When Lakhdar Brahimi said he would only accept to succeed to Kofi Annan as a United Nations-Arab envoy to Syria provided he earns “strong and unified support" from the Security Council, he sheds light once again on the reasons which pushed the United Nations secretary general to submit his resignation earlier this month. The two men are totally aware of something that is no longer a secret i.e. that reaching a political agreement between President Bashar al-Assad's regime and his opponents to ensure the discontinuation of the violence is not the obstacle. Indeed, since the first day of the action, the rule in Damascus never expressed a wish to reach political solutions. It thus adopted and is still adopting the military option on which the regime was based to begin with, and on which it relied to remain in power throughout four decades under the cover of resounding slogans! This option forced the opposition to pursue further militarization, to the point where the country is now caught between two camps, from which politics is completely absent. And as much as it is no longer useful for the regime to hide behind unconvincing pretexts, and as much as it is no longer useful for the opposition national council to cover up its shortcomings and the conflicts between its components, it is no longer useful to conceal the country's slide toward civil war, and consequently toward comprehensive chaos, after which it will become difficult to see the emergence of a centralized authority that can manage the situation. Hence, entities will surface and threaten with dismantlement and division, thus casting their heavy shadows over a number of neighboring states. In light of the complete disregard of politics, no mediator can find an agreement between the warring parties on the Syrian arena. At this level, there is no need to enumerate the attempts and efforts which failed to even achieve truce since the eruption of the crisis. The obstacle resides in another place. Annan, Brahimi and all the other actors know that no mediator or envoy can achieve a breakthrough between the major players on the regional and international arenas, as the latter do not seem to be ready to seal an agreement or a settlement that would stop the bloodbath. This was realized by the resigned UN-Arab envoy the day he was appointed. He became aware of the fact that the crisis was open and lengthy, thus anticipating the situation with a plan which he clearly announced would require a year, if not more! For their part, the United States and its close and distant partners, as well as Russia and its close and distant partners, wanted to gain time and hide behind the former secretary general's mission. The latter also wanted to gain time like everyone else, while waiting for the external circumstances to produce an acceptable deal. However, it seemed that this period of waiting will be much longer than expected, which is he why preferred to pull out. The first chapter or the first round of the UN-Arab envoy is over, and it was impossible to score any goals or achieve any breakthrough. The conflict inside and over Syria is not only awaiting the results of the American presidential elections in three months, i.e. when Barack Obama will be liberated from the restraints of the internal battle and the confrontation of his opponents' campaigns if he is reelected. Moreover, it is not awaiting America's and Europe's action without an authorization from the Security Council under the pretext of defending human rights and protecting the civilians from the massacres, as it happened in other recent situations, the last of which was in Libya. It is part of a wider international conflict over the region, from North Africa to Central Asia and beyond. In the meantime, Russia is not expected to eventually have mercy on the Syrians, relinquish its support to the regime in Damascus or show concern over what is left of its relations and interests with a large number of Arab states that have and are still opposed to its position vis-à-vis the crisis. Moreover, China which invested a lot in Africa, Central Asia and Iran is not expected to retreat. What increased the acuteness of the conflict was the eruption of the Arab spring and its spread from Tunisia to Syria, going through Libya, Egypt and Yemen, and the results of this spring in the aforementioned states where it mainly caused losses for Moscow and Beijing. Amid this conflict, Annan and his successor are not delusional about their ability to achieve a breakthrough between the big players, as there are rules and conditions for this game which does not require mediators. It rather requires convincing the Americans and their European partners, as well as the Russians and the Chinese, that the Syrian war took all the time necessary and that the developments on the ground now require a search for the next formula and the management of the transitional phase. Hence, the consultative meeting to which Tehran called was an attempt to anticipate any deal, by seeking the opening of a third path to handle the crisis, far away from the final conflicting international positions. This was preceded by Tehran's recanting of its accusations to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar of having kidnapped its 48 nationals in Syria, and its attempts to flirt with Ankara once again following the series of accusations it cast against it via a large number of Iranian political and military officials. Clearly, the Islamic Republic is as aware as everyone else that the regime in Damascus was completely stripped, and that it no longer enjoys this unifying national cover in light of the defection of the recently-appointed prime minister, the increase of the number of dissident military men and the exit of both capitals from their long silence. Moreover, the situation is clearly heading toward the regime's eventual turn toward the coastal strip to seek protection as long as possible, although it might not like such an ending. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is also thinking about the problems of the minorities and the other components in it, namely the Kurds whose dreams will be enhanced if they were to achieve independence in their regions as it happened in Kurdistan. Nonetheless, it might not find an escape if it were to receive a strong blow via such a scenario, whether through the support of this Alawi strip or the reliance on its Lebanese ally to maintain its advanced base on Israel's border and might link it to a Lebanese extension reaching the Bekaa Valley. This would explain the ongoing cleansing campaigns in Homs, Hama and the Rif of Latakia, and the concerns prevailing over some Lebanese sides regarding Hezbollah's repetition of the experience of the Shiite powers in Iraq, ones which gained control over power following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. This is true despite the fact that Lebanese demographic structure is somewhat different from its counterpart in Iraq on many levels. Hence, Lebanon will constitute the first test for the ability of Syria's neighbors to tolerate the results of the second round of the international and regional conflict over Syria. Still, the Lebanese are not doing any better than the Syrians, considering that nothing is bringing them closer together at the level of politics and that they are living day by day on the beat of the repercussions of their neighbors' crisis. At this level, the frail situation does not require any proof, as it is enough that the components of the government which is supposed to include one team are acting in a way revealing they have nothing in common. This reached the point where the files of interest to the citizens that are necessary for the management of their affairs and needs, have started to provoke clashes that are paralyzing the country. In addition, the various sides within the government are not converging over one unified political position, in parallel to the obstruction of the dialogue tables, the mobile tensions from Sidon to Tripoli and the attempts to resume the assassinations series. All these signs point to Lebanon's weakness and inability to seriously deal with the repercussions of the Syrian crisis. It was not a coincidence for the American administration to add Hezbollah to the sanctions' list imposed on Syria and the Islamic Republic - right after Iran concluded the consultative conference it held in its capital to discuss the situation in Syria – and to instigate Europe to follow in its footsteps, accusing Hezbollah of playing a key role in the acts of oppression affecting the Syrian oppositionists. It was also not a coincidence to see the escalation once again of the controversy which erupted in Israel over the possibility of striking the Iranian nuclear program prior to the American presidential elections, especially since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his team are not concealing their political and non-political support to Republican candidate Mitt Romney in the face of Barack Obama. On the other hand, it might not be a coincidence for the Lebanese security apparatuses to arrest former Minister Michel Samaha, who is considered to be one of President Bashar al-Assad's most prominent advisors. There is no doubt that this arrest and the campaign on Hezbollah will activate the murky water in Lebanon, and that the country will find itself in the face of the American – and maybe imminent European – sanctions on the party on more than one political and non-political levels, namely the financial one. It will also have to face the repercussions of the former minister's arrest and the issuance of a warrant against one of the most prominent security men in Bashar al-Assad's regime on the “abstinence" policy and the official relations between Damascus and Beirut. The conflict with its Iranian chapter is prone to escalate with the turning of the Kofi Annan page and the launching of a new round, in which the developments on the Syrian arena might provide some players with the opportunity to score goals that would help pressure other arenas. That way, the Americans and the Europeans will not continue to pass the time with attempts to come up with means to support the Syrian opposition in a way that does not affect the existing balance of powers to maintain the rules of the game and its pace, even if the scoring of the goals were to take place in the overtime during which the map of the Great Middle East from Afghanistan to North Africa would have become clearer.
