The Anadolu news agency reported that Syrian opposition member Michel Kilo met in Antakya with “Christian forces that have come from the interior and from abroad" to form a group dubbed “Christian Syrians for Justice and Freedom". The task of the group is to “bridge the gap between Christians who still support the regime and the Revolution". Kilo asserted that the new faction stands “with the wagers of the true Revolution, and against chaos and the Islamist option". In other words, it is a Christian formation in the face of Islamist formations. He also considered the Christians who support the regime to be “either Shabiha (paid thugs) or being misled by the Church". It is clear from Kilo's statement that he has joined the “Revolution" in the name of a Syrian community that has been known for its secularism and moderation. And in order for him to have value and a position in the leadership, it was imperative for him to come attached to a tribe or a confession, so that he may enter the “wagers" as a leader. Such a process of affiliation confirms the nature of the “Revolution", as represented by the National Coalition. It is a coalition formed of sects, confessions and ethnic groups, each with its own program and its own view of the identity of the “new" Syria. It includes the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafists, the clans and the Kurds, as well as a Christian (George Sabra), whom Kilo does not consider representative of this community – or else he would not have competed against him for leadership. It also includes “independents" such as Burhan Ghalioun, Bassma Kodmani and other founding members of the Syrian National Council (SNC) imposed by foreign powers, which they represent much more than they do the interior. In other words, Kilo has joined the “wager" in order to reserve for himself, in the name of the Christians, a place in the regime sought-after, before it is too late – i.e. before the constituents of the “coalition" divide up the shares and leave him out of the game. Indeed, in the new “regime", there is no such thing as an individual citizen affiliated to the state as such, since rights are distributed among sects, confessions and clans. Is this the identity of the awaited Syria? Will it resemble Iraq? Will it be like Lebanon? The experience of Iraq has taught us that the opposition “coalition" there before the fall of the regime had been similar to the Syrian coalition in terms of its diversity and constituents. And after the invasion, the country's Arab identity was removed from the constitution. In Lebanon, on the other hand, many civil wars were fought, starting from 1958, until its “constituents" were forced to agree that the country had “an Arab character" – and these “constituents" have not stopped quarreling since independence and to this day. It is no coincidence for the Syrian opposition not to address this important issue in any of its literature, nor in any of its programs and in its vision for the future, knowing that one of the priorities of the Revolution, indeed of any revolution in the world, is to set goals on the basis of the identity of the state it seeks to establish, so that it may define its view of the conflict in and over the region. Indeed, Syria cannot, being at the heart of the conflict, be neutral or be neutralized, which is exactly what many countries are seeking after, following the systematic destruction of the country's entire infrastructure and of its society, and after the “constituents" of the opposition have sided with this or that side. In addition to this, it is not sufficient to say that “the Revolution" seeks to overthrow dictatorship and establish democracy. Indeed, such general principles had previously been adopted by the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt, and as soon as the Islamists came to power, they began “Brotherhoodizing" all state institutions and excluding all those who disagree with them from among those who had participated with them in the revolutions, to thus establish a new holy dictatorship, in which fatwas are issued calling for those who criticize it to be killed, and for taking revenge on the books and statues of any deceased thinkers who represent a threat to the direction it is taking (an instance of this being the destruction of the statue of Taha Hussein). It had not been expected of Michel Kilo to join the “wager on the Revolution" in the name of the Christians, having been known to be a secularist liberal militant. Has the “revolution" managed to change him, as it did Marxists, Leftists and Nationalists before him, who returned repentant to “primitive communalism" – tribes and clans fighting over “sources of wealth"?
