During the presidential electoral campaign, Egypt went through a prosperous phase of freedom of expression and debate. The Egyptians thus heard countless talk and numerous promises from the presidential candidates. The climate, prior to the electoral silence that prevailed on the eve of the elections, was much similar to that which is seen in democracies around the world, in terms of ensuring expression and its freedom, even if this is the first time in its history that the country experiences such a pluralistic competition. And in order to confirm the unique character of these elections in their country, the Egyptian analysts stressed the fact that no one knew the name of the next president one day before the elections, considering that in the past, the name of the president was always known even before the electoral campaign was launched. This is the primary achievement registered by the new experience in Egypt. It is believed that such a climate would not have surfaced in Egypt, had it not been for the circumstances during the foggy transitional phase and the lack of clarity at the level of the nature of the Constitution and the president's prerogatives, knowing that the new and oscillating political balance in the country is forcing everyone – heretofore – to deal with all the political components and with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces based on its constitutional character. The climate of liberty, democracy and free voting cannot become a steady component of political life before the drafting of the Constitution and the laws that are binding to all the powers and unchallengeable in any way. This seems to be the actual wager of the presidential elections, after the parliamentary elections raised fears instead of offering solutions. In any case, and at the end of the first round, it is expected that the presidential competition will be limited to an Islamic candidate relying on the votes that produced the parliament – i.e. the Islamists with their various belongings – and a candidate combining a wide variety of inclinations – including the so-called remnants – and naturally enjoying the support of the military council. In other words, the electoral competition will be limited to the two most important and influential sides in the country, i.e. the military council and the Islamists, after it appeared for a while and before the launching of the presidential campaign that there was an understanding between both parties. Nonetheless, these speculations came to an end after the Islamists revealed their position vis-a-vis the military council's task and their wish to contain and legalize it, which prompted the competition to focus on this issue that will govern the new Constitution. In reality, the Islamists are not more religious than the military, and the military are not more persistent on the civil, democratic and secular state. In other words, the competition between the two sides is not directed by ideological concerns, as much as it is controlled by the size of the interests and influence. More than any other Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood group is aware of what it means to assume the presidency of the republic after having won the parliamentary and syndical elections. It means the achievement of the project on which it has been working for decades, and this is a golden opportunity that might never come again, and will be seized at the expense of the military council. Some estimates say that the Egyptian military institution controls around 30% of Egyptian economy, especially in the industrial sector, and that its branches are spread throughout the country through the army elements and the generals who assume upon their retirement leading administrative and economic posts. Regardless of the accuracy of this ratio, the military-economic-political component, which has extended deep within the country since the coup of the Free Officers six decades ago, enjoys real power, an influential position and major interests. Hence, despite their repeated announcements regarding their surrender of power to civilians, the generals will not hesitate to engage in confrontation to maintain their source of strength, which places their project in the face of that of the MB. And regardless of the name of the next president, this defiance will characterize the Egyptian political situation in the next stage. Indeed, if an Islamic president is elected, the two projects will enter direct confrontation, the first facet of which will feature demands to put an end to the role of the military council. And if a non-Islamic president is elected, he will definitely be close to this council, which will push the Islamists to oppose the president and to try to limit his prerogatives to a minimum in the new Constitution, by using their majority in parliament. Hence, the military and the Muslim Brotherhood will be the two sides involved in the next confrontation, unless the group relinquishes its major project, which seems unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future.
