There is a judicial-constitutional riddle surrounding Iraqi Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi's case. True, all the citizens are equal before the law. But for criminal law to apply on a member of parliament and a vice president, Al-Hashemi should have gone back to being a citizen who can be sued, by removing his parliamentary immunity and consequently annulling the Council's confidence in him as one of its members and as a vice president. But Al-Hashemi is still a lawmaker, considering that the parliamentary council did not announce that he was stripped of his membership and that the government did not call for the selection of a new member to replace him. Hence, he still enjoys parliamentary immunity against judicial pursuit, even if in a criminal case. Moreover, he is still officially a vice president, with the testimony of President Jalal al-Talabani who was appointed with him in their respective positions by parliament. The accusations addressed to Al-Hashemi are major and serious. As a result, the trial in such a case involving terrorism should have been held publicly, in order to reveal the goals, roles and methods. But this trial was staged behind closed doors, without anyone knowing the implications on which the judge relied to issue his sentence. As for the ruling, it was announced while no one was paying attention, and in a manner lacking the minimum level of transparency required in the trial of a prominent political figure in the country. These judicial-constitutional riddles cannot be figured out, unless the entire case is political and being exploited by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to face his political opponents and the detractors of his governance methods, thus reflecting his intention to benefit to the highest level from his current position and use comprehensive national reconciliation as a means to enhance his authority. Indeed, resorting to force or threatening to resort to it – as it is done by tyrants – is a political method adopted by Al-Maliki. And its negative repercussions are amplified when the issue is between Al-Maliki, as the leader of the Shiite Al-Daawa Party, and Al-Hashemi, as an official in the Sunni Islamic party. In other words, this case is placing the two main components of the Arab Iraqis in direct confrontation, regardless of what is said about the rule of the law and reconciliation, among other issues. Al-Maliki is undoubtedly aware of the symbolic character of Al-Hashemi's targeting on the sectarian level. This is why it is believed that the sentence might have been hastened to raise the ceiling of provocation vis-à-vis Iraqi components, after he guaranteed the recanting by other Shiite components of the confidence vote in parliament, and after he guaranteed total Iranian support to face the developments in the region, especially in Syria, in light of an Iraqi governmental policy that is identical to the Iranian one. But this provocation was not limited to Al-Hashemi who did not conceal his support in favor of the action in Syria. Indeed, it also affected the Kurds, especially in the areas of influence of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and its leader Massoud al-Barzani, who also announced his support of the protesters in Syria. It thus seems that Al-Maliki, who has so far adopted a vague policy toward the Syrian crisis, is now preparing the domestic arena to publicly engage in the Iranian strategy. In the past, the talk about financial support to the regime in Damascus and the transfer of weapons to its forces, accompanied the talk about the support of the Syrian people's right to freedom and plurality, and the hosting of refugees fleeing the battles. But today, it is said that the Iraqi official behavior in the border regions has changed, whether in dealing with the refugees or the troops of the Free Army. This change was linked to terrorist attacks being carried out in Iraq, in a way reflecting an attempt to unify the confrontation, and subsequently the efforts.
