It is enough for the Islamists of the Arab revolutions – from Tunisia to Egypt and Syria – to recognize that they are drawing their inspiration from the experience of the Justice and Development Party for Iran to feel jealous and concerned. It is also enough for Ankara to host the Syrian opposition's conference and express its anger toward the “brutal” way with which the Syrian action is being confronted for Tehran to express its disgruntlement, its further concerns and its support of the regime in Damascus. This was countered by the regime's oppositionists with a campaign against the Islamic Republic – knowing that this campaign did not spare Hezbollah, whose leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah expressed his clear and blunt bias in favor of the regime in Damascus. Hezbollah was remaining silent vis-à-vis the ongoing developments, leaving it up to its media outlets to reiterate the official Syrian version of the events. However, the increase of the pressures and sanctions on Syria and the rise of the Turkish tone toward it, did not only push the party to announce it was standing alongside the regime, but also to affirm it respected Damascus' wish to hasten the birth of the new Lebanese government. This hastening not only conveyed the fears of the “rejectionism alliance” from the repercussions of the Arab action until now, but also reflected an inclination to rearrange the ranks from Tehran to Damascus and Beirut, in order to confront what the sides of the alliance have agreed to call a “conspiracy” targeting the “resisting” Syria to serve the American and Israeli projects. Moreover, it marked the continuation of the conflict over Syria, which – following the recent events in Lebanon – has chosen to take sides with the two allies from which some Arabs and the West were hoping to distance it not too long ago. Also, let us not forget that there is a Syrian-Iranian feeling that Hamas has become closer to Cairo than it is to Damascus and Tehran. More than once, the Iranian command tried to give the impression that the Arab revolutions were drawing their inspiration from the experience of the Islamic Republic. But deep within, it needed someone to convince it – before all others – of the soundness of this belief. In the meantime, Turkey has so far acted based on a true wish to build steady bridges with the crowds of these revolutions, for numerous doctrinal, political, economic and strategic reasons. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who hesitated for two days before calling on President Hosni Mubarak to step down, waited a long time before addressing the same message to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. This reluctant position was governed by the necessity of guaranteeing the exit of around 25,000 of his citizens who were working in the Jamahiriya, but also of securing around $15 billion belonging to the Turkish companies and are part of projects and investments in the country. The position was also governed by the fear of seeing the Jamahiriya turning into another Iraq, which is the same fear that dictated his handling of the Syrian crisis. It is known at this level that on the eve of the formation of his new government, Ankara encouraged President Bashar al-Assad to include oppositionists in it, in order to find a settlement and proceed with the reforms instead of escalating the situation and entering the tunnel of confrontations which are ongoing until this day. And while Turkey handled the events in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya in a way confirming its choice to deal with the new leaders – including the Islamists at the head of which is the Muslim Brotherhood – it cannot stand in the face of the action in Syria. Erdogan has behaved and is still behaving toward the activity on his southern border based on the fact that what is happening concerns his country as much as it concerns Damascus. He believes that the Syrian events have become a “difficult case,” and that the situation over there was generating internal repercussions in Turkey itself, whether at the level of the flow of the refugees or the tensions on the border, but especially the increase of the complications facing the attempt of the authorities in Turkey to find a settlement with the Kurds living southeast of the country. Turkey defined its position alongside the rising young powers, as it cannot stand by the traditional elite which have been governing the country since the departure of colonialism or tutelage. But despite all that is shared by the two neighboring states, Turkey feels as impotent as all the other countries at the level of getting Al-Assad to introduce drastic reforms to avoid anarchy and the continuation of the violence. Moreover, it does not enjoy the tools to push in this direction, unless it decides to sever all ties with the regime. It is as impotent as all the others in the face of a president who is the subject of complaints by the secretary general of the United Nations and some American congressmen because he is not taking their calls! Erdogan, who established a warm personal relationship with President Al-Assad, cannot allow this relationship to prevail over the interests of his party and his country, and cannot proceed with his “favoritism” while knowing that the majority of the active factions of the Justice and Development Party have not yet forgotten their past in the Muslim Brotherhood or their sympathy toward the Syrian branch of the organization. He also knows that the escalation of chaos on the southern border will constitute a strong blow to Turkey which invested a lot during the last few years. It would be enough to say that Syria is its real gateway toward Lebanon, Jordan, the Gulf and Yemen and the bridge toward free trade throughout the Levant. Consequently, the closing of the border between the two countries would mean the closing of the border with Lebanon and Jordan, at a time when the new Lebanese government was created in haste to stand alongside Damascus in its conflict with the outside and internal arenas. This means that for now, Syria is still allowing the prevalence of the Iranian role, which ought to force the new government of the Justice and Development Party to fully reconsider its policy toward the region. This does not mean a pullout, as much as it means further integration to meet the wishes of several Arab countries, in a way going in line with the foreign policy drawn up by the party to open up to the Middle Eastern space, enhance its position when dealing with Europe and America and most importantly strengthen its commerce and investments. Turkey's attempt to establish a space of economic cooperation with the “great” Middle East will be without value if the Levant were to drown in anarchy. Actually, this drowning would mean the collapse of all the wagers of Turkish diplomacy, for whose accomplishment it worked throughout a decade. On the opposite end, if change in the region were to proceed with its course as it is desired by Ankara, this would allow it to hoist the new regional order, especially since most of the Arab countries hope to see a prominent Turkish role that would distance the Arabs from the grip of the Israeli and Iranian threats. This is happening at a time when the unreserved Turkish momentum had – in the past – prompted Arab reservations and fears, especially in Egypt and among the Arab elite who were never able to erase from their memories “the times of Ottoman hegemony.” This can clearly be seen from the extent of the Syrian regime's current dissatisfaction with the rhetoric of the Turkish officials toward the incidents in the southern neighbor, and the Syrian media outlets are filled with comments related to the statements of Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and others. This reached the point of raising the banner of the “stolen Iskenderun” which was relinquished by Damascus in the context of the rapprochement agreements with Ankara during the past years. It is no secret that just like Iran, Turkey is wagering on the Syrian bridge into the region, but it certainly does not wish to reach the point of clashing with it, especially since what links the two countries on the commercial and oil levels is massive. The same concerns are shared by the Islamic Republic, because Tehran is aware of the extent of its loss if it were to lose the Turkish neighbor. It is also concerned about the United States' and Europe's reassurance toward the emergence of this Islamic inclination that is headed by the MB movements at the level of the Arab revolutions. Indeed, the West believes that this new Sunni “elite” will not hesitate to confront “Shiite” Iran if it were to extend its influence over the space of the Arab “system” from Bahrain to Lebanon. In the meantime, Washington is not hesitating to accuse Iran of supporting Damascus in the face of the demonstrations and in the suppression of the action, which is enhancing the denominational tensions in the region. Now, the question is: Will Turkey still be able to combine two opposites? Will it still be able to produce the necessary warmth at the level of the relations with Iran which also cannot risk losing the Syrian bridge it has built throughout thirty years and used it to reach the shores of Lebanon and Gaza? Will Turkey manage to continue humoring the regime in Damascus and hosting the opposition parties at the same time? If it is serious about its bias in favor of the popular action, the upcoming days will place it before a total severance of relations with Damascus and Tehran, if not in an open confrontation with them, especially if it were to uphold the policy of hosting the refugees and protecting those waiting on the border. This is a policy which Syria does not wish to see emulating the policy of the “protection of the civilians” in Libya, and definitely does not wish to see growing closer to the policy of the “safe haven” established in northern Iraq during the days of Saddam Hussein's siege!
