In the folds of Western hesitation and reluctance over intervention in Syria, from waiting for the UN inspectors' report, to the vote at the British House of Commons, lies the Iraqi experience. Its manifestations can be seen in the fact that it has been deemed that conditions that allow waging a war with a legal cover have not been met, as much as it has been deemed that the outcome of the war in Iraq in 2003 did not jumpstart democracy there, while sectarian conflicts erupted and Mesopotamia fell into the arms of Iran. The memory of Iraq produced many lessons with profound effect, and it remains too early to tell how much has been learned from them. This is as far as one party to the conflict is concerned. But as for the other party, namely the Syrian regime and the chorus of the supporters of Mumanaa – the ‘axis of defiance' – they seem through their statements and media appearances to have no historic memory from which they can draw any meaning. Instead, the Mumanaa camp suggests that coming under "aggression" – denoting something quintessential in the sense that the aggressors and victims never change – is alone the historic background upon which everything else is built! If some compulsory reality check were to occur, then the Mumanaa camp cites events that are either resounding defeats (the Arab defeat of 1967 or the Lebanese defeat of 1982), or so-called victories that have dubious credentials (the 1956 Suez War or the July 2006 War). The crisis of the relationship to the past is but an expression of the crisis of the relationship with the present, and at its heart, the issue of war that condenses this relationship. While confusion has spread to the Western strike, over whether to weaken or topple the Assad regime, then confusion, too, and on a much larger scale, also mires responding to the strike, as the question of "a response" is rather impossible. Indeed, the Mumanaa camp does not have room for maneuver except between silence and acquiescence on the one hand, and igniting a major war in which it commits suicide, on the other hand. True, Hezbollah can target Israel with its rockets, and Iran can attack cities and oil installations in the Gulf. Both sides can also target European and American nationals in a wide swath of the planet. However, a ‘program' as such, which is the only thing the Mumanaa has at its disposal, would upset the rest of the world, and not just the region, and no one would carry it out unless they are mad. It follows from this that the Iranians, despite the ideological considerations so dear to them, might give priority to pragmatic considerations that they are in the end not shorn of either. In this regard, there is a lot of talk about hopes pinned on Hassan Rohani and his ‘moderation,' but also about Omani mediation between Tehran and Washington, as well as Western promises to consider the Iranian nuclear issue away from the alliance with the Assad regime. Meanwhile, as the Russians have asserted, in the words of some of their senior officials, that they would not take part in any hostilities in the event the region is sucked into a conflagration, then this is another reason to assume that Tehran might follow the example of Moscow, and just condemn, denounce, threaten, but essentially do nothing. In short, the Mumanaa camp today is locked in a battle without a plan, vision, or horizon. As for the ‘Arab and Islamic masses' that the Mumanaa claims to represent, well, they are preoccupied with many things that do not include solidarity with the regime in Damascus. History's many unpaid bills have accumulated, and it seems that payment is now due.
