If the only goal behind the parliamentary elections in Libya is to erase the image left behind by the former Libyan regime – in terms of its dismissal of the people's awareness and the imposition of the dictatorship of the Green Book – the operation on the security and future levels constitutes the beginning of the march in the right direction. At the very least, it imposes new rules going against the principles which prevailed throughout four decades in regard to democracy, the role of the parties and the prerogatives of the popular committees which operated based on militia logic. And while the change which toppled Colonel Al-Gaddafi paved the way before Libya's integration in the system of states that are not outside the context of the concord and laws setting the beat of international relations, the democratic process will not be an easy one. Its difficulties might reside in the fact that it will be launched from square one, with the annulment of the facets of hostility toward all that is democratic, so that the newborn state can achieve positive normalization with the values of openness, plurality and the acceptance of the others without the need for oppression and the use of arms. The same goes to the negative impact of a stage which was not subjected to any classification or description, and during which the institutions and mechanisms were absent and the state was limited to the person of the leader who was truly able to lead the country towards the hell of prisons, the poles of the gallows and the era of backwardness. Exiting this tunnel will be difficult, but not impossible, in order to ensure a smooth transition that would eliminate the facets of the crisis and instability, and undermine any radical inclinations. The Libyan experience is different from all others, considering that it emerged in circumstances contrasting with the ones which prevailed in the region. And although it was provoked by a will to achieve salvation and change, its democratic mechanisms – whether in terms of parties or laws – require further patience, rationality and know-how. By comparison, its eastern neighbor Egypt has reached the world of elections, competition and the will expressed via the ballot boxes through wide partisan experience and political traditions, ones which were impossible to eradicate by the drawing up of charts that was much to the liking of the former regime. To its west, the deposed ruler of the Palace of Carthage could not annihilate the opposition political forces, although he used all possible eradication means. This is why the collapse of his regime constituted an opportunity to allow Tunisia to rise to the forefront via democratic means. The Libyan situation is also different from the previous Algerian experience which was dubbed by Dr. Taleb al-Ibrahimi as being the Algerian spring that never matured. Indeed, those opposing plurality carried out a serial thwarting operation at the beginning of the nineties. Nonetheless, Algeria which healed its wounds did not wish – after having discovered the recipe of the new spring – to change a pattern with which it is coping, along with the current facts. This interaction's geographic spectrum reveals the imminent surfacing of a new political culture. The best example of democracy is that it does not stop at the counting of the votes earned by this or that party solely, but also measures the inclinations of the street and the strength of the political actors when allying with or resisting each other. This means that no one can anticipate the outcome of the Libyan elections, without summoning the momentum featured in the post-revolution interaction. The most important discovery exposed by the Libyan experience is that it is closer to the laws of political gravity. Indeed, the faction which was being depicted as though unconcerned by the political practices is the one that rebelled against its objectification or its treatment as though a mere secondary actor in the choir of loyalists. This is the same faction seeking a place under the sun, but this time, via competition and the ballot boxes. This shows that the Libyan wager has dual goals. On one hand, it wishes to set the foundations for a new political system relying on an unchallenged legitimacy, and on the other, to see competition between ideas and options in choosing the ruling elite. This in itself is a development only matched by the wish to transform Libya into an ordinary state that is far away from illusions, open to its people and relying on balance and coexistence at the level of its relations. These challenges require the transformation of the parliamentary elections into a strategic wager, regardless of who will win or lose the seats. These are obvious factors featured in an honest competition governed by transparency and neutrality. Nonetheless, the building of the state comes first, after which the arrangement of the participation in the decision-making process by the majority or under the supervision of the opposition will not be difficult. What Libya has been doing until now and what should be done now remains an issue to be settled by the Libyans among themselves, and they can choose the closest road to Rome, i.e. the straight road combining stability and democracy.
