiations an interval of four months. Yet it is too early – and perhaps wrong – to assume that such a fixed interval has been set in stone like a deadline or a countdown to confrontation. Indeed, the Middle East, in both its Israeli and Arab aspects, is in a state of sorting out, not just in terms of local and regional developments, but also because of international offers and roles which in turn are in need of time. Thus the Middle East is witnessing noteworthy activity that requires in-depth analysis, as it requires strategic Arab contribution to current efforts, whether those exerted by the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany in the Iranian issue, those engaged in by the Quartet – which includes the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union – for peace in the Middle East, those in which Turkey plays the role of a link between Syria and Israel, or those of the Lebanese National Dialogue which is examining the “defense strategy” and Hezbollah's arsenal, and whether it is time for the League of Arab States and for Qatar to return to it in order to avoid matters getting worse and to avoid confrontation. Despite the talk of war that has been rising in tone, the regional atmosphere indicates broadening the spectrum of Arab reconciliations and maintaining them, as it indicates an international decision to contain any Iranian-Israeli military confrontation while continuing to entice Iran to cooperate with both the carrot and the stick – the stick being only that of sanctions, not a military stick. In fact, even the carrot being extended by the great powers to Iran is only meant to buy time, as what Tehran is being offered is dialogue, negotiations, normalization and understandings for a certain period of time – perhaps two years – in order to think about the core of dealing with its nuclear ambitions, in exchange for merely “suspending” uranium enrichment. The Islamic Republic of Iran is being arrogant and rejecting the offer, while bargaining over guarantees that concern its priorities, which are the survival of the regime, its recognition and preventing any aid to those who are attempting to topple or modify it, followed by Iran's strategic interests in Iraq, then those regarding Lebanon, which Tehran wants to make into a base for itself through the arsenal of Hezbollah and some Palestinian factions. The leadership in Iran is politically experienced and wagers on its patience in the face of others' hurry. In Iraq, it negotiates with the United States over sharing influence there, and tries to send positive indications to some Arab countries so that they may improve the atmosphere with it in Iraq, breaking the isolation which will besiege and harm it in case sanctions are imposed. Moreover, talk of this matter points to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which seeks to have a positive role in Iraq. This explains the recurrent talk of US-Iranian-Saudi-Syrian understandings in Iraq's elections that avoid for everyone the eruption of confrontations which no one wants now. Yet, for the sake of assertion, this does not negate the fact that Iraq's historical elections have been an amazing achievement for every Iraqi who went to the voting booth while preserving their right to choose Iraq's identity and causing a regression of religious parties in the elections. This is merely an example of the levels of understanding involved in the differences between countries originally in disagreement, or the levels of differences between countries originally in agreement. The intertwining of the Iranian issue and the Palestinian issue runs through the minds of the different players, local, regional and international ones. Turkey for example plays striking roles with Israel, Iran and Arab countries, as it positions itself as a fundamental country in the regional balance of power. Turkey represents a semi-link between Syria and Israel, and it at the same time plays a role between Iran and the five countries plus Germany by conveying to Tehran “alternatives” to the proposals of suspending enrichment in formulas that would “save face” for everyone. Ankara, of course, does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, not just because it does not want to be the only one in the current regional balance of power who does not possess nuclear weapons. Indeed, Israel, Iran and Turkey are today the three main countries in the regional balance of power, after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein exited the nuclear equation by invading Kuwait. In fact, Iran rushed to obtain nuclear capabilities after it discovered that Iraq had preceded it to this, thus making it a strategic aim and the object of national interests and identity. Turkey does not want Iran to join the nuclear club, as this would radically affect its own strategic and international ambitions. Then there is the element of Turkey positioning itself in as a Sunni leadership, making its relationship with Iran nearly one of competition, after Turkish politics headed east to Iraq, and specifically because the Turkish-Syrian relationship is becoming strong to a degree that might not be comfortable for Tehran, which has been weaving an Iranian-Syrian relationship for many years. As for the Israeli element in these relationships, it is an important asset in the hands of Ankara, who knows that it alone among regional forces has the ability hold the Israeli, Arab and Iranian cards at the same time. Thus it will keep moving forward with them regardless of developments in terms of diplomatic confrontations, mismanagement or misconduct, whether from the side of Israel or that of the US Congress which is always biased towards Israel. In fact, Congress has sent an Israeli message to Ankara by considering that what happened to the Armenians under Ottoman rule was “genocide”. The significance of this message is that Israel remains an important key for Turkey's interests in the United States. Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made sure this week to say in Damascus, following his meetings with Syrian leadership at the highest levels, that “the ground is ready” for resuming indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel, and that US officials “strongly support” recommencing these negotiations. He also said, in speaking to Al-Hayat, that the “good climate will continue” between Syria and Lebanon, and called on the Palestinians to “unite and reject division”. The US officials whom Davutoğlu pointed to include Special Envoy Senator George Mitchell, who is currently launching proximity talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis, while Turkey is doing something similar between the Syrians and the Palestinians. Thus, both the Palestinian and Syrian track are headed towards proximity talks, yet there is no movement on the Lebanese track except by way of the Dialogue Table, which is supposed to deal with Hezbollah's arsenal which the party says is for the liberation of Arab territories. The Syrians are talking about ways of ending the occupation of their lands, and the Palestinians are talking about the future of their independent state on the background of ending the occupation. They both have a mediator entrusted with proximity talks which might become shuttle talks, and what is being discussed addresses ideas of gradual withdrawals. What the Quartet, which is meeting in Moscow soon, should do is pay attention to the Lebanese scene. Moscow in particular, and with it the European Union, should work with the main players in Lebanon to warn them against underestimating interest in it, at least because the spark of a war starting from Lebanon will lead to its destruction and to the destruction of opportunities to make peace, and perhaps in fact to setting off a regional war. Moscow holds some influence with Damascus, with Tehran and with Palestinian factions which it should make use of now in all seriousness, and in fact its influence extends to Israel. It is also time to make use of the influence of European countries with Israel. The Europeans in fact also hold investment-based influence with Damascus. As for Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon, he must today pay more attention to the Lebanese issue than others, and not to misestimate Lebanon's central place in the formulas of peace and weapons. Indeed, the UN has a direct and an indirect role to play in Lebanon and is responsible for implementing the resolutions issued by the Security Council. Thus when Ban Ki-moon visits the region, he must not focus on merely encouraging the two tracks that each have their own sponsor – the Palestinian track and the Syrian track of negotiations with Israel. The responsibility laid on his shoulders should be that of protecting the Lebanese track from being used or blackmailed domestically or regionally. He has the responsibility to draw the attention of international and domestic players to the fact that the Special tribunal for Lebanon was established by the UN Security Council, that the international community will not abandon Lebanon and that it is committed to its resolutions, which are not subject to trade-offs. It is enough for the Palestinians to live under the tragedy of occupation. It is not fair for the Lebanese to live in fear of the wars of others and in fear of war to come, even in these times of reconciliations and negotiations.
