The new regime in Egypt has sent a signal which might further complicate the Syrian crisis, increase polarization between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and add a new player on the arena of the ongoing Cold War in the region between major regional and international actors. President Mohamed Morsi called – from the heart of the Iranian capital – for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad. In his speech before the non-alignment summit, he presented a book of conditions for cooperation with the Islamic Republic, at the head of which being its relinquishing of the regime in Damascus. On the eve of the summit, he had proposed the establishment of a quartet committee including Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to settle the crisis sweeping Syria, which constituted a first message saying that his country was ready to play its usual role. It would be too soon to predict the ways Egypt will use to restore its status as a regional actor, just like it would be too early to predict the direction of its relations with Iran, without taking into account the circumstances, repercussions and transformations it is witnessing in the post-revolution phase, and the roles being played by Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The entry of a new player on the scene connotes change at the level of the rules of the game and its arena, as well as the availability of conditions, tools and cards. Full diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran have not existed since the Iranian revolution, after President Anwar al-Sadat granted political exile to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and signed the Camp David Accords. The two countries thus settled for the presence of missions, but the situation changed with the collapse of President Hosni Mubarak's regime. The day he became Egyptian foreign minister following the revolution, Nabil al-Arabi stated that his government did not perceive the Islamic Republic as being a hostile state and “is about to open a new page with all the countries, including Iran." And in February 2011, the military council allowed the entry of two Iranian warships via the Canal of Suez for the first time since 1979. When Gulf circles expressed their fears at this level, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry clarified that “Cairo is seeking normal relations with Tehran, essential and normal relations, that is all." This statement was followed by more than one confirmation issued by Egyptian officials, stressing that the Gulf security was linked to their country's security. And certainly, Riyadh was the first capital to be visited by President Morsi to corroborate his insistence on the historical relations between the two countries, knowing that Saudi Arabia had decided to help Cairo by providing it with $4 billion, also to confirm its insistence on stability for Egypt and its economy. A lot was said about the reasons behind the gradual retreat of Egypt's role in the Middle East and Africa since the signing of the Camp David Accords, from America's methodic policy to limit its role to the domestic arena, to the regime's preoccupation with the fighting of the extremist movements and the fixation of its men and entourage on corruption and the preparations for succession. But this remained a temporary stage in a history whose constant principles and facts cannot be disregarded. Pharaonic Egypt, which settled on the Nile banks, would not have hesitated for a moment to go beyond the eastern side of the river until the border with Syria and Iraq and across the Euphrates and the Tigris to preserve what it considers to be its national security in the face of those coming from the East, i.e. from the Land of the Two Rivers and behind it. Throughout history, its people never backed down on this constant reality, from Ramses II who launched a campaign against the Hittites, to the Mamluks who embarked to Palestine to deter Tamerlane and his troops, Ibrahim Pasha who knocked on the doors of Astana through Lebanon and Palestine and President Gamal Abdul Nasser who threatened leader Abdul Karim Qassim when the latter threatened Kuwait and showed on more than one occasion determination to defend Syria in the face of the threats which used to be launched from time to time by the Turkish army in the 1950s. This is not to forget the temporary unity between Cairo and Damascus. Even President Hosni Mubarak never hesitated for a second to provide a cover for the international-Arab alliance which led Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait around 20 years ago, while prior to that, he had established the Arab Cooperation Council with Baghdad, Amman and Sana'a to remain a partner in the security of the Gulf where more than two and a half million Egyptians work, and where the largest Arab economy benefitting most Arab states resides. And when the Council collapsed during the Kuwait invasion, he sealed – along with Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council states – a gathering dubbed the Damascus Declaration. When this Declaration collapsed, the ties with both Riyadh and Damascus were enhanced to maintain Cairo's role in leading any Arab project, or at least continue to be a key partner in the decision-making process. Moreover, he did not hesitate to warn against the Shiite Crescent when Iran knocked on Sinai's doors from Gaza! With all this history, Egypt rejected the “Turkish model" that Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked it to follow the day he visited Cairo following President Mubarak's toppling, as it rejected Guide Ali Khamenei's statements in which he said that the Egyptian revolution was an extension of the Islamic one. Cairo wishes to regain its political weight in the region, from North Africa to the border with Iraq, without being a number in Ankara's or Tehran's credit. In addition, President Mohamed Morsi does not need lessons from the Islamic Republic, as he belongs to a movement which was established around 90 years ago and is considered to be the largest political Islamic power in the Arab world. Prior to the revolution, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood stood alongside Hamas in Gaza, just like Iran which supported it among other Islamic movements. Moreover, it opposed and is still opposing the Camp David Accords, just like Tehran, throughout the last thirty years. On the other hand, a lot was said about its relationship with the Islamic Republic, knowing it definitely does not want to see the Arab-Iranian conflict prevail over the conflict with Israel. But reality does not convey that wish, seeing how direct clashes are taking place between Iran and its Arab opponents on more than one Arab arena, from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, the Emirates, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, among other locations scattered here and there. And unless the Arab states feel that Tehran has amended its policy, the region will continue to lack stability and become engaged in more than one armament race whose results will be catastrophic. It would be enough to say that this race will erode the oil revenues at the expense of human and financial development in the states of the region. And in light of this situation, Egypt cannot remain idle, in the presence of national and pan-Arab interests that enjoy priority over any religious or sectarian considerations. True, Iran succeeded in hosting the non-alignment summit and will head the group for the next three years, but what is also true is that it is completely aware of the fact that the group's member states and some countries in Latin America cannot act as its quarterback in its standoff with the United States and Europe. Only the Islamic geographic depth can provide it with the strength and political support it desperately needs. Iran could have increased its influence and improved its position, had it known how to deal with the Islamic powers that have risen and are now rising to power thanks to the Arab spring - i.e. had it relinquished its sometimes excessive Shiite rhetoric, discontinued its threats to the Arab Gulf states and stopped interfering here and there. With some wisdom and modesty, it could have established relations with its neighbors, and used them in the face of its opponents in the West and Israel. At this level, the Egyptian or Gulf gate could have constituted an important passageway, sparing it from the repercussions of the economic and political siege imposed on it. However, Iran relied on its Persian history and allowed the prevalence of its nationalistic tendency and Shiite ideology to present itself as being a power that should dominate the region. By doing so, it provoked the Arabs and Sunni Islam alike, from beyond Pakistan to the Atlantic. In addition, it provoked fear among the superpowers over their interests in the region. Then there was the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, one which always constituted a source of concern for Tehran and distracted it from the Gulf and the Middle East, and the major gift represented by the toppling of the Baath regime in Iraq where the current government does not have the right to disagree with Iran in several areas. As to its greatest investment – i.e. the building of Hezbollah – it earned further immunity and strength following the July 2006 war. Certainly, it will not be easy for Egypt to turn the clock backward, as it cannot simply become a quick and direct threat to this Iranian expansion. However, Tehran's sustainment of its current policies will push Cairo into the camp of the GCC states and Turkey in the context of this Cold War, whose main headline today surrounds Bashar al-Assad's departure or stay. On the other hand, it will also not be easy for Cairo to infiltrate what was achieved by Ankara throughout a decade of its absence – which is why Ankara might have the biggest share when reaping the fruits of the Arab spring, from Iraq where Turkish presence is wide in Kurdistan, to Syria via the opposition forces, Lebanon in the future and Tunisia, not to mention Turkish presence in Central Asia and the Balkans. Moreover, it will not be easy to compete with the role that the Gulf Cooperation Council states have started to play after they learned how to use their economic and oil capabilities to assume political roles they used to avoid in the past, taking into account the extent of Egypt's ability to play on the same arena as America, Russia and China among others, and whether or not its situation, troubles and domestic disputes will allow it to cross the Nile. Still, Egypt's alignment alongside Saudi Arabia and Turkey could help constitute an efficient trio in the region in the face of Iranian expansion and Russian stringency towards the Syrian crisis, which might eventually end with some sort of a settlement granting tripartite attention to Syria's Sunnis, while Tehran and Moscow will find a way to tend to their interest and the Alawites' affairs. But is it too late for settlements?
