The ongoing and escalating political confrontation in Egypt may result in the victory of politics and the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood's attempts to seize public life and of their constitutional schemes. Such a scenario would be, without a doubt, the most ideal and most proper outcome because, in addition to putting Egypt on the right track for political development, it would strengthen the argument of the revolution and reinforce its arsenal of justifications, while curtailing the use of the rise of Islamists as an excuse to stand against revolution. In truth, this applies to Egypt as much as it applies to other Arab countries. Here, one must not forget that the pivotal role of modern structures and forces, such as the judges in Egypt (and trade unionists in Tunisia) encourages such optimism – that is, optimism about a sustained vertical split of the kind known in longstanding democracies such as France and the United States, but one that is nonetheless controlled within the confines of the political and constitutional game. Egypt, however, may surprise us with another different scenario, where the repressive essence coexists and is conjoined with a facade of democracy. This would be more likely if the Muslim Brotherhood and the military were to agree on a formula that would serve this purpose. Needless to say, the two parties may find enough inducements to forge a ruling coalition of sorts. Just as some civilian fuloul, – holdovers of the Mubarak regime – have joined forces with the revolutionary factions, military fuloul may join the Muslim Brotherhood in a mutual marriage of convenience. This second scenario will collide with U.S. and Western desires, and subsequently, with Egypt's interests. Nevertheless, those advancing it may attempt to entice the West with firm security positions and concessions in regional relations, which brings to mind some features of Hosni Mubarak's tenure. This possibility, with or without a referendum, may engender a model that resembles Franco's Spain, where the regime was built on the alliance between the army, the church and the major landowners, but which tended to be a military dictatorship rather than being a totalitarian state in the Stalinist and fascist tradition. Nevertheless, this scenario, which would temporarily eliminate liberal and leftist forces, would only delay the final and decisive political and democratic battle for a period that is hard to estimate, in terms of both duration and cost. Sooner or later, Egypt would find itself having to deal with the task of democratization. Yet, there is a third scenario: that of disaster, which would be outside the realm of the modern notions of politics and its frameworks. In other words, society in this scenario may fragment in a way that it would be impossible for political life to mend it and put it back together. Here, the Egyptians find themselves face to face with the consequences of the deeds of both the authorities and the Islamists in the past decades. To be sure, the regime pushed for islamisation in society and partly in culture, in the context of its confrontation with the Muslim brotherhood. Meanwhile, the Islamists, created a parallel and cunter society, culturally, economically, educationally and even in moral values and the dress code. By doing so, both the regime and the Islamists succeeded in expanding the gap between two “peoples", so to speak, within the Egyptian people at large: The Islamists' “people", and the non-Islamists' “people" (because it is hard to describe the latter as bona fide secularists). While we see some of this in the broad fission that has crept into the trade unions and all other grassroots organizations, the cultural foundations of the two currents create distance between them, all the way to having a different interpretation of modern Egyptian history, since Napoleon's campaign all the way to the reign of Ismail and the construction of the Suez Canal, and down to the present day. In addition to history, the focus on “identity" within the conflict, whether directly or otherwise, leads to widening the gap between two broad segments of society, with a direct impact on the Coptic question, which is then added to a wide array of other thorny contradictions. In this context, one must not forget to underscore the dangers of purely numerical majorities, particularly when they produce a factional rule that is more concerned about its “victorious" political party than its obligation to care for the people and the nation. So will Egypt find itself, and us along with it, paying this lofty price imposed by history, culture, and, of course, politics?
