The speech by Lebanese President Michel Suleiman on Wednesday raised issues and questions, both implicit and fundamental, that are the subject of concern by narrow circles within the country's Sunni and Shiite communities. These questions and concerns spring from the Lebanese people's urgent need to prepare for the possibility of the fall of the Syrian regime. In his urging of the various political groups to accept the process of National Dialogue that he called for, Suleiman warned against "mistaken decisions and stances, based on confused readings or short-sighted calculations. In the logic of the history of our pluralist society, one partisan group cannot dominate another; one sect cannot dominate another, and one religion cannot dominate another in Lebanon. The country cannot see weapons exercise control over our territory, no matter how fixed or how changing the domestic or regional balance of power." It would be logical to describe these comments as fundamentally important, if one notices the profound fears that are active in the ranks of the two groups confronting each other in the country, namely the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, and more particularly, the Shiites and Sunnis. These fears may be summed up as follows: 1-A portion of the Shiite public is afraid that the weakening and fall of the Syrian regime will be used to harm what it believes are the benefits it has obtained because of the Syrian support for the resistance, and because the Syrian-Iranian alliance fully supports the interest of the sect and its role, whose impact is growing in Lebanon's internal political equation. This public is hard-line in its insistence on the weapons of Hezbollah and the resistance. It believes that an attack on these weapons will take place because of the likely change in Syria; this Shiite public, along with other leaders in its ranks, leans toward denying that there is an uprising in Syria. It insists on the foreign conspiracy theory and the allied regime's ability to achieve victory. It believes that the regime's regional negotiation cards, from Iran to Iraq and some Gulf states, in addition to its ability to confront Israel, render it a regional power that is difficult to weaken. In contrast, a handful of this public, even in Hezbollah and Amal, think that change is coming in Syria as part of regional transformations. This requires a dialogue between Hezbollah and the Future Movement in particular; it does not rule out mistakes in political behavior in recent years toward this partner, and a new formula of understanding should be worked out. 2-The overwhelming majority of the Sunni public believes that Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, which weakened its role in the domestic political equation and harmed its leading figures, has begun to weaken. It believes that the political groups that benefited from this dominance, especially the Shiites, should return to their earlier political weight, in proportion to the decline of the regional political formula that produced Hezbollah's weapons and its political and security influence in Lebanon. This is especially the case because the dominance of armed groups has led to chaos in the streets and in official institutions, which these groups should give up power over. In contrast, a small number of figures and thinkers in the Sunni community and the Future Movement itself believe that it is time to have a serious dialogue with Hezbollah. First of all, it is in order to reach an understanding on saving the country from the repercussions of the Syria crisis on Lebanon's domestic situation. Secondly, this dialogue would be about the future, based on the need to reassure the Shiite public and Hezbollah that the end of an era of foreign influence on the Lebanese political equation does not mean harming the status of the sect and its political groups. Also, treating the issue of Hezbollah's arms should take place in stages, taking into consideration the possibility of benefiting from these weapons, to achieve a minimum level of stability in Lebanon, in a way that allows the country to avoid new confrontations that serve non-Lebanese ends. Between these two broad schools of thought, perhaps President Suleiman's warning about mistaken readings or short-term calculations touched on, whether or not deliberately, what is implicitly taking place in these two communities. However, it certainly touched on the implicit fears of the concerned groups. One might say that painting such a picture, and the position of Suleiman in it, represents an unrealistic belief that the fall of the Syrian regime is imminent, and a search for the phase that will follow. In fact, this collapse will not take place quickly, as many hope, unless a surprise emerges. The bitter truth is that one Lebanese side has come to link its policies in Lebanon to work tirelessly, using all available means, to defend the regime. When Tehran decides to do everything to prevent change in Syria, to the degree of threatening a regional war undertaken by the forces of resistance and defiance of the west, the rhetoric of Hezbollah will become one of "nothing is more important than the current battle." Then, any small group within the party, and thus on the other side, will be blocked from beginning this dialogue. Certainly, Suleiman did not base his calculations on a "short-term reading" that the fall of the Syrian regime is imminent. He is not known to be hasty, despite his affirmation that "weapons are now at the heart of the domestic discussion." But he, and many Lebanese, feel how sensitive the confrontation in Syria has become. The rising influence of regional factors in the confrontation, with the Syrian regime's insistence on a security solution, are taking place amid talk of role for Turkey and Jordan, and the exclusion of Lebanon. However, the fear is that the country will be used by the other regional camp, which is waging a war that enshrines the survival of the regime. Perhaps Suleiman's warning will help head off this development.
