Had the option of the United States and its partners been an eventual war on Iran, the diplomacy, the sanctions, the electronic war against the nuclear facilities and the assassination of the Iranian scientists would not have been extended for that long. Had war been so easy, the Republic's opponents would not have shown reluctance for years, knowing that even the administration of George Bush Jr. did not dare undertake such an adventure. Had war been Iran's choice, it would have also not hesitated to drag its opponents to more than one arena of conflict. The regime's leaders who have been governing in accordance with Khomeini's school – so to speak – cannot exit it. Al-Khomeini, while at the peak of his absolute authority and power, did not risk subjecting the country to a war it was unable to wage and whose results and consequences it could not tolerate. So will the “sons” of his revolution, with all the divisions, conflicts and crises facing the country, act against this policy? Will they be more Khomeinist than Khomeini himself? A country enjoying the size and status of the Islamic Republic cannot risk shooting itself. It cannot resort to the policy of no return, or close the Hormuz Strait – its maritime passageway to the world – under the pretext that it will also prevent its enemies from using it. The escalation of the rhetoric, the use of mutual threats and the setting of red lines, reflect the rise affecting the tensions to the utmost levels, just as they reflect the predicament facing the options adopted by Iran, and those adopted by America and its partners. This is true, although Washington has yet not depleted its alternatives, as long as Iran's threats have not been translated on the ground. President Barack Obama warned Guide Ali Khamenei against closing the Hormuz Strait, announcing that this step was a red line. We do not think that the Guide will take a risk to feel Washington's pulse and test the extent of its seriousness, just as the leader of the White House cannot take a risk and abstain from responding after he chose that course, in case the Republic were to close the Strait. This is due to the fact that his reluctance will hasten the collapse of the United States' status, at which point it would have lost the confrontation. Iran is able to close the Strait, and the United States is able to reopen it. But between this and that step, there is a war for which both parties are not yet prepared. The predicament in Iran lies in the fact that the regime cannot remain silent vis-à-vis an open economic war which could turn the people against the regime and threaten to destroy it, instead of pushing them to rally around it in the event of a battle. So far, the regime has been relying on the resistance option against America and its allies to face of its domestic opponents and give momentum to its supporters. Hence, confusion is affecting the positions of the Iranian politicians at the level of the closing of the Strait slogan. It is confusion, and not the policy of multiple voices and positions used by Tehran through the issuance of more than one speech. Iran is aware of the fact that it cannot confront the American military machine. Indeed, its leaders are more reasonable and pragmatic than some might think. They know that the opponent's arsenal is much greater and much more efficient, and that there is no comparison between the two. Therefore, war is not the right option. Former Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf once said in a televised interview that in case war were to erupt, the Islamic Republic will not know from where the rockets are hitting it. It will thus turn into a scorched land and will be led years backward. It knows that the Americans are present in the Gulf waters and on Gulf soil, and the Guards have recognized and are still recognizing this presence. They are also present in Afghanistan and enjoy great facilitations in Central Asia, not to mention Turkey which hosted a few months ago NATO's missile shield systems. The United States' predicament lies in the fact that it cannot disregard Iran's imminent building of its nuclear weapons. Acquiring the bomb means it will be able to threaten, compromise and establish a balance of terror with all the powers residing in the region, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. This would render it an influential partner in the determination of the region's policies, which would force Washington, along with its partners in Europe and these areas, to reconsider their interests and the ways to protect them, while taking those of the Islamic Republic into account. Furthermore, no one would be able to threaten the republic with war anymore, and the policy of containment will no longer be useful with a regime sitting on top of a nuclear bomb, although the chances of seeing it used are almost null. Still, it would be militarily possible to establish a balance of terror with the Republic to contain its arrogance. The war option against Iran will not be easier than seeing this country sitting on a nuclear arsenal, seeing how war will not be limited to it and will expand wherever Tehran enjoys influence and allies, from Afghanistan to the shores of Beirut, going through Iraq and the Gulf. This war will not be a picnic and will cause the deterioration of the economic situation around the world, leading to overwhelming anarchy on the oil and financial markets. There is no arguing about America's ability to destroy the Iranian military machine within a few rounds. But this does not mean the end of war. It will be a round between two regular armies. So, how will the military machine respond to thousands of fighters in organizations and formations closer to those of militias? Did it not learn from the Iraqi nightmare and what it is now facing – along with NATO – in Afghanistan? The eruption of war will be awaited by Hezbollah, the heavily-armed Iranian wing on the Israeli border. It will also constitute an opportunity which will be seized by Bashar al-Assad's regime to elude the domestic developments, through the wide opening of the front along the border with Israel. Even the Gulf states will not be spared from the confrontation, seeing how for years now, Iran has not been concealing its threats to its neighbors. War on Iran will turn it into a victim in the eyes of the Islamic populations, and will earn it the sympathy it had started to lose during the Arab spring. Moreover, war will supply the regime with a major dosage of continuity and will rally the people around it, in a way that will eliminate any form of opposition against it or conflicts within the ruling elite among the conservative hardliners. If the American strike settles for hitting the nuclear facilities, it will not achieve its goals, considering that the regime will rebuild its nuclear project. On the other hand, it is not certain that a wide-scale blow will undermine the foundations of the regime in preparation for its toppling. Indeed, unlike the case in Iraq, the Iranians do not want foreign assistance to remove the regime. Even the domestic opposition does not wish to change the Republic's identity, as much as it wants power rotation and the changing of the hard-line policy. This means that factions among the Iranian people will stand behind the regime, and grow more persistent over the continuation of the efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. So far, Washington's and Iran's options have not succeeded in finding a settlement to the Iranian nuclear file issue. Indeed, the sanctions policy and the Western pressures were ineffective, just like the attempts to engage in announced and non-announced negotiations. One of the reasons for this failure is the fact that the negotiations under the nuclear dust feature numerous files. There is the Islamic Republic's political, security and oil role in the Gulf and its position in the regional system that expands throughout the Great Middle East. In this region, there are also numerous sides and intertwining interests that cannot be limited to one negotiation session or a package of sanctions. This is why we are seeing contradictory positions in regard to the Syrian crisis, the dramatic developments on the Iraqi arena, Lebanon's pending issues and the Palestinian pending cause among others, which were further complicated by the Arab spring. Henry Kissinger used to trigger fires ahead of his difficult missions to hasten the opening of the negotiations door before the conflicting parties. He adopted this method at the beginning of the 70s. But at the time, there were two poles controlling the entire situation and enjoying the ability to direct the courses of the topical wars. They used to sit directly or at the level of lower bases to redraft the limits of the game. Today however, in light of the presence of more than one side seeking to confront America's unipolarity or fill the vacuums it is leaving behind here and there, one cannot predict what Iran could do for instance, and cannot push it to stop at specific limits that should not be violated at the level of international relations, whether in peace or at war. Moreover, the American war decision should take into account the concerned superpowers and their interests, at the head of which is Russia, which clearly threatened to respond to any act that disregards these interests. At this level, there is no need to recall its repeated positions, in which it stressed it will stand alongside Tehran and Damascus. But this will not prevent Washington from enhancing its control over Middle Eastern oil, especially in the Gulf region, because controlling this wealth gives it the final say in regard to the determination of its exportation courses and prices, and offers it a pressure card in any dialogue with China or any among the Asian powers which are now competing with it on the economic level. The pressures, the mutual threats and the play on the brink of the abyss are among the conditions of the electoral game in America, where Obama is seeking the renewal of his term, as well as in Iran where the conflict between the conservatives is revealing fierce battles in imminent parliamentary elections and presidential ones that will follow in a little over a year, and in Russia where Vladimir Putin wishes a successful return to Kremlin. At the end of the day, the pressures and threats are a necessary policy to appease Israel and avoid the war option, but also to save face for the conflicting parties when they decide to head to the table, seal a settlement or a deal, change the rules of the game and draw up its framework and limits.
