If the Americans know that Vladimir Putin has for years been building his popularity on the Russian interior scene by presenting himself as opposed to the policies of the United States in the world, why then would they grant him a badge of honor by cancelling a proposed summit between him and Barack Obama, who described him on the personal level in terms that will only help reinforce the impression the Russian President gives his country's citizens of himself? Yet it seems that Obama is purposely severing ties with his counterpart in the Kremlin because of a series of challenges he is trying to elude, most prominently that of the situation in Syria. And he has found no better pretext than the issue of IT expert Edward Snowden, although the Americans have never extradited any suspect to Russia, neither during nor after the Cold War. Meanwhile, Arab concern for the ongoing hemorrhage in Syria is growing, in view of its tragic nature, which has exceeded all bounds, and of increasing indications of it spreading towards other countries, such as Iraq and Lebanon, and perhaps Jordan as well. The Arabs are thus in a hurry for it to stop, while the Americans seem unconcerned with the atrocities being committed and the dangerous sectarian direction taken by the conflict. This is as long as all those fighting are "enemies" – starting from the Syrian regime and its Iranian backers, to extremist Islamists and all other opposition groups of diverse loyalties – of which the US is monitoring the alliances because it does not trust in their ultimate loyalty. This is as long as the Americans share with their ally Israel the benefits of prolonging the conflict, after it had pressured them – and continues to – in order to prevent it from ending decisively. Indeed, by calling off a long-awaited opportunity to potentially reach a middle-of-the-road solution with Moscow, which clings to Assad remaining in power until the end of his term while generously supplying him with weapons as well as funds, Washington is only consecrating a status quo that puts no one at ease but itself and Tel Aviv. It thus expects the war to last for years, thereby excluding the possibility of holding the Geneva 2 conference, about the clinical death of which "medical reports" are issued every now and then, and freeing itself of the burden of negotiating with Putin and pressuring him, because it will be forced to accommodate him on other issues – issues that it might not have decisive answers to. As for the repeated and tiresome talk of the US administration's desire to hold such a conference, it no longer convinces anyone, after it has become apparent that its purpose was simply to cover for the decision not to get implicated and to merely observe developments and their repercussions, and even to neglect to take measures to provide humanitarian relief. Indirectly, Iran meets with the (originally Israeli and by proxy American) desire to prolong the civil war in Syria. Thus, the intervention of the Revolutionary Guard and of Hezbollah in battles there is aimed not just at defending the Assad regime, but also at anticipating any potential concessions by Russia and cancelling their effects. Indeed, Tehran seeks to assert by its involvement that the fall of Assad would not end the war, and that the fight would continue with or without him "in defense of the Shiite community" in Syria and Lebanon, in an effort to impose itself as a major party to any solution. Perhaps the fact that Bashar Al-Assad understands and is convinced that the international pressure being put on him is not serious feeds the obstinacy that dominates his stances and increases with time. Indeed, he does not neglect to assert that the solution to the crisis raging in his country can only be found on the battlefield, reducing the Syrian people's options to a choice between black and white. Thus, if they do not stand with the regime, they deserve to be killed, as long as no one is asking questions.