Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki could have done differently from, or the opposite of, what he did. He could have turned his presence at the head of the government into an Iraqi and regional sine qua non. It would have been sufficient for him to carefully analyze the losses suffered by the neighboring countries, and to come to the conclusion that the time was appropriate for Iraq to mend its internal composition and external role. He could have proceeded from the Iranian-American understanding over his person to render his role a new opportunity for his country, no matter how many tough or painful decisions this would have required. Iraq's neighbors suffered some major losses. Following the eruption of the Syrian uprising, the Iranian role in the region suffered a huge setback. Iran had no choice but to side with the Syrian regime. This attitude, however, certainly contrasts with the positions of the vast majority of the Arab and Islamic countries. The scenes of death and destruction in Syria have raised profound questions about the lexicon of Mumana'a, [the so-called pro-resistance policy of Syria and Iran], and its claims about defending the oppressed. Sunni-Shiite tensions worsened in the region, and turned into the equivalent of a barrier in the face of the Iranian role, meanwhile. One may say that the Turkish policy in the region was also hit by a huge setback, on account of what is happening in Syria. Assad's Syria was the gateway that Erdogan's Turkey used to cross into the Arab world before the eruption of the Arab spring, when Ankara rushed to book a seat in it. It is no secret that the policy of “zero problems" championed by Ahmed Davutoglu had to be retired early. The bitter conflict in Syria has led to the collapse of the Syrian player and his exit from the arena. The regime's control over its territories has shrunk, in tandem with its Arab, Islamic and international legitimacy. Having once been a player, Syria has now turned into a playfield. Maliki could have heeded this opportunity. He could have realized that he had to move quickly to achieve a historic compromise with his compatriots, and give some concessions from a position of strength. The goal would be to protect Iraq from the winds of disintegration blowing from Syria, and heading off the possibility of the Iraqi components turning into cards in the game of regional conflicts and bargains. He could have delivered on his promise to Barzani and provided a national umbrella for addressing the problem of Tareq al-Hashemi. The opportunity came but Maliki did not seize it. Seizing it would have been much more important than retaining some cabinet portfolios. A successful national reconciliation in Iraq would have sent out a message against the climate of Sunni-Shiite conflict in the region. It would have also provided an example that Lebanon failed to produce because it preferred the policy of digging trenches over the policy of outstretched hands. For this reason, Maliki is facing an unprecedented challenge: An uprising in the Sunni Arab provinces; deterioration in relations with the Kurds that portends dire consequences; and harsh remarks by Moqtada al-Sadr accusing Maliki of turning Iraq into a 'farce' and urging him to think about resigning before an “Iraqi spring" forces him to do so. Maliki's government is also coming under what could be even harsher. Some people in the restive provinces are pining for the days of Saddam Hussein. They are raising slogans against Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. It is no secret that these climates may make it easier for al-Qaeda to once again find footholds in areas that it had been forced to leave. Yet the most serious threat faced by Maliki is the bid by prominent Sunni cleric Abdul-Malik al-Saadi to dispel the sectarian nature of the Sunni uprising. Any success in this direction would test Muqtada al-Sadr's credibility. The concomitance between al-Sadr's movement, the uprising of the Sunni Arab provinces and the despair of the Kurds vis-à-vis their former ally would make Maliki in need of firm Iranian interference to save his government, and this deepens the problem rather than solve it. Maliki's reliance on a tacit Iranian-American agreement to support him does not constitute a permanent insurance policy. The opportunity came and it was squandered. So the question that remains is this: Why did Maliki miss this opportunity?
