The American administration's revelation of an Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to Washington Adel al-Jubair will move the cold war between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to a whole new level of confrontation. It will also help the United States push the international community to tighten the noose around Tehran's neck, and will carry repercussions for the Arab protest movement - further complicating it in more than one arena – and consequently, this will escalate this confrontation even further. Saudi-Iranian relations have always been prone to competition on the political, religious and economic levels. But with the establishment of the Islamic Republic, they moved to the stage of cold war, which was silent at times and overt at others, via political or security confrontations. However, this does not mean that the confrontation this time around will lead to a fourth war in the Gulf, considering that there is nothing pointing to such a possibility so far. Indeed, it is in no one's interest to see a war erupt, as the United States, which is preparing to leave Iraq and is facing numerous difficulties both there and in Afghanistan, is not about to open a new front. Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta had warned Israel last month against any adventure targeting the Islamic Republic. As for Iran, which is incurring losses here and there, it is not willing to risk additional losses but would not mind seeing confrontations by proxy. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for its part, wishes to prevent the Arab Gulf from sliding into a fourth war. There is no doubt that the Arab protest movement has fueled this open confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Prior to that, the wars of the Houthis against the regime in Sana'a almost turned into a war by proxy between the two countries. At the time, the Kingdom mobilized its troops to protect its national security, its backyard and its position in the Arabian Peninsula. For its part, Tehran did not hesitate to respond to it with a flow of statements of condemnation and a fierce campaign of criticisms. It also revived its campaign following the Kingdom's dispatch of troops in the context of the Peninsula Shield Force to help Manama maintain security during the demonstrations and acts of violence which erupted in Bahrain. Certainly, Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to stop what it considered to be an “attempted coup” to change the map of the Arabian Peninsula and the relations and interests system within it. In reality, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries started to look at Iran's policy with suspicion after the fall of the regime of the Taliban and that of Saddam Hussein. It appeared to them that the Islamic Republic was repeating the experience of Saddam who thought – following the end of the Cold War –he could use the extra time while Moscow is trying to collect the remains of the collapsed Soviet Union. He thus invaded Kuwait to fill the vacuum and established himself as the only interlocutor with the United States and the industrialized countries with regard to Gulf security, the oil wells and the passageways. The Kingdom could not tolerate Saddam's occupation of Kuwait and what this represented a breach in the balance of powers, bearing in mind that it never hesitated to support him during his war with Iran to prevent such a breach in the region, had Tehran defeated Saddam in this war. Since the liberation of Kuwait, it seemed that what Riyadh rejected back then to ensure its vital interests on the political, economic, energy and even religious levels, could not be accepted today regardless of the circumstances. Saudi Arabia cannot accept Iran's hegemony over the region, its choices and decisions and cannot allow it to dictate its foreign, energy and security policies on this region in the future. Moreover, it cannot tolerate this Iranian chain from Iraq to Lebanon, and Syria. On the other hand, the reality of the concerns, turmoil and weakness in the conservatives' ranks in Tehran does not require any proof, such as the uncovering of the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on American soil, regardless of the size of this plot, the status of those involved in it and the position to be taken toward the American accusations. Divisions and dissent within the Iranian regime are conveyed by positions, incidents and almost daily accusations exchanged between President Ahmadinejad and his opponents. These two camps are facing more than one predicament domestically and abroad, but the most dangerous predicament of all is probably the impact of the Arab protest movement on the balance of powers in the Middle East and the web of regional, international and even local interests. There is no need, for example, to recall the return of the Palestinian card - particularly the “Hamas card” - from Tehran's and Damascus' hands to Cairo's hand, which hosted early on a conference on reconciliation between the movement and the Palestinian authority, then supervised the prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, after it had been obstructed for years due to the Islamic Republic's stance. There is also no need to recall the concerns in Tehran over the developments in Syria, which reached the point of addressing a warning to Turkey to get it to change its position towards the Syrian protest movement. Moreover, the Gulf position in regard to what is happening in Syria is a source of annoyance for Iran for several reasons. For one thing, it may have found itself to be the only state backing the Syrian regime today, something that is alienating many Syrian and Arab factions. Also, every day, Iran hears dissenters accusing it of supporting the regime in Damascus with both money and men. In this context, Tehran is afraid to see the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the Arab League repeating the Libyan scenario, during which the Gulf position was the hoist that provided an Arab cover for an international resolution to protect the civilians being threatened by Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. Also, the Islamic Republic knows that the GCC initiative for a settlement in Yemen constitutes the backbone for most of the international positions toward the protest movement in this country and the ways to ensure a peaceful transition of power there. In addition to all these transformations, there are the statements being reiterated by senior Egyptian officials regarding the fact that the security of the Gulf States is an inherent part of Egypt's security. This is enough to discourage the Islamic Republic that cheered the Egyptian revolution and placed high hopes on it, at a time when the Kingdom rushed to support the Egyptian treasury with $4 billion, to confirm the depth of the relations between the two countries, despite the change that took place in Egypt. However, it was not only surprised by this position, but also by the fact that Cairo has regained the Gaza card, i.e. restored its “sway” over Hamas, which - before the protests in Syria - was standing behind the Iranian and Syrian policies. This position constituted the basis of the dispute between Damascus and Cairo during the last few years and somewhat led to lukewarm relations between Syria and some GCC countries. In the meantime, Iran is aware of the fact that the situation in Iraq might witness changes at the security and military levels, following the pullout of American troops from the country at the end of the year. It is also aware of the fact – although it does not recognize this – that the role played by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, in addition to the American role, are curbing its monopolization over the Iraqi sphere. Consequently, despite its discounting and disregarding of others, it must take into account the interests of the Kingdom in this country that does not only constitute the Arabs' eastern gate, but also the main gateway into the Gulf States! Here, it is known that Tehran always accused Riyadh of supporting some Sunni factions in Iraq against the pro-Iranian government in Baghdad, bearing in mind that more than one American official accused Tehran of having backed up and continuing to back up sides affiliated to Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, as well as the organization's branch in the Arabian Peninsula and “Hezbollah in the Hijaz.” It is also known that Riyadh accused it of standing behind some terrorist operations in the Kingdom – namely the Al-Khobar attack against American troops – and some problems during the pilgrimage season. Hence the warning issued by the Saudi Interior Ministry regarding the fact that it will not allow any chaos or turmoil during the pilgrimage season which starts in two weeks. Based on its definition, a cold war could mark the birth of settlements or the birth of confrontations. So, what shall be engendered by the American accusations against Iran, of namely plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington and collaborating with some groups from Al-Qaeda?
