The scene produced by the presidential elections in Egypt reveals that the political class, with all its formations, is not ready to respect – even in form – the peaceful transition toward democratic life, but also that what the country endured under the former regime did not push toward the reassessment of the work methods. The current conflict could be summarized by the confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood group and the military institution, both of which showed, each in its own way, a great divergence away from democratic practice. But at the same time, the so-called liberal and civilian powers did not show an insistence on this practice either. Even the presidential elections, especially in the ranks of the latter powers that should have been carrying the banner of democratic practice, appeared to be a retaliation operation against a regime whose page was turned, and not a starting point for a new system. Indeed, those who blatantly supported Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi or candidate of the military institution General Ahmed Shafik, justified this support by the wish to get rid of the other and not by a political conviction in a program. It is expected, if there is no new major surprise similar to the ones to which the Egyptians have become accustomed since President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, that these powers will not have a special position and will find themselves annexed to one of the sides of the conflict, even fueling that conflict as it happened in the disbanded parliament and at the level of the constitutional committee. Hence, the marginal character of these powers is limiting the major negative repercussions on democratic life, ones being caused by the practices of the military council and the Muslim Brotherhood, without this sparing them from the responsibility for allowing the conflict to be limited to these two parties after each of them chose to follow one of the two. The media show put on by Morsi and the entire media machine of the Muslim Brotherhood group following the elections, before the counting of the votes is completed and the results are officially announced, revealed a lust for power. Indeed, the man who delivered the “inauguration speech" – rather than commented on an electoral process whose outcome had not yet come out – only seemed interested in confirming his victory. By doing so, he did not respect the legal mechanism or the rules of the democratic game. He said he enjoyed a lead ranging between 2% and 3%, which meant that half the voters elected his opponent. Hence, he completely disregarded the aspirations and feelings of this half, and when a politician overlooks his opponent's opinion and the votes of his supporters in the ballot boxes, he is undermining the main foundation of the democratic process. Moreover, the greater predicament is that Morsi is the candidate of an organization led by a general guide, from whom the candidate draws his political legitimacy before and after the elections. The legitimacy of an individual is thus replacing that of popular voting, which undermines another key foundation of democracy. As to the other party in the conflict, i.e. the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces - that draws its legitimacy from its nomination by Mubarak before he stepped down and does not enjoy any prior popular or democratic assignment - it relied on the constitutional “appearance" to enhance its legitimacy, and granted itself rights surpassing the legitimacy of the voting. As to the revised constitutional declaration, it merely aims at limiting the elected president's freedom, and was likely drawn up based on the expectations surrounding the presidential polls and Morsi's arrival to power to besiege the new president and annul his electoral legitimacy. Hence, the conflict in Egypt is taking the shape of democratic practice, but this practice is subjected to the wishes to monopolize power, which denies the existence of democrats to protect this practice.
