Those who know the Syrian regime, the circumstances of its birth and endurance, and its weaknesses and strengths, do not find the open-ended tragedy in Syria very surprising. For this regime does not resemble its peers in the countries swept by the Arab Spring. Those who know President Bashar al-Assad know that it is out of the question for him to follow the example of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, hand over power like Hosni Mubarak, or tread the same path taken by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Baath, like many parties at the time, thought that whoever seizes power would be doing so once and for all. In other words, it is not part of the Baath's culture to agree to enter into fair competitions with other parties on the electoral playfield. The idea of partnership, too, is difficult for the Baath, unless it is fully under its control – which would defeat the purpose of partnership. Yet this is not solely the result of the Baath's ideology. Indeed, it is also about security generals taking control of the party's reins, the network of intertwined interests linked to the Baath and the security services, and the real hard core of regime supporters, who were a taboo that could not be discussed or mentioned. Despite the hordes that joined the party, from various sects, the regime continued to harbor an unspoken fear that segments belonging to the religious majority still dreamt of vengeance and bided its time, waiting for its chance to pounce. This prompted the regime to depend more and more on the grip of the security services, while championing pan-Arab attitudes as the main basis of its legitimacy and as the justification for its right to crush any threat. The regime thus had no serious opportunity to develop and expand its popular base, except at the beginning of Bashar al-Assad's tenure, when the president was truly capable of contending and winning in fair and free elections. But the barons of the security services and the Baath party were quick to close that window. Since those days, the regime has chosen to rely on the pro-resistance axis, but the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon denied it the chance to lead. This caused it to become subservient to an explicit Iranian scheme that the internal scene could not tolerate. In this context, two major events are relevant: The invasion of Iraq, and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. With the eruption of the Arab Spring, in conjunction with the deterioration in Sunni-Shiite relations in the region, it was already too late. Some believe that the regime, by virtue of its composition and alliances, had no other choice but to do what it then went on to do: That is to say, consider the protests to be a conspiracy against its very existence and pro-resistance policy, and that it was now a matter of life or death. Therefore, the regime surmised, its primary response must be to prevent the creation of a Syrian Benghazi or Tahrir Square, which might become home to the million-strong crowds of the opposition. For this reason, the regime rushed to deploy excessive force to eliminate the peaceful character of the protests, believing that a battle with ‘armed groups', no matter how strong, was still better than seeing the squares of Aleppo and Damascus heaving with protesters chanting, “The people want to overthrow the regime". The regime succeeded in luring the opposition to an armed confrontation that borders on being a civil war. This confrontation reinforced the cohesion of the hard core that the regime relies on, and headed off early on any prospects for transition or other formulas that leave no place for the president in a solution. The regime also succeeded in showing that the confrontation was a matter of life or death for an entire axis. In this context, one may understand the largesse shown by Iran in extending support to the regime, and the fact that since the assassination of the crisis cell leaders on July 18, Iran has moved to a position of direct partner in the daily details of the Syrian conflict. It is as though Iran considers the survival of the Syrian regime a matter of life or death. Similarly, one may understand the journey of the Iranian drone sent by Hezbollah over Israeli airspace, followed by a statement by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in which he claimed responsibility for this move, and deepened his party's involvement in the Syrian conflict, as though also declaring that what is happening in Syria was a matter of life or death. It is a matter of life or death for the regime, its allies and the opposition equally, without the battle being this fierce for the latter's allies. In the absence of an American-Russian understanding that seems far off, an unlikely American-Iranian accord, or an intervention by NATO that seems out of the question at present, many more will die, entire villages and even cities will disappear, and many “barrels" will fall.
