The losers in sport competitions often accuse the referee of being biased towards their opponents. Yet UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's situation in dealing with the Western Sahara issue exceeds his responsibility as an arbiter, as he must monitor the conduct of competitors even outside of the stadium. Evidence of this is the fact that his Personal Envoy Christopher Ross, upon examining the difficulties hindering direct negotiations, called for informal talks, which would be tantamount to playing outside the limits of a formal match. Perhaps he, like Ban Ki-moon, will need a greater extent of psychological and physical training to carry on with matches of unsportsmanlike violent competitions. Between the stance taken by Rabat, which tends to be more relaxed, and the Polisario showing increased irritation with regard to the Secretary-General's latest report, lies yet another divergence further deepening the chasm. Indeed, Ban Ki-moon has acknowledged the predicament reflected by the two parties clinging to their stances, yet his being accused of bias by the Polisario adds bricks and stones to the wall of existing disputes. More than once in the past the parties concerned have directed acute criticism at the international mediators who have tried to deal with the Western Sahara issue on numerous bases with political and legal backgrounds. Envoy Peter Van Walsum was not the first and last upon whom blows fell the day he acknowledged that the independence of the province was an “unrealistic” option. Similarly, mediator James Baker marked time between Morocco's approval and the anger of Algeria and the Polisario, then the relaxation of the latter two and Rabat's criticism, until he was finally forced to resign. Yet this is the first time in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations finds himself amidst a torrent of negative reactions. The origin of this may be that the period of time separating the issuing of his report and the UN Security Council agreeing over a new resolution has driven towards the exercise of some pressure, especially as past experiences have decisively shown that the Security Council often endorses the draft of the Secretary-General's recommendations, since the conflict falls under regional tensions which should be resolved consensually, and not by imposing solutions from above. And insofar as some of this criticism seems tantamount to warm-up exercises in preparation for future matches, the belief has become entrenched that the option of negotiations is facing real difficulties, not the least of which is the fact that the responsibilities of sponsoring it have become liable to be dismantled. This means that the predicament no longer applies only to conflicting stances, between Morocco's commitment to move forward with the negotiations on the basis of its plan of granting the province broadened autonomy and the Polisario making this contingent on returning to discuss the referendum option, but now also applies to the organizational framework of negotiations. Furthermore, it is unlikely for any progress to be achieved towards the settlement being negotiated in light of doubts continuing to be shed on the role of the body sponsoring these negotiations, be they formal or informal. When the Polisario wagered on the human rights card, which is of concern to a few activists in the province falling under Morocco's control, it had sought by this to expand the powers of the MINURSO (Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental) mission to include monitoring the human rights situation. The fact of the matter is that such a task remains the responsibility of the UN Commission in Geneva, aside from the fact that the mission's tasks, which are originally connected to consolidating the implementation of the ceasefire, are set by resolutions issued by the Security Council. What bothered the Polisario was that, instead of Ban Ki-moon's report including a recommendation to this effect, he frankly called for a census of the refugees of Sahrawi origins residing in the Tindouf camps. The logic of things entails that human rights cannot be fragmented by using double standards. And if Ban Ki-moon expresses his concern over the situation in the Western Sahara, he to the same extent calls for a population census on the other side. Indeed, one cannot speak of strictly a human rights situation without first knowing who the people included by such standards are, at least at the humanitarian level, at long as the big solution does not seem near. It is not in the Polisario's interest to lean towards isolation, as, within the political developments that led to the start of direct negotiation, it has become a partner in the solution, just as such developments shaped Christopher Ross's call on Algeria to cooperate with the United Nations in security-related and humanitarian issues to consecrate the regional dimension in resolving the Western Sahara conflict. There is no doubt that these developments will certainly lead to a settlement, provided “good intentions and political management” as specified by Ban Ki-moon. Yet the lesson that must be learned resides in the fact that it is impossible to go backwards. Indeed, the Western Sahara issue, after having been drawn into the framework of negotiations to which there is no alternative, is no longer the same as it was during the phases that preceded endorsing that option, the soundness of which is reinforced by the fact that it remains contingent on the consensual frame of reference and not on any other condition.
