So far, the attempts by secular forces to agree on a unified coalition that rivals the Islamist groups in the forthcoming parliamentary elections have not been met with any success. Yet despite the fact that the revolutionary secular factions have failed to reach an agreement, they are still calling on their main rival (the Islamist groups) to share power, and even denounce the monopoly by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists over the affairs of the country, without seeking their counsel. The fact that the military council has left the political scene in Egypt as an influential actor has not caused a crisis to the army itself. On the contrary, this gave the army the chance to restore its prestige and respect among the people, and deal with its wounds away from the spotlight, the media and the watchful eyes of other rival factions in the political game. And because the exit of Field Marshal Tantawi and his deputy, chief of staff Sami Annan, was flawless, and because the military council was dismantled without clashes, the privileges of the military, including those of its commanders, officers and soldiers, were not touched. They were even rewarded with additional benefits, in light of their keenness on safeguarding the law and accepting for their leaders to be replaced in the manner that happened. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they were the party that had most to gain from the political exclusion of the army, being themselves behind the measure when President Mohammed Mursi ventured to impeach the Field Marshal and the chief of staff, and won the bet when they left without resistance or a reaction that could have dragged the country into a conflict that goes beyond politics and costs lives. The Muslim Brotherhood itself was the closest political group to the military council, for a whole year after the Egyptian revolution. So much so, that they were sometimes accused of loyalty to the military at the expense of the revolution, or benefiting from the armed forces at the expense of the revolutionaries. This situation continued until the positions, or interests, of the Muslim Brotherhood conflicted with the attitudes of the military and its actions, which lasted for a while until Tantawi and Annan were dismissed. President Morsi and his powerful group will face crises of a different kind, this time related to the challenge of improving the economy, the level of freedoms, and tackling unemployment, while creating a climate that is conducive to investment, in addition to other issues affecting the Egyptian people that the latter want to see resolved. The army will be supportive of the president's plans and positions, but the military will not return to playing a political role unless the equation changes – but it does not seem that it will in the foreseeable future. What matters is that the Egyptian political scene currently reflects the crisis experienced by the secular revolutionary forces, not only because it has been difficult for them to unite in the face of the unified Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists), but also because the most prominent element in it is the absence of the military from the scene. To be sure, these forces, ever since Mubarak stepped down and his regime crumbled, were in a state of constant animosity with the military council. But now, they appear as though they have lost their adversary which had helped unite them inasmuch as it had besieged them, and had helped make their activists famous and popular among many segments, inasmuch as it had targeted them. Now, the secular revolutionary factions seem unable to confront the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, using the same methods they had pursued in their confrontation with the military for over a year. This is simply because the Muslim Brotherhood has not made the same mistakes that the army did, and has not gone into uncalculated adventures, like the military council did, or become involved in unwise confrontations in the street, such as the ones between the revolutionary forces and the army in Mohammed Mahmoud Street, in front of the cabinet headquarters or at the Maspero Building. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood has significant popularity in the street, which allows them to mobilize their members and supporters quickly, to take to the street with full conviction to support the president and his decisions. This is an advantage not enjoyed by the military council, whose supporters were always from the “couch party", or those who sat at their homes dreaming of stability. The absence of the military council from the scene left a vacuum that the secular revolutionary forces are yet to fill, a vacuum that they failed to take advantage of even though they had for long demanded that the military step down - but when it finally did, this created a crisis for them. By contrast, the Islamists sought to fill this vacuum, even if there have been criticisms of their conduct or choices, but at least they are exercising power, while the secular forces are so far unable to unite or convince the Islamists to share power. But what is even more intriguing is that these forces are also unable to exercise... their role in the opposition.
