Michel Foucault was seldom fascinated with the Iranian revolution, its religious discourse and this discourse's ability to mobilize the crowds and change the world. Foucault, based on his position in the cultural “institution,” exaggerated the importance of the Iranian revolution's accomplishments on the human, moral and political levels. But when he discovered the revolution's shortcomings in rising up to the hopes he had placed on it, and became aware of its unwarranted execution of the oppositionists before the revolutionaries started liquidating each other, he remained silent vis-à-vis what he had written about Iran until his death. A lot was written about the reasons that prompted the French philosopher to overcome the prevailing political and cultural divisions during his days, as well as the aversion which prevailed – in general – toward any religious role in the formation of society. In his approach of the Iranian revolution, Foucault tackled the Islamic discourse and its archetypal representation of collective will. The richness of the religious discourse and its handling as a cognitive and political tool on a day to day basis amazed the French academician who had come to Iran amid the French debates – in the sixties and seventies – over the meaning, the discourse, the structure, the text and the dismantlement. The revolution's discourse was so simple and comprehensive it encouraged a philosopher the size of Foucault to expect militant Islam to constitute a force threatening the global powers. Today, the expectations of Foucault, who rejected the division imposed by the Cold War on the world, seem very distant from reality. Indeed, militant Islam which charmed a large portion of Muslims around the world – in addition to some Western intellectuals – was limited in Iran among other countries of Muslims to one sect fighting other sects and the ideology of a regime that does not hesitate to resort to religious discourse to justify its stay in power. One of the examples for the emptiness of the current Iranian rhetoric and its alienation from what Foucault perceived as being a sign of richness and a representation of collective will, is the expression “Muslims”, which is used by the Iranian officials as a synonym for the word “crowds” that was adopted in totalitarian, nationalist and Stalinist regimes. Whoever reads the Iranian statements can note the great contradiction affecting the behavior of the concerned “Muslims,” between one speech and another, and one occasion and another. Indeed, the “Muslims” are toppling the pro-American (anti-Iranian) oppressive regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, but are absent from the protests staged against the Syrian regime which is more oppressive than the aforementioned (but is Iran's friend). Also according to the Iranian definition, the “Muslims” are playing a dubious role in Libya where they are allying with NATO against Muammar Gaddafi's regime, although this did not prevent Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi from heading to Benghazi to meet with “NATO's revolutionaries,” according to the descriptions given to those opposed to Gaddafi by certain Arab writers. Another level of confusion is then reached by the “Muslims,” when Iranian Chief of Staff General Hassan Firouzabadi announces that the “Muslims will all rise” and that the United States and the Zionist entity will vanish in case the Syrian regime were to collapse. One would not need a great degree of logic to conclude that America's and Israel's demise is much more important – on the scale of the anti-imperialistic and anti-Zionist tasks – than the sustainment of the Syrian regime. And if the fall of the latter regime can lead to such demise, then the “Muslims” must let President Bashar al-Assad's regime crumble in order to reach the higher goal, i.e. defeat the United States and its Israeli protégée. On the other hand, the Iranian commander did not clarify the reasons why the “Muslims” had been showing self-restraint throughout the past years, thus abstaining from rushing to annihilate the enemies prior to the Syrian regime's collapse. It is known that logic is not a must in the Iranian and Arab statements of threat. But the “Muslims” – whose identities and actions are determined by Tehran and its army officers and guards – seem lost between the support of certain regimes here, the rise against others there and the visits to NATO's agents from time to time.
