What is new about the current confrontations in politics and on the field in Egypt is that they are taking place in the absence of a direct role played by the military institution, at least so far – even if President Mohamed Morsi gave himself the right to declare a state of emergency or take any other measure if he finds there to be a threat to the Revolution and to the country. Most likely taking such a measure, which would thrust the military institution directly into the political struggle, will be the last resort in the confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood, along with the Salafists, and secular forces – when the electoral legitimacy obtained by the Islamists is no longer able to restrain the movement of the secular opposition. Another new element is the fact that secular forces have united in the face of Morsi's plans, both in terms of Islamizing government and society on the one hand, and of seizing broad powers that cannot be opposed on the other – making members of the opposition speak of a return to dictatorship and tyranny with the new constitutional declaration. The elements of the current confrontation are thus different from those that have governed the situation ever since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak's regime, as the military institution has receded to the background, while political Islam is now in a confrontation against allied secular forces. When Morsi headed towards making his new constitutional declaration, he was assuming that this step would go smoothly, after the Egyptian government had regained some of its political prestige as a result of the Israeli campaign against Gaza and the role it played in reaching the new truce, in addition to the praise it received from the United States and Morocco, as well as Israel's reassurance to its role. In other words, Morsi relied on Egypt's renewed regional influence in order to move forward with rearranging the domestic situation according to the Muslim Brotherhood's calendar. Yet he did not concern himself with generally Western sensitivities towards tampering with the democratic process, as well as gathering the branches of government in a single hand and not respecting the separation between them. Indeed, those who had welcomed the democratic process that brought Morsi to power had done so on the basis of the process itself, not on the basis of the elected president's personality. Support for this process thus represents support for the President in person only to the extent that it preserves the bases of democracy. And what is the issue of the loan from the World Bank but an expression of support for the progress of democracy, regardless of the details, the conditions and the debate it has aroused inside Egypt? Indeed, foreign aid, especially from the United States, and loans are directly connected to the internal direction taken by the government and its ability to establish stability by clinging to the work of state institutions. And that is precisely what the constitutional declaration has done away with – threatening of renewed pressures on the Egyptian government to return to it, something which was expressed in American and European reactions. Tahrir Square in Cairo witnessed a scene the country had not experienced since the Revolution erupted, as prominent civil society figures, including former candidates to the presidency who had altogether obtained a number of votes far exceeding that obtained by Morsi, have been at the forefront of the demonstrations demanding the withdrawal of the constitutional declaration and condemning such a turn towards hijacking the independence of state institutions, and of the judiciary in particular. Moreover, the headquarters of secular political parties have been witnessing meetings and seminars that all drive towards opposing the step taken by the President. This is the first time all Egyptian secular forces and figures unite to confront the rule of the Brotherhood, indicating a new balance of power in favor of secular forces, after the period of fragmentation that followed the collapse of the former regime and contributed to Morsi's election as President. If secular forces can preserve their unity, they will have obtained an effective weapon for confronting the rule of the Brotherhood. And if one were to add to this the move of Egypt's judges to defend the independence of their work and the wave of resignations in the institution of the presidency, the secular opposition would hold effective means to win this round against the rule of the Brotherhood.
