The day Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to form the so-called Dijla Operations Command under the pretext of the Syrian developments and the Free Army's staging of attacks on the northern border with Iraq, it was clear that this decision was related to the tensions with the Kurdistan province. As for the Syrian developments, they were a mere cover to lift the ceiling of the central government's warning to the province's command. True, many issues are still pending between the province and Al-Maliki's government, especially the Kirkuk issue and the exploitation of the oil wealth. They are the ones provoking direct tensions between both sides, in light of what they feature at the political level – namely the province's demands to annex Kirkuk to it based on nationalistic ties – and at the level of the oil production, and consequently the current economic prosperity in the province. But behind these two important issues for both sides, there is a third one governing the way the central government is dealing with them, i.e. Al-Maliki's understanding of central power and what this features in terms of the way the provinces in general should be dealt with, particularly the Kurdistan province. Indeed, despite the federal constitution which allows the provinces to manage their own affairs and divide the wealth with the center, Al-Maliki attempted to manipulate this administration to serve his own political goals. And at a time when he thwarted the attempts to establish other provinces in Iraq, he is known for his obstruction of the work of the conservatives and their subjugation to the central administration at the level of local affairs. But while it appears to be impossible for Al-Maliki to reconsider the status of the Kurdistan province from a constitutional angle, without risking a new war with the Kurds, he has tried to subdue its powers to the central decision-making authority, in an attempt to maneuver around the federal constitution. Amid the tug of war with Erbil over the oil file and the mutual threats with financial and administrative measures, Baghdad - and upon an initiative from Al-Maliki - intentionally lifted the ceiling of its armament via deals with Russia, ones which were perceived by most observers as being outside the context of the Iraqi military's armament policy, namely the attempts to acquire an air force that was perceived by Erbil as being a headline for underlying intentions in the test of power between them. This step, which might be justified by the need to provide the Iraqi army with sophisticated equipment to face the repercussions of the deteriorating situation in the region, did not reassure the province's command which in turn sought the arming of its Peshmerga troops with heavy equipment, i.e. with tanks and artillery. And when Erbil deployed the Peshmerga in the disputed region in Kirkuk, it became clear it was about to respond to Al-Maliki's defiance via the Dijla Operations Command. The two sides, which reached the brink of the abyss, have retreated for now under clear American pressures. But nothing guarantees the non-renewal and escalation of the problems, especially since Al-Maliki's overall approach in dealing with the internal issues in particular, and the regional issues in general, reveals monopolization and the disregarding of the other political components in Iraq. And as long as the center of the Shiite weigh can be sustained with Iranian support, he will not offer the necessary concessions to implement the constitution, whose violation can mainly be seen at the level of the tense relations with the Kurdistan province, in parallel to the ongoing tensions with the other political and sectarian components which he believes should be mere affiliates to him. In that sense, the current crisis between Baghdad and the Kurdistan province is related to the understanding and treatment shown by Al-Maliki at the level of his authority, especially the implementation of the constitution at the level of its content and spirit. Had this not been the case, it would have been possible – albeit with some difficulty – to agree with the command of the Kurdistan province through the implementation of the constitution at the level of the Kirkuk crisis, and reach a solution to the oil issue through negotiations. But it seems so far that such intentions are unavailable on Al-Maliki's end, who sometimes appears as if he does not recognize the province and its powers.
