In the recent period, Vladimir Putin was keen to explain to his Arab visitors his country's position on the bloody conflict raging in Syria. Putin complained about the lack of understanding among international regional forces of this position. He also complained about those who attributed the Russian position to the naval facilities afforded to his fleet in Tartous, or the fact that Syria is a top buyer of Russian-made military hardware. Putin would admit that his country has interests in Syria, and that there were relations of political and military cooperation between Moscow and Damascus that are more than five decades old. But he was insistent on suggesting that his country's position goes farther than these factors, and that it should be seen in the context of a realistic understanding of the needs for stability in a region not very far from his country. Putin told his visitors that his country would not allow the Iraqi or Libyan scenario to be repeated in Syria. He wondered what the position of Syria's neighboring countries would be if it fell into the hands of jihadists and became a breeding ground for terrorists. The Russian president strongly criticized the fighters who came from abroad to violate Syria, and also spoke about beheadings and the eating of livers, calling on the countries that support the opposition to think about the consequences. Some visitors noted that the Russian president, after explaining his country's hardline position, was also keen on letting slip certain hints, as though to say that Moscow, through its position, was not defending a regime, a person, or a family, and as though to say that he understood that there were many in Syria who want change away from the rule of one party, one person, or one family towards a new regime. Observers following up these meetings noted that Putin, who in the past emphasized the right of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to run in the next presidential election when his term expires mid-next year, is now only emphasizing Assad's right to finish his current term. One of the visitors asked Putin about the reason why no progress was being made in addressing the Syrian tragedy, and Putin answered by saying that the solution has been delayed because Russia has not been able to reach an understanding with the U.S. over the ‘day after.' The visitor understood this to mean accord over the period that follows Assad's departure and the end of his current term. Putin gave the Syrian regime invaluable assistance, including sustained military support, which, in addition to Iranian support, helped prevent the opposition deal a fatal blow to the regime, and diplomatic support that reached the extend of paralyzing the UN Security Council. Putin benefited to the maximum extent from Barack Obama's keenness on not becoming involved in a new war. The policy of obstruction went until the end, establishing Russia as a key player that must be brought in into any process that determines Syria's future. But two major developments put this policy to the test: The chemical massacre in Ghouta; and Obama's threat to carry out a military strike that could only degrade the abilities of the regime and damage the Russian umbrella erected above it. It is in this context that the ‘Geneva deal' can be understood. The deal took place three weeks after the massacre in Ghouta and two days before the UN inspectors report on the massacre. The timing of the deal raises questions. The text of the agreement, which included references to the role of the Security Council and Chapter VII, also raises questions and opens the door to many interpretations. Meanwhile, setting the final date of the program at mid-next year raises questions about a possible link to the end of Assad's term in the same period. At first glance, it appears as though the American and Russian sides have reduced the Syrian tragedy to the chemical weapons issue alone. But the question is, can their deal be implemented without regard to Geneva 2, without providing conditions for it to convene (and if so, then on which basis)? What does it mean when the United States stresses that the military option remains on the table? And will the ‘Geneva deal' bring Moscow and Washington to agree on the ‘day after'? Some believe that there are precursors for an American-Russian rapprochement over the features of the ‘day after.' This rapprochement is based on benefitting from existing state institutions in Syria, especially the army, after a change in its leadership and doctrine, and bringing in the ‘moderate opposition' into the process of developing a democratic regime that takes into account the inevitability of change and the need to reassure Syria's communities. But certainly, this journey will not be an easy one, and many more will have to die before we get to the ‘day after.'
