The Constituent Assembly elections in Tunisia and their results are not an internal Tunisian event. It is from there that the first spark of the ongoing Arab action erupted, and from its ballot boxes that the first lesson emerged. As for the new political powers, they will present the first experience, while the Islamists who are progressing toward power will present the first archetype. With the beginning of the announcement of the non-official preliminary results, the Ennahda movement seemed to be in a rush. It thus hastily opened the door before consultations with the other blocs that could participate with it in the next government. It should have shown patience, especially given that it has not left its defensive position since the success of the revolution and the beginning of the preparations for the elections. In the meantime, most of the liberation, nationalist and leftist powers and parties participated in the process with a project headlined “the fighting of Ennahda.” These forces could have probably reaped a larger number of seats in the Constituent Assembly had they gathered in a wide coalition, or at least presented another headline addressing the future of the country and the political identity, tackling the numerous problems and proposing the desired solutions to the economic and social sectors among others. Consequently, these forces now seem divided between those engaged in dialogue with the movement in preparation for participation in the next stage, and those closing the doors of cooperation in its face. Since the first day that followed the toppling of President Ben Ali's regime, Ennahda made sure to confirm it drew its inspiration from the Turkish model of governance, not only in Tunisia but also at the level of the entire Arab world. This would mean the establishment of a state in which the Islamic values merge with the modern democratic values as it was stated by the movement's leader Rached al-Ghannouchi. The movement is still upholding this rhetoric that constituted the pillar of its defense line in the face of its opponents, after the latter warned against the Islamists' rise to power to undermine all the modern acquisitions and women's rights that were built since the days of Habib Bourguiba until Ben Ali's departure. Hence, every day, it is reiterating its insistence on leading a coalition government with the participation of all the sides and has sent more than one message of reassurance domestically and abroad in regard to the country's – or rather the regime's – identity, by saying that Ennahda will rely on a market economy and power transition via the ballot boxes. However, some opponents of Ennahda are hinting to the fact that its pragmatism does not conceal the reality that it enjoys in its ranks a wing of youth who are more radical than the elders, as the latter were taught by the long exile and imprisonment experiences to be more realistic. So will these young elements have a different rhetoric inside the mosques and in the narrow partisan forums? And are the announced and excessively moderate positions only directed toward foreign consumption? Regardless of Ennahda's rhetoric, its experience cannot be similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, to that of the Salvation Front in the neighboring Algeria or to the Sudanese experience. And even if it adopts two or three speeches, it will not be able to overcome historical facts which characterized Tunisian society despite the tyranny it suffered. This is an advanced society that has countless graduates and college degree holders. It is a society that has known – although under tyranny – Islamic, liberal and leftist movements, as well as urban and unionist committees which it was never able to fully adjust. It also adopted an archetypal civil status law which established equality between Tunisian women and men, and constituted an economic miracle despite the confrontation led by the ousted regime to strike these lively and active powers. It witnessed a modernization action since the days of Habib Bourguiba, one which grew after the country's economy was linked to the European economies - especially at the level of the tourism and light industries sectors - which significantly contributed to the national income and provided thousands of jobs to cheap labor in the European industrial machine. Will Ennahda disregard these facts and the various political, intellectual and cultural points of strength in the Tunisian society? Will it risk addressing a blow to the country's economy? The sheikhs of Ennahda are well aware of the fact that there are massive domestic challenges, namely the numerous economic and social problems that were increased by the international economic recession, the wide-scale unemployment which was behind the youth outburst in Tunisia and the influences coming from across the border, i.e. from Egypt. Indeed, the latter is preparing its electoral process amid a raucous ideological dispute between the Islamists and the liberals, but also amid sectarian tensions, a resident fear vis-à-vis the possible infiltration of the remnants of the former regime and its National Party, and suspicions surrounding the military council. For its part, Libya is also feeling its way through a path filled with mines and complications, while Algeria is governed by concerns from the winds of change. In light of these internal and external challenges, can Ghannouchi and the men who are engaging in the governance experience for the first time from the highest position respect their commitments to maintain the civil character of the state and go far enough in the implementation of the Turkish model? Or will the outcome of the action in more than one Arab country bear repercussions on this first fruit of the Arab spring? The success of the elections in Tunisia will not be isolated from the future of the Islamic action in the Egyptian elections, as the conflict is still wide open. It will also not be isolated from the inclinations of the Islamists in Libya, where the community is more conservative than in the Tunisian neighbor. In this context, the course of the “war” against Gaddafi's regime enhanced the great role played by the fighters among the Islamists, whether at the level of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Fighting Group led by Abdelhakim Belhadj, who led the Tripoli “liberation” campaign. In the meantime, the conflict over power in Libya was launched early on and was governed by an ideological rather than a regional character. It thus seemed clear, since the attack on the head of the transitional executive authority, Mahmoud Jibril, that the Islamists are lying in wait and want to cash in the credit they accumulated throughout the months of combat against Gaddafi's brigades, not to mention the signals that were sent and the demons that were awakened by Mustafa Abdul Jalil's “liberation speech.” The revolution's successful toppling of Gaddafi and liberation of Libya gives the Arab spring more confidence, hope, strength and patience. The same goes for the success of the first democratic experience in Tunisia, as it will have an impact on the Arab action, provide a model to be followed by the Egyptians, and another that will pressure Syria and Yemen where the action is still confronting fierce resistance. So, after today, will the two latter countries be able to compare the “virtues and values” of the command under one leader and one party with what is being accomplished by the Tunisians, more than 90% of whom participated in the elections like crowds who have been parched throughout half a century? Is it logical to say that the Tunisian experience is part of an American project standing behind the entire Arab action, while even if the Americans and the Europeans are trying to secure their interests that would be among the simplest obligations of the states? Do the Tunisians not perceive their experience as being a wild expression of the wish to see change and restore the values of freedom, dignity, justice and equality? Are the Tunisians not presenting an archetype undermining all the theories of those dealing with the Arab spring based on double standards? The Tunisian experience allows the prediction of the outcome of the Arab action, and we would not be exaggerating if we were to say that the issue is related to the future of the political game in this country. There is no doubt that Ennahda's credibility is at stake, since it can either spread hope regarding the possible move of the Arab world from the era of tyranny to another brighter era at the level of individual freedoms, plurality, democracy, justice, equality and power transition no matter how long the pain and blood were to last, or provide a model for the possible confrontation of the values of our current times with all their facets, from the control of technology to the globalization of human rights and the economy. If the Tunisian model succeeds, will there be an opportunity to see Yemen or Syria presenting another one? Since the collapse of the Berlin wall and the birth of democracies in Eastern Europe and many Asian and Latin American countries, some Arab capitals, at the head of which is Damascus, have been wanting to emulate the Chinese model by flaunting Beijing's experience and its ability to lead society and its economy to the highest global ranks around. They blamed Russia for having fallen in anarchy due to its rush to introduce unstudied change. Hence, they have so far been relying on this Chinese model, with the addition of the known and repeated slogan related to the Islamic extremist “gangs” which will be the alternative for the existing regimes, and the warnings against chaos and the possible slip toward civil war, division or “Afghanization” as it was stated by President Bashar al-Assad two days ago. Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe before them took steps toward democracy and liberalism and achieved miracles. Even China and Russia under the Putin-Medvedev due and on which Damascus among others is nowadays relying, are establishing institutions allowing the prevalence of the law and securing a margin of freedoms and the respect of human rights. There is no doubt that the Tunisian experience and the Egyptian one which will follow will open the path before the promised change throughout the Arab world, from Iraq to Mauritania, unless Syria and Yemen have none other but the Sudanese model!
