Turkey's ambition of leading the Muslim world faces many obstacles, some of them domestic and others foreign. Achieving such an ambition would have been possible when the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) presented itself as a modern model of political Islam that went beyond sectarianism and confessionalism and was subject to the methods of secular government established by Atatürk, in contrast to prevailing trends in the region. Turkey's behavior changed since the “Arab Spring" started in Tunisia, then moved to Egypt and exploded in Libya. Indeed, it considered itself to be victorious, and started to prepare to reap the fruits of this victory in its direct neighborhood, i.e. Baghdad and Damascus. But the events in Syria came to confirm that achieving such an ambition was nearly impossible, after Ankara abandoned its moderate approach and donned its battlefield attire, preparing to take part in reshaping the Middle East on sectarian and ethnic bases, not realizing that it was exposed to having its own map redrawn just like other countries home to multiple sects and confessions. It is true that Turkey's economic successes, its excess military force and the fact that its government is from the majority, in addition to its relations with the United States and membership in NATO, provide it with protection and make it an essential player in the new Middle East. Yet it is also true that, without internal cohesion, such strength would become a danger for itself before others. Such danger has become clearly apparent ever since the shift made by the AKP government from keeping problems at zero to inflaming them, thus turning over a few months from Syria's best friend into its worst enemy, and from Iraq's prime trade partner into one in a relationship of clear enmity with it. This has reflected on Turkey's interior, where the opposition grew stronger and restlessness began to appear within the army, forcing the government to discharge a large number of high-ranking officers and to arrest others from a particular sect, under the pretext that they had been planning a coup. This has also reflected on the situation of the Kurds, whose dream has been awakened of establishing their own country on lands that could be taken away from Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Indeed, gone is the era of cooperation between Ankara, Damascus and Baghdad, which had put an end to such a dream. This threat also appeared clearly after battles erupted in Aleppo and Ankara hinted at establishing a buffer zone that would include Syria's trade capital, or large parts of its countryside, and turning it into a Syrian “Benghazi" in preparation for an assault against the regime in Damascus. Yet Ankara's calculations were incompatible with the reality on the ground, especially after Syrian Kurds took control of large areas in coordination with Damascus. This means, among other things, that Syria had prepared to respond by establishing a safe haven for armed Kurdish fighters – one connected directly to Turkish and Iraqi areas. This is why Erdoğan's government declared seven areas (inhabited by a majority of Kurds) military zones, which entry to and exit from would be restricted. And it may well be forced to establish similar zones at the border with Iskenderun if inter-Syrian battles were to move there. The Syrian regime is not the only one to be besieging itself from within and from without, believing that military might would protect it. Erdoğan too is besieging himself, believing himself to be doing away with the dreams of the Kurds, and of others as well. What Syria is witnessing today will move to its surroundings, and the old maps will not remain in the history books.
