It is the right of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi to say that he is the first democratically elected civilian president in Egypt, and that he had entered the presidential palace by a mandate from the voters, and not on top of a tank. He can say that the opposition leaders, with the exception of his opponent Ahmed Shafik, recognized his legitimacy and the fact that the elections were free and fair. Indeed, Mohamed ElBaradei, Amr Moussa, and Hamdeen Sabahi all visited him at the Ittihadiya Palace, and the whole world recognized his legitimacy and received him as president. It is also Morsi's right to say that the Egyptians gave him a mandate for a full term, and that it is not right that his tenure should be shortened under pressure from the street. It is his right to say all this, yet it is his duty to check his watch. Morsi can say that he is not an isolated president, and that the group to which he belongs is deeply rooted in Egyptian society, and, therefore, the Islamists would not allow the first Islamist president of Egypt to be deposed. Morsi can say that he is able to organize million-strong pro-regime protests to counter the opposition ones, and that he can task the members of the Muslim Brotherhood to protect his palace if the army should hesitate to do so. Yet, it is his duty to check his watch. On the other hand, the president cannot accuse those who gathered yesterday in the squares and outside his palace of being mere holdovers of the previous regime, or thugs nostalgic to the bygone era. This ploy is old and has been overused ad nauseam. Morsi cannot say either that the millions who signed the Tamarrod petition are liberals who are complicit in a Zionist-American plot to thwart the renaissance project Morsi brought with him to the palace. He cannot deny that the first year of his term was marked by terrible unrest and deep divisions in the street, and that it has disappointed those who voted for him, from outside his Islamist group, for the sole reason that Shafik's victory would have reproduced the former regime. The president cannot deny what the numbers say about the economic collapse, soaring unemployment, poverty, and the deterioration in services and the security. He cannot deny either that there is a growing belief that the first year of the Muslim Brotherhood's tenure in power exposed its lack of experience and qualified leaders able to administer the state with the logic of the state. Two weeks ago, my journalistic curiosity prompted me to visit Egypt. I did not want to write about the major battle there from afar. Indeed, this battle concerns the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and everywhere, and political Islam as well as the outcome of the ‘Arab Spring.' I met leaders from the opposition and the Brotherhood. I also met with journalists and ordinary citizens who had falsely believed that the revolution would open the doors of hope, make bread less inaccessible, and restore Egypt's longstanding identity, spirit, and role. On the eve of my departure from Cairo, I became greatly fearful for the days that lay ahead. I felt that millions of Egyptians are living in deep and unprecedented fear and anxiety, as well as rage that needed to be expressed. Some are concerned that Egypt may go bankrupt, others are afraid of efforts to tamper with Egypt's spirit. More still say that the Brotherhood's regime is ‘Mubarak's regime with an Islamist makeover,' while some are convinced the state is being eroded, and that the attempts to impose the Brotherhood's ideology has led to battles in the street, "to take back the revolution from those who hijacked it." Some are even saying that the army must take action before the ‘volcano' erupts. I also felt that Hosni Mubarak had surprised the Egyptians with his rapid departure, and that the political factions had not expected or prepared for that. I felt that the military council acted like someone turning over hot coals in his hands wanting to get rid of them, and that it was for this reason that the council rushed and made mistakes. But I also realized that the Muslim Brotherhood, by running in the presidential elections, made a huge gamble, and not a ‘huge sacrifice.' I also understood that the triumph of those who wanted to pounce on the feast took place through a handful of votes, but it is clear today that this move only led to the Muslim Brotherhood risking their entire legacy as well as Egypt itself. Mursi misread the messages of the revolution, and the limits of his mandate. Mistakes then accumulated because of the manner he dealt with the constitution, the judiciary, and the affairs of the state, and even Egypt's spirit and the components of its identity. This accumulation of mistakes rekindled the revolution, but rivers of hot lava mean a volcano is erupting. It is difficult to expect the Muslim Brotherhood caving in to Tamarrod's protests. But certainly, Morsi's occupancy of the palace will be cumbersome to both the Brotherhood and the country, because there is nothing worse than living at the edge of a volcano.
