Syria did not anticipate the fire of the Arab Spring to spread into its territories, believing that the pro-opposition policy it pursues is intimately linked to the ordinary Syrian's feelings. Thus Syria acted as though it indeed enjoys such immunity, possibly wagering on the strict security grip that it has enjoyed for decades. Perhaps Syria even believed that the Muslim Brotherhood has not awaken yet after the fatal blow they were dealt in the early eighties, and that the other factions in the opposition do not have strong roots in the society. The growth of religious sentiment across Syrian society was no secret in the past ten years, but the authorities believed that they had succeeded in coexisting with and taming it. The Syrian stance on the U.S. invasion of Iraq denied the Friday preachers the opportunity to project some of their anger onto the government. Moreover, the Syrian authorities, which were belligerent and hostile to America and Israel, are allied with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Furthermore, Syria had strategic relations with Turkey and Qatar for years, two countries that have excellent and special ties with Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups and their likes. Syria was extremely preoccupied with its foreign battles, so much so that it forgot what it should have learned from the former Damascus Spring, especially with regard to two main issues: The Party's aversion to reform to which it became a major hurdle, and the issue of freedoms and the exaggerated control exercised by the security services over the citizens' lives. Successes in foreign battles thus delayed efforts to address internal issues. The regime became too preoccupied to anticipate issues that cannot be deferred indefinitely. Some who directly witnessed that era believe that the network of the Party-Security services, which had succeeded in stopping the Damascus Spring dead in its tracks, had also succeeded in stroking fear with regard to any kind of change, and in solidifying the belief that the foreign sphere can solve domestic issues. In their belief, the authorities' relationship with Turkey, Qatar and France thus must not contradict the essence of life in the pro-opposition camp, and that instead, the economic and diplomatic benefits of such relations must be exploited to bolster Syria's position in this camp, while economic openness must not infringe upon the dominance of the Party and the security services' grap. Suddenly, the Syrian authorities found themselves caught in the cycle of protests. They reacted with a mixture of anxiety and cruelty. The security services-Party network interpreted the developments as being winds blowing from abroad, and concluded that success in this confrontation requires learning from the lessons of other countries. The network deduced that the protesters must be prevented from finding the equivalent of Tahrir Square and a permanent site for their protests, and that winning the battle requires precluding million-strong -and below million- demonstrations, or in other words, gatherings that countries of the world would be able to rely on to say that the regime has been isolated. Thus, the emergence of the Syrian equivalent of Benghazi near this or that border must be prevented, because this would otherwise facilitate international intervention, while it was resolved that directing decisive strikes against the hubs of the protest movement is sufficient to circumvent and extinguish the fire. It could be argued that the Syrian authorities were able to achieve this, but with a high price at home, and an even higher price abroad. Nine months after the outbreak of protests, the crisis in Syria is growing deeper, as the country inches ever closer to civil war. The crisis in Syria has overlapped with sectarian fault-lines in the region. Syria has also suffered consecutive losses of relations that were once described as strategic, and today, the country faces Arab and international isolation. While Russian opposition has prevented a resolution at the level of the Security Council, who can guarantee that this will last, and if so, then at what price? This is not to mention the fact that Syria has lost the media battle since the first few weeks of the protests. Nothing suggests that there will be a rapid resolution to the standoff on the ground in Syria. Every day that passes carries more funerals and tragedies. Every day sees the crisis deepening more and more. The only idea circulating at present is the Arab initiative. But the more Damascus reads into the provisions of the initiative, the more it remembers the Gulf initiative in Yemen, and the more it feels that the medicine is very harsh. However, experience tells us that taking a bitter medicine may be better than remaining without treatment, and subjecting oneself to inflammations, buffer zones, no-fly zones and destructive surgeries.
