The international envoy to the Sahara, Christopher Ross, launched his mission in light of the relevant Security Council resolutions. He ended up seeking a regional mediation mainly between Morocco and Algeria. For the first time ever, the UN's Secretary General announced that a regional solution for the Sahara conflict is a must and that there is a need to contain the repercussions of the security threats in the Sahel and to activate the Maghreb Union, as this will allow for responding to the challenges. This approach represents a positive development in dealing with the ongoing conflict. By admitting that the mission of his envoy is to encourage Morocco and Algeria on the positive normalization of their relations; by announcing a new strategy that takes into account the events in the Sahel; and by insisting on the Maghreb fusion, Ban Ki-moon is doing nothing but diagnosing the present situation – especially that no progress has been achieved despite all the efforts. This called for modifying the methodology of managing the sensitive Sahara file. Ban Ki-moon did not limit himself to making suggestions, as he also proposed a practical vision based on the different available opportunities for the enhancement of the Maghreb structure. At the beginning of his mission, Ross made a point to meet with the Secretary General of the Maghreb Union. This was an indicative sign that went unnoticed at the time. He then toured the neighboring European countries, mainly Spain and France, in order to explore the possibility of them supporting his new directions. It seems that Ross's return to the region will be different this time partly because the misunderstanding he had with Rabat is now history and also because the development of the situation in the Sahel affected the conflict in the Sahara, thus preventing the opening of new fronts in the agenda of the consolidation of the regional stability. The features of the UN's new directions are based on international resolutions that brought forth a “political solution." Indeed, these resolutions allowed the concerned parties to initiate the rapprochement by agreeing on a fair, constant, and acceptable agreement. At the same time, the resolutions tried to obtain a Maghreb support for this vision with the most tangible effect being the détente in the relations between Morocco and Algeria. The direct and unofficial negotiations used to include the two directly concerned parties, Morocco and the Polisario Front, in addition to the two moderating parties, Algeria and Mauritania. Now however, all the countries of the Maghreb structure are involved since they are encouraged to proceed with the negotiations based on a consensual, selective background. Interestingly, Ban openly announced that the issue of the Sahara is being dealt with in the framework of a wider strategy for the Sahel region and that the problem consists of a conflict that “is of interest for North Africa" and not just to the traditional concerned parties regardless of their different interpretations. This openness is not only linked to the growing security threats but also to the available opportunities to the North African countries to achieve a better economic fusion and a more global political coordination. There is a transformation in the dealing with the issue of the Sahara. The new strategic approach with the Maghreb, European, and African dimensions has exceeded the traditional approach from the point of view of speed and importance – especially that the UN efforts have so far failed to reach an agreement around an acceptable political solution. The strategic dimensions are certainly stronger in the face of any tendencies. On a positive note, just like the Maghreb structure exceeded the regional dimensions, the Sahara conflict has now imposed itself. This explains why the UN has moved from simply sponsoring a solution to mediating it.
