Russia is acting in the manner of someone who cannot lose in Syria. A year ago, Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin carrying a project for a ‘corrective movement'. He sought to restore his country's position in the framework of US-Russian relations. He wanted to end the paradigm brought about by the fall of the Berlin wall and the implosion of the USSR. There are those in the ranks of Putin's advisers who believe the time is right to clip the wings of the world's only remaining superpower, with the US having been severely wounded by two costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a biting financial crisis. Putin's messages were clear. He wants Russia, its interests, its image, and its arsenal to be respected. He does not want to see another Libya repeated in Syria. He does not accept for the United States to step forward to claim victories, under the cloak of the United Nations. Putin does not want to see an Islamist Middle East. He has enough problems with the Islamists in the Russian Federation and its neighboring countries. He does not want a repeat of the scenes of the Arab Spring, where a dictator is toppled only to be followed by ballots out of which Islamists emerge, with legitimacy that helps them forget their pledges and promises. He does not want Moscow to bid farewell to yet another ally. He does not want to see Russian armaments suffer another humiliating defeat. For all these reasons, Moscow was quick to draw the first red line in the Syrian conflict: Foreign military intervention. Invoking WMDs or humanitarian intervention is strictly prohibited. This is how Moscow came to wield its veto power repeatedly. Moscow's position then encouraged Beijing to wield the veto too. The maximum that Russia has agreed to was the Geneva Statement. Lakhdar Brahimi tried to operate based on this document, but ambiguity soon took his mission down. Sergei Lavrov proved to be a faithful keeper of the red line drawn by his superior, President Putin. Iran's position was never vague, meanwhile. Tehran dealt with the Syrian revolution as though it were a conspiracy, or at least a coup, against the Mumanaa axis, the so-called pro-resistance camp. It acted as though defending Damascus and defending Tehran were one and the same. Removing the Syrian link from the Mumanaa axis means for Tehran pushing Iran back into Iraq, and limiting and circumventing Hezbollah's role. Iran was thus quick to draw its own red line. Its Supreme Leader was quoted as saying that Syria must be that which it were before the crisis, or otherwise be in the hands of no one. It is in this context that one can understand the latest appearance by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, which marked a transition from sympathy and timid participation alongside the regime, to official involvement in its war. Nasrallah drew a clear role for the ‘real friends' of Syria, and said that they would never allow Damascus to fall into the hands of the United States, Israel, or the Takfiri (extreme jihadi) groups. Israel has been closely monitoring what is taking place near its borders. But its observers and analysts are divided. Some say better the devil you know than the devil you don't. Others purport that the fall of the Assad regime would be considered a strategic loss for Tehran, and that the ‘jihadis' in the long term would be a less risky choice. Israel has since focused on what it calls national security calculations. Chemical weapons and transferring advanced weaponry to Hezbollah fall under that category. With its air strikes, Israel has proclaimed that it does not need to take permission from anyone when the matter involves its national security. In turn, Israel has drawn its red line in the Syrian arena. Three developments preceded John Kerry's visit to Moscow today: Obama's talk about the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the position of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and the Israeli strikes against targets in Damascus. In truth, all three developments carry several messages and threats in their folds. Most probably, Kerry will seek to take advantage of the chemical weapons issue to ask Moscow to go ahead with a process for political transition in Syria. If Moscow remains unresponsive, then Obama will have no choice but to arm the moderate Syrian opposition. This means pushing the Syrian crisis towards further escalation. Clearly, we are heading towards a major regional-international crisis in the now-boundless Syrian battlefield. Here, an observer must have much more questions than answers: Can Syria respond to the Israeli raids? Where and through whom? Will Iran go beyond its public involvement in the conflict, and turn Syria into an arena for many more wars for the sake of many more agendas? Will Syria risk fighting a war on many fronts? How will Russia act if the Middle East appears to be heading towards a major conflagration? Ultimately, it is clear that Obama is under great pressure to take serious action. It is also clear that Putin cannot afford to lose. It's a dilemma for all parties in the incendiary Syrian battlefield. And every red line has a faithful keeper.
