Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi is still misinterpreting the assignment he was given. And through his issuance of the Constitutional Declaration in November, he proved that he and the group to which he belongs perceive the elections which led him to the presidency in a way limited to the "right to exercise tyranny," and not as an assignment linked to the conditions of the law and the constitution. A few days following the eruption of the massive demonstrations which drew the limits of the MB's influence, especially in Cairo and the major cities, Morsi was forced to back down in a humiliating way. And the ratification of the constitution in December made the picture even more complicated, as it was revealed that a large portion of the Egyptian people supported the MB policies. It seems that the new ruling party in Egypt is learning the hard way, through trial and error. So far, the mistakes seem to be much more numerous than the positive steps that could be attributed to it. Indeed, its objective and ideological motives placed Morsi's victory and the successful ratification of the constitution in the context of the support offered to the MB's political program, and not in a more modest context based on the absence of any real alternative and the opposition's lacking of wide popular support and of an understandable and acceptable program on the social and economic levels. Hence, it was no surprise that the victories achieved by the Freedom and Justice Party transformed in the minds of its leaders into a popular call for them to practice tyranny the old way, in parallel to the presence of a large and highly conservative and religious audience. On the other hand, and despite the catastrophic mistakes committed by the MB, the opposition has failed - since the referendum over the Constitutional Declaration in March 2011 - to achieve any victory in the ballot boxes. And whenever the Egyptians are summoned to cast their votes, they choose the side that is the object of the revolutionaries' hostility, which is a reality worth contemplating. Still, this did not affect what the revolutionaries perceive as being a strategic gain which was secured for them by the revolution, i.e. the right to stage disobedience. Indeed, the elections, their results and the revolutionaries' failure in them - regardless of the valid justifications and explanations surrounding the participation ratio - were not enough to convince the oppositionists and their solid bloc that they should not resort to the street to express their rejection of the policies adopted by Morsi, his government and his party, and should consequently recognize the outcome of the democratic process and accept what the largest active bloc among the Egyptians decided. In reality, the missing legitimacy of the existing authority and the opposition's insistence on direct action both stem from one root, i.e. the lack of a political or social contract. Clearly, based on the way the new constitution was passed, the MB opted for factional deals and settlements, thus ensuring the army's distancing from any control, after such control was an unwritten custom practiced since the days of President Gamal Abdul Nasser. In addition, they offered the Salafi movements some concessions in regards to social issues, and humored the prominent businessmen in marginalizing the social justice issues. It is no secret that constitutions are not drafted that way, even if they are ratified in referendums. Moreover, major charters convey the contract reached between the various sides and active forces in society. These gaps, that are growing wider and more dangerous, are the ones granting the revolutionary oppositionists the right to disobey, without enjoying the ability to introduce imminent drastic change at the level of the political scene, and without the ruling party expressing any wish to draw the necessary lessons from its shallow practicing of power.
