Ali Saleh steps down, or steps down not, and additional killing is seen in Yemen. Dialogue in Syria is growing closer, but what dialogue and reform are possible in light of the guillotine of blood? In Tunis, among other capitals of the Arab spring, the natural antipode of exclusion and tyranny – which the Arab spring aimed at toppling – is dialogue, participation and justice. And because Tunisia was the first to trigger the revolution, it is now facing the crucial test following the first elections of this spring. Indeed, it is no longer valid to use the pretext of the remnants of a deposed regime or fear over the intentions of the Islamists, in order to elude the burden of participation in the establishment of the civil state institutions for a normal society. Following the polls to choose the members of the Constituent Assembly which will draw up the new constitution, Ennahda Party that ranked first appeared to be reassured about its leader Rached Ghannouchi's crossing of the road toward a Tunisian “Erdoganism” (in reference to Erdogan). This would mean rationality in the openness shown vis-à-vis the reality in the country and the fact that wide factions among the youth - who etched the path of the revolution - reject stringency at the level of understanding and implementing the doctrine. Ghannouchi sent messages of reassurance regarding the intentions of Ennahda's Islamists, namely the upholding of women's rights and the non-imposition of restraints on a tourism sector that is widely contributing to Tunisia's revenues. He then gave yet another example showing his respect of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (that is headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan). He thus encouraged the stock markets to “diversify the economy,” at a time when he had extended his hand in favor of a coalition partnership to lead the second transitional phase. This completely contradicts the experience of Hamas's Islamists in the Gaza Strip, who used arms to impose their authority at a very hefty price. And while Tunisia's Ennahda leaders are still at the beginning of their power and political decision-making experience, they were chosen by the voters just like Hamas's leaders were via the ballot boxes. The party returned to the forefront of the events after the revolution and exile, while the movement jumped into the “unknown” following a coup. But what is certain – and definitely separates them – is Ghannouchi's realization of the message sent by the Tunisian voters who suffered throughout decades under a vicious security grip, with a “soft” touristic aspect wrapped up in secular facet. There is no absolute assignment to any party or movement in Tunisia, in order to prevent its cloning of a “modern” totalitarianism that would gradually gain control over the street and reenter the ditches of monopolization under the cover of the ballot boxes. The most eloquent expression of that reality was made by the leader of the Congress for the Republic, Moncef Marzouki, who conveyed his rejection of an “extremist secular state such as France and the extremist dictatorship of Iranian Islamism,” and his refusal to perceive Ennahda Party as being Tunisia's Taliban. Indeed, the test for all the parties – most of which were born out of the womb of the revolution – is the acceptance of participation, middle ground solutions and moderation at the level of the “victories'” demands. Consequently, in case Ennahda actually claims an absolute right over the monopolization of the legislations and the rule, or tampers with the elections to achieve that goal, a second revolution would be possible against the exclusion of the programs of other parties and societal factions that are opposed to Ghannouchi's aspirations. But the question on the other hand revolves around the legitimacy of the boycotting of any coalition he might head at the Constituent Assembly under the pretext of the rejection of his ideas, which would take everyone back to the dark square, i.e. to isolation, boycotting, accusations of betrayal and infidelity and division on the street that might cause the thwarting of the revolution. The leader of Ennahda is not opposed to the notion of democracy promoted by the West, which is supporting the Arabs' revolutions, and considers that his party - that won the majority - is entitled to form the government even if it “earned its share with a spirit of compromise and altruism” and allied with the Communists. There might be among the Tunisians and their newborn parties some who fearful about Rached Ghannouchi's aspirations to maybe head the “Second Republic.” But in any case, they are facing the dialectic of democratic voting, which we accept if it suits our desires and reject if it tilts in favor of the other side. Some among the children of the “Jasmine Revolution” probably perceive Ennahda's eagerness to form the government as being indicative of the Islamists' intentions and true aspirations, despite their docile resorting to the elections. Moreover, among the Egyptians who are also about to engage in the electoral process, many are still questioning the Muslim Brotherhood's intentions although the latter relinquished the religious slogans. The same dialectic will thus be revived in case they win an exceptional share of the parliamentary cake. But what is more important than the rise of “Erdoganism” in the region is the fact that Washington rushed – early on – to announce its willingness to deal with Islamic governments and establish partnerships with them, while Paris refused to “demonize” these government. The Arabs' spring, summer and autumn are still at the beginning, and the test of partnership in power will be a difficult one whose road is definitely not paved with jasmines.
