The Syrian crisis caught the neighboring countries by surprise. It has also shocked them with its endurance, depth, appalling scenes, and the threats it poses as well as the sheer number of victims it has claimed. Syria's neighbors once believed that the Syrian regime was firm, rigidly airtight and stable. They thought that the four-decade old fortress would not allow a storm to blow from within and unsettle its bricks and stones. The regime rested on its laurels, believing that it will be able to ‘nip sedition in the bud'. The regime always maintained that the threat is external, taking the form of a ‘conspiracy' to punish the regime for its pro-resistance stance. But the regime failed to notice the new generation, which was quick to reject the antiquated discourse. Instead, the regime wagered on its fixed positions in foreign policy and the strict security apparatus in domestic affairs. It did not realize that the ruling party had expired when it became infiltrated by the security services and private interests, and that intelligence reports had only widened the gap between the people and the corridors of power. The regime went too far in wagering on the gains of its foreign policy, such as with its success in helping defeat the U.S. invasion of Iraq; its awareness of the need to withdraw from Lebanon at the conclusion of one of the longest compulsory Arab unions; and its success in returning to the international arena - with Turkish advice, Qatari support, French participation and Saudi encouragement. The regime cultivated these successes, but declined to pay the prices required in return, both at home and abroad. These prices required a modicum of moderation in foreign policy, and a serious amount of openness in the interior. For this reason, the regime rushed to confront the wave of protests after losing the safety valves it had by virtue of its relations with the capitals of the moderate camp, in the region and beyond. Syria does not resemble Tunisia or Libya. It cannot be compared to Egypt either. Its composition is different and delicate, and its regime is different and so its position. Syria is closely linked to the arteries of its neighboring countries. Its fires may well spill over, and change there has prices just like protracted civil wars have. In Amman's night, the Syrian scenes thus overwhelm you; cruel, hurtful, dangerous and sad scenes. Jordan, too, is condemned to coexist with the Syrian fire, and the protest movement on its streets. Yet you do not sense in Amman that the country is on the verge of collapse. For one thing, the Jordanian authorities did not cave in to the temptation of repression. They did not allow Fridays to turn into funeral-begetting days, and did not address the protesters with bullets or consider them marauding armed gangs. The Jordanian authorities understood the messages of the street, or at least some of them. They tried to turn the problem into an opportunity. They concluded that the best way to react to the winds of the Arab spring is to go far in political reform, which factions within the regime had managed to obstruct in recent years. The Jordanian establishment realized that talk of combatting corruption must be translated in practice, and that institutions must be given immunity and their work must be transparent. It also realized that the way out of the unrest on the streets is to let the Jordanians express themselves in fair and transparent elections. Thus, the Jordanian establishment decided to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood as a part of the national fabric, and sought to entice the group into participating in elections, without allowing them to dictate the rules of the game in a manner that goes beyond the size of their actual representation. At the office of King Abdullah II, the visitor hears that the decision to embark on a process of reforms is final and irreversible, and that the elections, likely to be held at the end of the year, will be free and fair. The visitor also hears similar talk in other influential places. Talk about the spring also intermingles with talk about the tough economic situation, and appreciation for the role played by Saudi Arabia in recent years in preventing the economy from suffocating. Amman is waiting, but it is waiting under a government that is able to convene, and military and security institutions that can hold it together, amid a belief among the Jordanians that reforming the regime is a necessity but that overthrowing it is out of the question. Indeed, this would be an adventure that may open the door to disintegration and civil war. Meanwhile, the Lebanese are doing their waiting near the abyss. Khaled Mashaal, head of the Political Bureau Hamas, was in Amman, visiting and receiving people. I thus went to see him. In the past years, I became accustomed to visiting him in Damascus. The Arab spring has changed many things, however. Now, Mashaal can sleep in many capitals.
