As soon as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan completed his visit to Lebanon, where some were keen on welcoming him by describing him as the symbol of renewed Ottomanism, Prime Minister Saad Hariri was packing his bags and heading to Tehran, a capital which some other Lebanese accuse of using South Lebanon's soil to establish an Iranian base on the Mediterranean. Lebanese media outlets did not fail to note the differences between the manner in which preparations were made to welcome Iranian President Ahmadinejad, and the manner in which Turkey's Prime Minster was welcomed. The differences were strongly characterized by their sectarian nature, especially in the popular aspect of these receptions. Indeed, as opposed to the festivals that took place in Beirut's Southern Suburb and in Bint Jbeil to welcome Ahmadinejad, where Shiite participation was dominant, the same was repeated in festivals in Saida and the villages of Akkar, where receptions took on a Sunni character par excellence, and in fact a Turkmen character as well, as was the case in the two Northern villages of Kawashra and Aidamoun. There is of course Lebanese nostalgia in both cases, nostalgia that seeks those who would titillate its dreams. In both cases also, there is Lebanese flight, as a result of the current collapse of national identity, towards the embrace of others. Yet at the same time, the Lebanese ignore what those others seek from embracing their “followers”. And if Ahmadinejad's supporters in Lebanon, who raised Iranian slogans to welcome him, have the audacity to declare their allegiance to the Velayat-e-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), in spite of it being in contradiction with every basis upon which rests Lebanon as a nation, or what is left of it, those who welcomed Erdoğan displayed more sympathy for restoring the “glory” of the Ottoman Empire than Erdoğan himself would dare to voice, despite his attempts at a break with the legacy of Atatürk. Just like the Velayat-e-Faqih, such pining for past Ottoman glory seems only to be a plan opposed to the modern Lebanese state that arose on its ruins, as did the remaining countries of the Arab Levant. Although the Lebanese are serious about looking for the means of regional support to strengthen their internal frontlines, the truth is that the sectarian competition that dominated the two receptions prepared for each of Ahmadinejad and Erdoğan is “Lebanese competition” that reflects the regional sectarian conflict. Yet it is a competition that has no equivalent between Turkey and Iran, in terms of the role they seek to play in the region and in terms of defending their interests there. There is now what resembles complementarity between the roles played by Turkey and Iran, comparing with the former rivalry since the rise of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran. This is largely due to the reversal brought about by the Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in Ankara, as well as to the attempt by Tehran and all the forces that orbit around it, with their diverse sectarian identities, to make use of such reversal and try to benefit from it. Based on this, there is a wager among the “defiant” in the region on the support that Turkey's power could afford. As for the degree to which they can benefit from such support, it remains in question, especially as Turkey's role has not been able to contribute, neither negatively nor positively, to altering the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel, in spite, and sometimes because, of the thunderous speeches that have characterized Erdoğan. There are many examples of the failure of this role, from the collapse of Turkish mediation between Syria and Israel, which Damascus had greatly relied on, to the failure to prevent strengthened sanctions against Iran, and up to approving NATO's missile shield, aimed at what NATO considers to be an “Iranian threat”. If Iran has a coherent sectarian plan in the region, those competing against such plans are dreaming if they have placed their wager on a Turkish plan that can serve the interests of those who feel that their influence is waning as a result of the expansion of Iran's plans. Turkey seeks to achieve commercial, economic and political interests, and on its path to this does not mind relying on a discourse of mobilization, no more, no less – one that calls for applause according to the identity of the public. An example of this is the applause received by Erdoğan threatening the Israelis from Beirut, saying: we will not be silent about what Israel is doing and we will say with everything we have that we stand with what is right. Conversely, in the other speech Erdoğan gave in Akkar, in which he touched upon the assassination of Rafic Hariri, he said: we will call for implementing international law and we say loud and clear in the face of the murderers – yes, you are the murderers. There is a time and place for everything, the Erdoğan way.
