The oppositionists calling for dissolving the Tunisian cabinet and replacing it with a technocratic one are failing to admit that they are mainly targeting the performance of An-Nahda government; and that the heated confrontation aims at preventing the Islamists from monopolizing power. In fact, although the troika formula did reflect a temporary coexistence, this quickly ended up being shredded to pieces. The An-Nahda movement is failing to admit that losing partially in the face of the flared-up Street is better than losing all positions. The partial loss might either lead to a setback or to a realization, depending on how the still-burgeoning power struggle will be run. However, just like the Jasmine revolution spread to the neighboring countries, the Egyptian situation might spread at an even faster pace, especially that the Street there is still in a state of boiling. In addition, the outcomes of the Spring movements – at least when it comes to the demolition of several old regimes – have proven that everything is possible, in an era when the both conflicts and agreements are concluded in the Street. The earthquake that hit the Tunisian An-Nahda preceded the state of anger that exploded against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the deposed President Mohammad Morsi. Following the fuss that was raised around the situation of former Prime Minister Hamed al-Jabali – who seemingly predicted the direction of the wind – it clearly appeared that the Islamists' experience in power lacks something deeper than the mere replacement of some people. Some ideas and concepts are sometimes acceptable during the opposition phase with the aim of obtaining the people's support. However, such ideas cannot prevail, especially when they are used to divide the communities according to the laws of Islamization and perversion. This is even more relevant in Tunisia, a country with a massive history of openness that cannot be easily uprooted. Indeed, the founding leader, Habib Bourguiba, had planted major principles of openness, although he failed to complete his work on the political and economic level, all the way to building a modern state. Yet, when the Islamists accessed power in Egypt and Tunisia, they failed to use this opportunity to show more tolerance and moderation. Instead, some radical Islamic movements emerged, which increased the fears that their experience in power would not actually serve to eradicate radicalism and exaggeration. The Islamic movements failed to navigate towards the shores of moderation and to attract other movements along. This was perhaps one of the reasons that led to increasing the fears and complicating the already complicated classifications. However, showing opposition to the Islamic experiences in power was based on a religious rather than a political aspect. One cannot possibly accept people's rebellions against the ousted regimes and reject their present uprising against the spring governments. There are valid reasons that pushed the Street to confront the new regimes, which failed at a record time. Indeed, the wall of fear, which was brought down by millions of protestors, cannot be possibly rebuilt, because history cannot proceed backwards. The lack of a vision prevailed following the popular revolutions. as the new rulers underestimated the new awareness brought by the Arab spring. The Tunisian Islamists do not wish to repeat the Egyptian scenario. They must be wishing to benefit from the Egyptian mistakes, especially that the nature of the alliances between the troika constituents prevents them from monopolizing power. Furthermore, the fact that the oldest unionist organization, the Tunisian General Labor Union, joined the negotiations allowed for overcoming the suffocating void. The problem with the MB's experience is that they revoked the possibility of openness to any political or unionist organization. This means that the presence of several political groups and organizations, even when differences exist between them, helps to create a link between the channels of communication. The best proof to that consists of the Libyan experience, which rose in the total absence of political groups and thus any kind of dialogue. Nevertheless, the Libyan example is rich with controversies. Indeed, armed groups seized control of the oil sources and established prisons and tribunals outside the surveillance of the state, which is incapable of imposing security and the rule of law. The Egyptian people rebelled on June 30 because a coup had been staged against the January 25 revolution. The same goes for Tunisia, with the difference that An-Nahda leaders showed a greater deal of understanding in the face of the opposition. An-Nahda could benefit from this understanding, provided that it is authentic, rather than being a mere show to gain time, although those who used to be in control are not likely to be on the winning end.
