The recent political positions of the Russian, Syrian and Iranian leaders reveal that the sides of this tripartite axis have become tightly connected in the face of the American policy and the Western one in general. It is as though their fate has become one and the same. Hence, it is not surprising that extremism is the headline of this trio's political rhetoric. Indeed, for weeks now, Iran has been threatening to close the Hormuz Strait if the Western sanctions were to affect its oil sector. President Bashar al-Assad on the other hand recently appeared to confirm his insistence on the security option, while blaming the Arab League and the foreign conspiracy, and consequently excluding any possible settlement of the domestic crisis. As for Vladimir Putin, he threatened - on the eve of his presidential battle - that he will not allow individual steps on the international arena that do not take into account Russia's opinion and interests. Tehran and Moscow have not concealed their support to Damascus ever since the eruption of the protests in the Syrian cities. Al-Assad's regime is greatly relying on this support in the face of its opponents, both domestically and abroad. In the meantime, Moscow cautioned it will perceive any attack against Iran due to its nuclear program as being a “direct threat to its security,” while Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov condemned the proposed oil ban against it, reiterating his country's refusal of any wide-scale action against Al-Assad's regime. Clearly, the three leaders are attempting to shift the conflict away from its domestic course and what it summons in terms of activities drawing inspiration from the Arab Spring, towards a wider regional and international scale, in the hope of reviving the national feeling in Iran, tickling the nostalgia of some powers over a lost imperialist era in Russia, or motivating some forces to stand in the face of the foreign conspiracy which has been ongoing in Syria for years, and was defeated on more than one occasion! President Al-Assad found no alternative but to go back to his first speech, considering that the internal settlement between the opposition and the regime seems impossible in light of the blood that was shed, and due to the presence of both sides on opposite lines of fire that are growing more sectarian and whose flames are expanding. For its part, the Arab League initiative did not earn regional consensus and did not give enough time to Russia's, or even Iran's and Turkey's efforts in the absence of any international understanding or convergence over a formula or a deal that would not be successful, unless it affects a basket of files linked to the Syrian crisis and the future of the situation in this country. In the meantime, Putin and Ahmadinejad are each facing a domestic – before an external – challenge. In Russia, as in Iran, there is clear rejection by influential factions and forces of the attempts to monopolize power. They are also facing protests that erupt and appease based on the circumstances. In other words, they are living in a state of constant threat, which is pushing them to tickle the national feeling through the repeated talk about the greatness of the nation and the reinstatement of the glories of a lost or stolen empire. On the other hand, they are sharing the same fears over the rise of the Central Asian states from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan at the level of the oil and gas sectors, and what this constitutes in terms of competition threatening the monopolization – so as not to say blackmail card – enjoyed by Moscow and Tehran. Moreover, Putin, like Ahmadinejad, is facing a campaign targeting his government against the backdrop of the freedoms and human rights issue. This campaign will not stop fueling the domestic arena and pushing it towards escalation in the face of the regime. Certainly, Washington is not hopeful that the regime in Russia or Iran can be changed, but the possibility of changing the ruling or political elite is on the table if the right conditions are available. It is no secret that the campaign of threats launched by the Islamic Republic is due to the new package of sanctions sought by America and its European and non-European partners. This is due to the fact that this package will pressure and motivate the Iranian street to raise its voice, revive the opposition in the face of Ahmadinejad's government and its internal and external policies, and seek the discontinuation of the nuclear project. Syria, for its part, constitutes the link of this trio. It is indeed a passageway for Iran to the heart of the Middle East and the border of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as it is a communication line between Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Palestine. In regard to Russia, the Russian military institution perceives the Tartous Port as being an inherited symbol from the days of the conflict between the Eastern and Western camps, which provides the Russian Navy with a foothold in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the close relations with Damascus in general provide Russia with an efficient role at the level of the Arab-Israeli conflict and any peace arrangements or settlement. And just like the Islamic Republic is trying hard to confirm its efficient presence in the region and restore what it enjoyed during the days of the Shah, Putin's voice is rising to warn against the American and NATO attempts to besiege Russia and contain its role, whether in the Arab world or Central Asia. Putin knows – just like Ahmadinejad – that the new American defensive strategy is focusing on Asia and the Pacific Ocean, in order to face the growing Chinese threat in this region, which might become in the next few years the most prominent arena for the conflict. He is also aware of the fact that the Russian role cannot be prominent in it, in the presence of the American and Chinese powers. Nonetheless, it will enhance the Chinese presence, which is why the Chinese are welcoming any role played by Moscow in this region, in the face of the role played by South Korea and Japan in support of the American one. Consequently, Russia is placing all its weight in the Middle East and the neighboring states. Throughout history, Russia always believed that the building of relations and bilateral partnerships with the neighbors to maintain its vital interests was more useful than the relations with the United States and some distant European countries. Hence the partnership between Moscow and Tehran, although it seems that the first sometimes uses the second as a card in its struggle - or dialogue - with America and Europe. This partnership is not only imposed by what the Republic represents in terms of a wide arms market for Russia, but also by their joint interests in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and the attempts to contain the influence of Turkey, which Russia believes has gone back to playing its old role in NATO and at the level of the strategic relations with the United States. This is why it is feared that Putin's arrival to the presidency in two months will damage the positive facets of the relations whose development was sought by President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, preferring to rebuild trust at the level of the relations with Iran and uphold the regime in Syria. Indeed, such relations would place Russia's foot back in the warm Gulf waters and at the heart of the Middle Eastern equation, while offering it a space that would break the siege which NATO tried to erect around it, from Georgia to Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Moreover, Russia does not want to see Syria and Iran revolving in America's and Europe's space. Putin is not clearly expressing his wish to revive the Soviet Union. However, he is similar to Ahmadinejad when he announces he will render his country a power whose status and interests cannot be taken lightly at the level of international relations and the conflict throughout the globe. But the paradox is that the American president – whom the Russian and Iranian leaders are addressing – did not take them into account in his new defensive strategy the way he has done China. Indeed, Washington is aware of the fact that Russia is no longer a great military or economic power that could restore its lost role, knowing that its arsenal surpasses China's at the level of strategic weaponry and deployment outside the region. So, will Putin be able to accomplish what he failed to during his two previous terms and his current premiership? Will he be able to restore Moscow's role via the Syrian and Iranian gates for example? True, Moscow proved it could not be disregarded when tackling numerous files. In the war on Iran for example, it is impossible to avoid taking Russia into account, which is relied on by Tehran in its conflict with the West. Moreover, it is clear today that the Russian position at the level of the Syrian crisis is standing as a major obstacle in the face of the attempts to induce change that are led by the opposition on the domestic arena, and by some Arab and Western powers abroad. Nonetheless, the Russian influence in the region remains limited to the deterrence of the American influence, the biggest proof for that being the available evidence and the developments witnessed in the region during the last couple of decades. Putin cannot restore Moscow's past status, and can only engage in trade-offs by raising his voice and issuing his threats, just as Iran is doing by displaying its military arsenal on a daily basis, especially its missile arsenal. The latter does not want a war that would damage its opponents but turn it into a scorched earth. What it wants is for these opponents to carry out a trade-off with it, or at least leave it alone. What it wants is the recognition of its pivotal role which existed during the days of the Shah on the regional and international levels. So far, the re-embracing of the former Soviet republics and the enhancement of the relations with the United States and Europe were at the top of Russia's list of priorities. But will the tripartite axis change these priorities? What can Putin offer to the Middle East populations? Can he resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict? What is the extent of his impact on the course of the Arab spring, and what can he reap from a region that is heading – in its entirety – toward conservative Islamic regimes, while fearing that such regimes will reach the Russian border? Is he not aware that the people's ability to induce change comes ahead of the plans of the higher circles? Does he not take into consideration what happened to the Soviet Union and the repercussions of its collapse around the world, ones which have finally reached us? Will he go back to bargaining as he has done so far with the Iranian and Syrian cards? Is he capable enough?
