Michel Kilo, in an article titled ‘Deadly Chaos' (Al-Safir, May 18), mourned the Syrian revolution. Yet even the word ‘mourn' is not fully consistent with the content of his article, because mourning always carries connotations of praise and regret, and prayers for mercy for the deceased. Instead, he spared no bad quality to attribute it to the political and military leaders of the ‘revolution', some of whom apparently “carry an exceptional amount of selfishness and ignorance." In addition to that, Kilo accused those leaders of “sitting on their chairs to manage organized killings in an unreserved manner." Kilo wrote that “the heads are corrupt, and their corruption has played a dangerous role in corrupting the body." He then asked, “What legitimacy has a coalition left, when its members betray Sheikh Moaz al-Khatib? Or when its secretary general and the revolutionary, whose name I can no longer remember, have an exchange at an official meeting in which the former tells the latter ‘Shut up or I will expose you, and expose your corruption, bribery, and the reality of your positions,' to which the latter replies: ‘And if you don't shut up then I will expose your secrets and connections.'" Kilo finds it surprising that these accusations pass without anyone asking for an inquiry into the matter, and wonders, “Isn't this the ultimate corruption?" If someone from outside the opposition wrote what Kilo wrote, he or she would have been immediately accused of being an agent of the Syrian regime, or part of a fifth column tasked with undercutting the work of the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and its revolutionary purity. But the writer has been known for his opposition to the regime both before and after the crisis, and is a major figure in the Damascus Spring, so what he wrote is supposed to be emanating from his concern for the opposition. No one denies that the Syrian opposition receives great support, both armed and political. For instance, the British paper The Financial Times mentioned that a certain state alone has granted up to $3 billion to the opposition in the past two years. But for important members of the opposition to exchange accusations of corruption and treason, and threats to expose one another, with no measures taken for accountability or even to protest, aside from Kilo's article, then this is a matter that should be thoroughly considered. Indeed, the Syrian people, who rose against corruption and nepotism, are paying the price in blood twice, one in the face of the regime's tyranny, and another because of the opposition's recklessness. Nothing spoils a revolution of the poor like money. Nothing derails it from its goals like subservience to its backers, especially if those pursue multiple policies, and if the leaders of the revolution have no clear program on the basis of which they receive support. Such a program must cover all facets of life, from the economy to politics, and from the form of the regime and internal and foreign relations, to the attitude on the backing countries and others. Perhaps the Palestinian and Lebanese experience in the 1970s and 1980s are the best example of this (e.g. Abu Nidal and his relationship with Iraq, and Carlos and his relationship with Gaddafi). The former Iraqi opposition, which holds power in Baghdad today, is also another example. In truth, the SNC is an alliance of many parties and political figures, including some that emerged during the uprising, and others who have a long history in political action such as the Muslim Brotherhood. It is therefore only natural for each faction to have its own political ambitions. However, the issue is about how they can join their efforts together to achieve these aspirations and agree to a unified plan. Initially, the Syrian National Council, after it was established in Istanbul, called for a joint Arab-NATO military intervention, similar to what happened in Libya, and continued to make this demand for more than a year. When the Council saw that meeting its demands was almost impossible, and when the United States declared that the Council had “expired," as suggested by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Council bowed down and joined the SNC. After that, it changed its plan to calling for a buffer zone under the control of an interim government in the ‘liberated territories,' which would act as a staging ground to ‘liberate' the remainder of Syria and ‘expel the Assad family from the country.' When that too became impossible, because of US and European positions and because of Turkish concerns, this goal was substituted with the call for military aid that can help the militants fight the regular army, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and long-range artillery. This demand is still in place, but it faces many difficulties, most importantly the need to unify the political and armed wings of the opposition, and purge ‘extremists' from their ranks. The SNC also retracted its objection to the US designation of al-Nusra Front as a terror group, and there are many indications that it has now abandoned calling for Assad's departure as a pre-condition for attending the Geneva II conference. The Syrian opposition's backpedalling from its strict positions reflects similar attitudes by the countries that back it, and also its weakness and lack of a clear vision. Michel Kilo's mourning of the SNC may be premature, but what is certain is that the opposition grouping is undergoing many shifts to comply with the demands of ‘friendly countries.' Whoever wants to know the stance of the Syrian opposition must therefore consult its backers – and not George Sabra, Haitham al-Maleh, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Ghassan Hitto.
