Wednesday was a long, bloody day. Every person who loves Egypt wished it could have been avoided. But every observer closely following developments had felt that such a day was drawing closer. When doors are completely shut, some are tempted to just break them. It was difficult for the current administration in Egypt to accept to coexist with two authorities on Egyptian territory, one in the palace and one in Rabaa al-Adawiya. It was difficult for the administration to accept a reality that suggests "two legitimacies" were facing off against one another. The continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood-led sit-in was nothing if not a daily challenge to the prestige of the ruling administration, especially after winning the broad mandate the latter had sought. On the other hand, it was not easy for the Muslim Brotherhood to accept that Morsi's term was just an old page that has been turned. The defeat was more than the Brotherhood could bear. It was thus that it acted with a mixture of bitterness and anger. It acted as though Morsi had indeed fallen because tanks stormed the palace. It did not try to understand that Morsi fell under pressure from what was half a coup and half a revolution. It refused to heed the millions who flocked to give their mandate. The Brotherhood only saw that day the picture of Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Muslim Brotherhood did not heed the fact that a decision to break up the sit-in was implicitly contained in the mandate. The Islamist group acted with the logic of insisting on breaking the will of those who were given a mandate, and those who gave them the mandate, namely, the military and the millions of protesters. The Muslim Brotherhood dealt with local and foreign mediation efforts with the logic of maximum demands. It did not accept less than Morsi's reinstatement, that is, a full defeat for its opponents. This is the behavior of the wounded person whose wound overwhelms them and prevents them from coming up with solutions that allay their pains and the risks of its gambles. The Brotherhood had the ability to embarrass its opponents, if it had taken advantage of the mediations to develop a proposal for a way out that would make it difficult for the current administration to resolve to clear the protest camps. It wagered that the high cost of breaking up the sit-in would prevent the current administration from going though with it. The Muslim Brotherhood took a risk when it insisted on retaking the palace, leaving the administration no choice but to risk an attempt to uproot the protest camps. It missed the fact that it has clashed with a majority of Egyptians before clashing with the police and the army. The Brotherhood did not pay attention to the fact that Sisi would not have risked going directly to the people to request a mandate, were it not for the fact that he and his institution felt that the majority of Egyptians were afraid of the Brotherhood's rule, to the extent of accepting any formula for ending it even if that included terminating the term of an elected president. The Brotherhood did not heed the voices that rose over months, warning against exclusivity, enablement, and the imposition of Brotherhood ideology, while altering the features of the Egyptian character and spirit. Anyone who has been following Egyptian developments since the last days of Hosni Mubarak in power realizes that the Brotherhood's gambles did not start during Morsi's tenure. The first gamble was deciding to run a Muslim Brotherhood candidate in the presidential election, without paying attention to the fact that such a transformation was more than Egypt could bear, because of the actual size of the factions, the actual roles in making the revolution, and because of the deep roots of the military institution and Egypt's commitments resulting from its position and its economic conditions. The risky approach of the Brotherhood went even further, when the Islamist group chose to carry alone, with the government of Hesham Qandil, the burdens of an extremely difficult transitional phase. Morsi did not find real partners, and the Brotherhood did not help him find them. He appeared like someone dancing alone, gambling in the way he dealt with issues from the constitution to the judiciary and the relationship with the military establishment. This risk approach was also marked by a lack of direction, poor performance, absence of a vision, and competent cadres. In politics, a group or an individual does not have the right to gamble to the extent of pushing people to suicide and the country to its death. In politics, losses must be managed when winning is not possible. True, victimhood may be profitable, and the number of martyrs and funerals may spare one until further notice from being asked about risks and responsibilities. But it is also true that the Brotherhood had clashed with the sentiments of millions of people before it clashed with the police and its bullets. The most dangerous thing Egypt can see is if the Brotherhood acts with the logic of "it's too late," in the sense that they have no other choice but total confrontation and unrest, and being implicated in fires and other practices from the handbook of civil wars. In addition, the Brotherhood may choose to overly rely on U.S. and Western condemnations for the manner in which their sit-in was broken up. On the other hand, despite inflamed sentiments, the current administration must not act with triumphalist arrogance, or the logic of "it's too late," meaning there is nothing but the policy of force left. The mandate that allowed the current administration to uproot the protest camps, included above all the demand for a constitution that accommodates all Egyptians, and a return to the ballot boxes so that the Egyptians can choose in free elections that exclude no one which party and which Egypt they want. We must not surrender to the logic of "it's too late," and the priority today is for preventing civil war and the Algerian scenario.
