The world does not need to hear the statements of the Iranian officials to validate their presence on the field on the Syrian and Lebanese arenas among others. Moreover, the world does not need to hear their confirmation of the fact that war in Syria is a war against them, i.e. against the “resistance and rejectionism axis." They are repeating what was said by President Bashar al-Assad a few days ago, as he was receiving Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. He assured: “The current battle targets the entire resistance system, and not just Syria." But prior to that, General Mohamed Ali Jafari, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, did not reveal anything new by announcing that elements from the Qods Brigade, which is affiliated with the Guard, were working as advisors in Syria, stressing nonetheless that their presence did not imply his country's engagement in the military operations there. But what is new about the Iranian positions is that they feature a clear message saying that the Islamic Republic is a party in the crisis, whether the violence escalates or the situation heads towards some sort of a settlement which UN-Arab Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi might be allowed to draw up in a way that would satisfy all the sides involved in the conflict, both domestically and abroad. In addition, they were made on the eve of the quartet contact group meeting in Cairo, which was proposed by Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi and was held in the absence of Saudi Arabia. What is also new is that Israel did not hesitate to respond to them with new surprising maneuvers in the Golan Heights, to confirm its presence and readiness, but also to recall the red line drawn since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, i.e. steer clear of the border and abstain from moving the crisis beyond it. This is due to the fact that such an act could lead the region towards a war that is being intensively tackled, but for the triggering of which no one seems to want to be held responsible. For its part, the regime in Damascus had tried to activate the front in the Golan and the Lebanese South, through demonstrations that quickly dissipated due to the commitment to the limits of the game, to which another red line was added, i.e. the prevention of the regime from using chemical weapons. These developments might enhance the expectations voiced by many, according to whom the only way out from the numerous predicaments which involve crises and complex issues in the region, would be through wide-scale regional war. There are many pieces of evidence pointing in that direction, starting with the Syrian crisis, the Iranian nuclear file, the imminent turning of the page of the Oslo Accords and the repercussions of such a step and the heated confrontation between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the White House over the nuclear file. Moreover, there are exchanged between Tel Aviv and Tehran, exchanged maneuvers in the Gulf waters and over the Golan Height, joint exercises staged by 30 states on the threshold of the Strait of Hormuz, not to mention the American anger over Iraq's authorization of the passage of Iranian arms shipments to Syria through its territories and airspace, and Nouri al-Maliki's statements regarding the fact that “the region is going through a dangerous wave of challenges whose roots are sectarian" and that Iraq “was able to besiege sectarian strife. We toppled it. But this is not enough as long as some are using it to reach their evil goals." Hence, he disregarded the attack launched against him a while ago by his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan who said that Al-Maliki was “fueling sectarian tensions between the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq, through his behavior along with his partners in the ruling coalition." Naturally, the Turkish prime minister is not turning a blind eye to the mounting problem in his country, one which is not limited to the Kurdish issue and also features the confrontations and demonstrations opposing the presence of Syrian refugee camps in Turkish Alawite regions! The region is no longer living to the beat of the war drums between Israel and Iran solely. Indeed, what is being witnessed in Iraq and Turkey, and what is endured in Lebanon and even Jordan, threatens with the slide of the entire region towards sectarian war, one whose sides and elements need not be defined. Moreover, no matchstick is necessary as long as the crisis in Syria is evolving in that direction. The infighting sides in Syria can claim day and night that the country is not going through civil war with a sectarian or denominational character, and that it could never know what happened in Lebanon with its civil wars. But this is exactly what was said by the Iraqis following the American invasion which turned the components of the authority and the regime upside down. Still, both countries have seen and are nowadays seeing a “proclaimed" or “concealed" denominational war which they avoid to recognize, at a time when the fire beneath the ashes in Lebanon is no secret, to the beat of what is happening in its bigger neighbor. So, do the actors need Brahimi's reminder of the fact that the field developments in Syria reveal the existence of “civil war" in order to publically recognize that this is a war between the religions and sects?! Hence, it is no wonder that Iran confirmed its field presence on the Syrian arena, not only because the ongoing war targets it or because the fall of the regime in Damascus would mean the weakening of its presence and influence in the region, but also because it wishes to protect a sect facing a defiance by another sectarian majority which enjoys the support of numerous states in the region and is receiving field supplies from Arab and Islamic powers that are now on the ground, partaking in the fight against President Bashar al-Assad's regime. This does not mean that the settlement of the situation in favor of this or that side has become difficult, if not impossible, as much as it means that the balance of powers is being enhanced on the ground, which could extend the crisis and bring the region closer to destructive civil war or push it towards an inescapable settlement to avoid what is worse. It would be easy to enumerate the signs pointing to the imminence of comprehensive confrontation between Iran and its opponents, just as it would be easy to detect the signs pointing to the eruption of bitter sectarian conflict that would further divide and weaken the region. But on the other hand, something reveals that the major actors in the region neither wish to see the first, nor the latter, at least during the current stage. Indeed, the regional players probably wish to deter sectarian conflict, to avoid going through the difficult handling of its repercussions in their own countries. Therefore, the recent Iranian positions can be placed in a completely different context, i.e. the recognition of the fact that the Syrian regime is undoubtedly falling and that there must be some room left for a settlement or a deal. Did Iran not propose during the Contact Group meeting the dispatch of observers to Syria from its four member states? It wants to say it is still present, that the regime will not be easily broken as long as it is willing to supply it with men, after it had supplied it with weapons, advice and money, that its “share" – its ally's share in terms of what it represents and whom it represents – should go in line with that presence and that Russia could not act on behalf of it or on behalf of Damascus in any deal. Not only that. President Al-Assad himself was quoted by Al-Ahram al-Arabi magazine as saying that the settlement “will need time," recognizing on a more important note that “political dialogue is the only possible solution to the crisis" and that “change cannot be made through the removal of the heads of the regimes or through foreign intervention." But before him, Erdogan had informed the American Washington Post that the regime will leave and that “Bashar is politically dead," indicating that Russia, China and Iran believed that Al-Assad will fall, while the question on their mind was “what will happen after Al-Assad?" On the other hand, he reiterated Turkey's rejection of “any foreign interference in the attempts to form a regime in Syria." What Erdogan said about the positions of the three states supporting the regime in Syria is not entirely new, as numerous circles within these countries previously said they were not insisting on Al-Assad, but rather on the sustainment of their interests. So, in the absence of any conclusion, has the Syrian crisis grown closer to drastic change or a new turn under the headline of seeking the details of some sort of a settlement? Has Iran launched its preparations to book its shares, or are their disputes within its ruling wings? What good would it do Tehran, Moscow and the Alawites following all this destruction and blood, if the regime were to retreat to the coastal strip? At this point, would the need for its president not become null, unless he holds on to Damascus and Aleppo even if they are devastated? What cards would be left for the Russians, the Iranians and the regime itself during the negotiations if it evacuates the two capitals? A lot was said about the reasons behind the imminent war on Iran in light of these circumstances. They include the Arabs' preoccupation with their spring, the mounting tensions between them and Tehran, the resumption of the crisis in Iraq between its sectarian and ethnical components, Syria's drowning in its blood and destruction and the way this is affecting the position and influence of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, there is Hezbollah's fear in Lebanon over the problems faced by the regime in Damascus and its possible sudden collapse, and what this could cause in terms of a Sunni rise in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria in a way provoking wide-scale sectarian conflicts among the populations throughout the region. But on the opposite end, is it not enough that Syria and its role are absent from the region and that tomorrow, the country will be preoccupied with a reconstruction that will require a Marshall Plan? Would this not weaken Iran in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and push it – in addition to the repercussions of the sanctions – to reconsider the bases of its dialogue with the P5+1 states over its nuclear program?
