In a country the size of Egypt, and regardless of the Revolution's repercussions and ensuing events at various levels, the relationship between the army and the institution of the presidency will remain in jeopardy – along with the forces with influence in and on it, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and other Islamists loyal to the presidency. Both sides sometimes seek to lighten the mood, promote their “sweet" relationship, and display their keenness on avoiding a public clash between them. Nonetheless, the nature of the circumstances imposed by developments and ambitions among parties, groups, individuals, prominent figures, forces, fronts, coalitions, families, interests, benefits, alliances and affiliations, makes of the stances taken on every influential event by the presidency and by the army the object of close examination and analysis, in order to determine the extent of differences and agreements between them, and the effect of every dispute or agreement on the shape and content of their relationship in the future. There is a blatant contradiction in the convictions of some Egyptians with regard to the army's stance on the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as to the direction taken by the latter with regard to the army, especially since those who hold either of the two views always have what they believe to confirm their convictions and leave no space for doubt. Thus, there are those who believe that the Military Council under Field Marshal Tantawi “sold the country to the Brotherhood", and promote the notion of a deal between the two sides having taken place to prepare the former's exit, by virtue of which the army would preserve its gains and privileges in exchange for the Brotherhood leaping to power. In their view, no clash could take place between the two sides, as long as they both keep to the rules of the game without any of them changing these rules or striking a “blow" at the deal made between them unilaterally. Within such a framework, there are dozens of details, facts, records, memories, fatwas and “phone calls", facing dozens of others that support a different belief – namely that the Muslim Brotherhood set a trap for the Military Council and other active elements in the Revolution, and constantly drew the army, from the moment Mubarak stepped down, into confrontations in the street that harmed its reputation and caused discord between it and the people. It was helped in this by the mistakes of some of the revolutionaries sometimes (one of them voiced support yesterday for the kidnapping of soldiers in the Sinai!!) and the keenness of secular forces on revolutionary demands that would have been difficult for the army to meet, in view of its leaders' lack of experience in political work, or the careful considerations that preceded every step they took, or even the great care they took not to “torment" Mubarak, his family, and the major figures of his regime. Those who hold this view now speak of information being covered up about certain roles having been played by the Muslim Brotherhood before and during the Revolution. Had it been revealed back then, such information would have made people aware that they were being used to achieve the goals of the Brotherhood rather than true revolutionary demands, or, in other words, that they had been played not players!! And amid all of these interactions, every now and then, and with every crisis, as a result of the mistakes of those in power, voices rise demanding that the army intervene. Thus the spotlight on the relationship between the army and the presidency grows more intense. This is in spite of the responses of Defense Minister Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi and of other leaders asserting the army's commitment to legitimacy despite its loyalty to the people, as well as the statements made by President Morsi when surrounded by army leaders, or at any other gathering, stressing the strength of relations with the armed forces, his opposition to smearing the army and the “depth" of the connection between those in power and the leaders and members of the army. Yet none of this can conceal the state of anticipation, or say watchfulness, over how patient each side will be with the behavior of the other!! Today, there is the issue of the soldiers kidnapped in the Sinai, and of the army's position on this, especially after the statement of the presidency, in which the President seemed as concerned for the safety of those kidnapped as for that of the kidnappers (!!), as well as the unprecedented measure of calling for national dialogue to discuss the issue of kidnapped soldiers (?!). As for the case of the “martyred soldiers" during Ramadan, it remains open. And between the two events, there are dozens of items, incidents and events that make believing the refrain of the army and the government being “hand in hand" a doubtful matter. Or perhaps it is this way, but only in pictures and in front of spotlights and cameras. On the whole, the different point of views and opinions on the nature and the future of the relationship between the army and the presidency may diverge on a few details, but most agree that the army will not turn against those in power as long as the crises remain at a level that does not threaten the integrity of the state, and yet that the army will not protect the institution of the presidency and will not turn into an instrument held by it if the people – or let us say the majority – were to decide to dispense with its services.
