Whenever Egypt is close to fateful events along the path leading toward the liquidation of the heritage of the former regime, stability is undermined and the mobile clashes escalate from Port Said to the squares and streets of Cairo. Whenever the Egyptians move toward a new stage of the transitional phase, the squares precede them to clashes which everyone agrees are set up in advance, and the Egyptians start exchanging accusations in all directions. It is feared that the situation will grow out of control if the voices demanding the staging of the presidential elections before the formation of the Constituent Assembly to hasten the surrender of power to civilians were to escalate. This is due to the fact that the military council rejects this step, as it firstly wants to be reassured about the identity of the incoming head of the authority, and secondly, about its position and role in the next regime, i.e. the privileges it has been enjoying since the nineteenth century. Hence, it is not odd for the Egyptians to agree over the fact that what happened in Port Said was not a sports-related riot. It was simply a political battle which was bloody this time around as well. Many expected what happened to be seen on the first anniversary of the revolution, but it was postponed for a few days to coincide – in a noticeable paradox – with the anniversary of the “camels' battle!” The message delivered yesterday was not that different from the one seen a year ago under the headline of security or chaos, which would explain the ongoing conflict around the Interior Ministry. It is certainly easy for the youth and some revolutionary forces to cast accusations against the military council or the remnants of the deposed regime, as it is easy for the accusations to affect the Islamists although they have finally joined the enthusiasts calling for the surrender of power to civilians through the anticipation of the presidential elections to precede or accompany the work of the constituent committee drawing up the new constitution. It would also be easy for the Gamaa to accuse some youth who lack any political or even national sense to provoke clashes with the military, or to accuse some marginalized factions of being behind such incidents which are threatening the revolution and obstructing the exit from the transitional phase. The same goes for those managing the transitional phase, for whom it would be easy to accuse foreign sides, third parties or some youth forces, as it happened in previous incidents. But what weakens the tale of the military and its loyalists among those seeking to benefit from the revolution, is that they are not naming the accused. At this point, it is not enough to dismiss an official here and there. The government must place its hands on the parties whom it is accusing of tampering with Egypt's security, or else it would be possible to lay blame on circles in the government and the military institution of trying to undermine the revolution or retaliate against the youth. This could be done either by the Ultras or those who were not pleased with the appeasement of the Muslim Brotherhood's zeal after it enhanced its presence in the People's Assembly and is about to enhance its presence in other locations while remaining silent towards the practices of the military. The exchange of accusations will not spare Egypt from additional chaos, just as it will not spare it from another tragedy similar to the one seen in Port Said. It will also not spare it from what could happen if forces were to insist on storming the Interior Ministry to subject some symbols in it to defeat and eradicate the remnants of the deposed regime, or from security mayhem, theft and anarchy which have escalated during the past few days. All the sides share the responsibility, i.e. the partners in the revolution, whether the youth on the squares who launched this revolution, the Islamists or the military which joined it. They are responsible for exiting this political anarchy and lethal confusion, to face reality and facts that cannot be disregarded as the entire situation is heading towards clashes placing the country and the revolution before an unknown fate. What may be required is the handling of the mistakes, in order to overcome the tensions between those partners and complete the transitional phase in peace. There is no arguing about the fact that the military council committed a series of mistakes, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in the context of its battle to succeed to the deposed regime or – at the very least – impose its conditions on the new regime that has started to materialize following the emergence of the People's Assembly and the beginning of the first phase of the Shura Council elections. In the meantime, the council is still struggling to manage this stage and the battle over its upcoming role and position, the biggest proof for that confusion being its recanting of decisions and positions on more than one occasion under the pressures of the street. Even the consultative council it formed a few months ago to help it in the management and consultations, has so far failed to come up with anything that would change the rules of the game. At the beginning of the revolution, the army presented itself as a key partner in it. But soon enough, doubts started emerging among the youth on the squares in regard to the military council's behavior which will only lead to the reproduction of the former regime, while completely disregarding the revolutionary forces and the sacrifices they have offered. Indeed, the military institution did not seem to want to vacate the scene in favor of the civilians for free. What it wants was actually conveyed by many decisions and steps it adopted since the eruption of the revolution, and with the imminence of the presidential elections, it is rushing to secure the share which the military enjoyed under the former regime. However, this is facing obstacles, considering that the revolution will neither allow the institution to remain outside of any legal or constitutional framework – i.e. exempt from any legal or even political accountability – nor will it allow the military to maintain its economic privileges without any control, as though it is the alternative for the state institutions that ought to be governed by law, the Constitution, monitoring and accountability. The military leaders are upset to see the world, at the head of which is the American administration, talking to the symbols of the upcoming authority, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood group and those with it. They want the aid to keep coming to them, and not to the next governments. As for the Gamaa, it cannot dissipate the feeling of some youth who triggered the revolution in regard to the fact it has stolen the revolution or rode the wave when it was time to harvest the benefits. They did not forget that some leaders in the MB were negotiating with the leaders of the deposed regime during the first days of the revolution, and are continuing – until this day – to jump from one bank to another. They do not want a clash with the military that might jeopardize everything they have accomplished so far, which is why they cannot elude their responsibility for the current stage and its consequences. They are the partners of the military council which looked at them with relief as they assumed the mission of confronting the demonstrators as they were advancing toward the People's Assembly on its behalf a few days ago. It would be an exaggeration to place the MB in the same trench as the military. However, it would neither be an exaggeration nor an injustice to say that they are merely interested in benefiting from this historical moment which allowed them to come to power at the People's Assembly and now at the Shura Council. There is no doubt that they will wage a battle and engage in maneuvering to overcome the transitional phase, in order to liquidate the military institution on the political arena, and lead it out of the hallways of power from which they have suffered throughout decades. For that purpose, it would be fine for them to join yesterday's partners who are demanding the shortening of the military's term during this stage, if these pressures are able to succeed as they have on many previous occasions. It was natural, in light of this situation, for the youth who triggered the first spark to be greatly disappointed and bitter. This is especially true after they proved to be impotent, i.e. after the secular, nationalist, leftist and modernist powers were unable to compete with the Islamists in the parliamentary elections and at the level of the political performance and its schemes. This is why they are almost rejecting everything that was accomplished by the transitional phase, from the parliamentary elections to the council's sessions, the election of its committees and the launching of the Shura Council elections, while insisting on the necessity for the military to surrender power to civilians. Indeed, they do not want power to remain in the hands of the military council, which they perceive as being among the inherited tools from the deposed regime, with its figures, positions and policies. Consequently, they believe it must be removed to establish a new political system having nothing to do with the previous one. Nonetheless, some youth are exaggerating and committing a mistake when raising the slogan “the legitimacy of the square supersedes that of parliament,” in their attempt to justify their stay on these squares. This slogan deepened the gap between them on one hand, and the Islamists and those who voted in their favor on the other, thus generating a separation between the two partners. The latter youth have the right to fear the Islamists' monopolization of power and the loss of what they had called for since day one. However, this does not deny their responsibility. Some of their dreams and demands appear to be fictional and non-achievable in the context of the political game, which is why they must recognize that the revolution came a long way, that the military council contributed to the eradication of the head of the regime and that its commander Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi acknowledged the council's mistake. They must recognize the results of the elections and the fact that what they lacked and still lack is organization in the context of a political entity, through which they can address their demands and raise their slogans based on the rules of the political game, but also compete with the others among the MB and the Salafis. Finally, and in light of the outcome of the elections, they must recognize they cannot reshape society the way they want to. They must realize that democracy cannot exit the ballot boxes all of a sudden like a magic potion. Democracy, the way they want it, can only be achieved through practice and following cumulative reforms affecting the school curricula and all the traditional principles, whether they are cultural or doctrinal. This cannot be secured in a country over which ignorance and poverty are prevailing. The partners in the revolution must acknowledge the importance of their partnership and what it has achieved so far, regardless of their roles. That way, the military council will not conceive turning the clock backward to reproduce what is already being destroyed, the Islamists will not be able to disregard the sacrifices of the others and their fears toward the possible reproduction of a dictatorship of another kind, the youth will not think about inducing change in one leap. The only way out of the current confusion is through the return of the three partners to the minimum level of political consensus over the major and critical issues, i.e. the selection of a president, the new Constitution and real partnership which does not exclude or annul any party.
