Erdoğan dedicating his victory in the elections to Ramallah, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Sarajevo, the Balkans, and “the entire nation” was only to remind of some of the political geography of the Ottoman Empire, and also that he would not give up the gains he has achieved over the past few years in the Levant through the Syrian gateway, and in the Balkans through Turkish-speakers. The limits of the nation Erdoğan speaks of are not limited to those two regions, but exceed them to a Europe that is apprehensive of introducing a Muslim country to the paradise of its Union, despite the fact that it confronted the Soviet Union with its Islam during the Cold War, and despite its longstanding military alliance with Israel against the Arabs. The soul of the nation Erdoğan speaks of is Islam as well. It is the only link between its many quarrelling races and ethnicities, whether in the Turkish interior or outside of it. By turning to religion, the Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) was able to bring together the Turkish mosaic, inspired by the past of an empire that was the center of the Caliphate for many centuries, renewing its ambitions in its neighborhood and beyond it. And what is Neo-Ottomanism but the echo of such a past? This link, as well as its influence on the interior and on the neighborhood, turn Turkey into a regional superpower and allow it to impose itself on Europe and on the West as a whole. It also consecrates its role in issues of war and peace, on the background of unprecedented Arab vacuum, and on the background of escalating and escalated enmity against Iran, which also ambitions to consecrate itself as a regional superpower. Erdoğan was able to remain in power for the third time, thanks to his “moderate” Islamist proposals in the interior, but his foreign ambitions are being subjected to many challenges, which is why he has tried to take advantage of the Arab Spring by embracing “the nation” instead of standing alongside the regimes of his allies. This explains his stance on Gaddafi's regime, after he had defended him and wagered on his remaining in power at the start of the crisis in order to preserve the investments of his companies. He abandoned him and took the side of his enemies in order to preserve those investments as well, and so that he may have a role to play in the formation of whatever regime comes after the Colonel. The mix between religious ideology and pragmatism is what has distinguished the direction taken by Erdoğan and his party, and his welcoming Syrian refugees is only the practical translation of such a direction: standing alongside “the nation” that has risen up in order to ensure interests in the future, and offering the regime advice that takes on the form of publicly warning of support for those participating in the uprising (some assert that Turkish authorities are encouraging the displaced not to return to their villages). One very “optimistic” scenario goes as far as saying that Turkey is preparing for the worst, politically and militarily, as several officials in Ankara have said, among such preparations being the possibility of turning a buffer zone on both sides of the border into a base for the opposition, a base of operations if necessary, similar to that of the Kurdistan province on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. Yet such a scenario goes too far and does not take into account the response from Damascus and its allies, aside from the fact that it would be an adventure that would not spare the Turkish interior from its consequences, at the ethnic level among Kurds and at the sectarian level among Alawites, in addition to the possibility of the military returning to power in Ankara. Then the Sultan's wager on “the nation” would be similar to the wager on it made by the Sultan of old, a wager that toppled the Caliphate and nearly did away with Turkey itself. Syria's predicament is faced by a Turkish predicament as well as an Arab one. And the modern Sultan is behaving under the inspiration of Ottoman history, ignoring the theory of “zero problems” with the neighborhood. As for the Arabs, they care only about their small circles, and let the regime and all of Syria go to hell.
