The Syrian authorities are not accustomed to receiving international envoys who second-guess it over its behaviour on Syrian territory. The regime before did not accept such interference, whether it came carrying warnings or advice. Syria used to receive envoys who would call on Damascus to help curb a regional fire that it had the ability to influence or control. But that era is now gone. Syria has become a beleaguered state, with a wide-open file in nearby and faraway countries, and in the Security Council. Today, the Syrian authority cannot refuse to receive Annan, not because it believes he carries the antidote in his briefcase, but because receiving him would help Russia and China continue to be on Damascus's side. Otherwise, a refusal as such would exacerbate its international isolation. Its seat in the Arab League is already vacant, and the scenes carried by television networks around the world have turned the Arab, Islamic and international public opinions against the regime. And whenever its crisis is discussed in the Security Council, the regime becomes in need for Russian muscles to protect it from strong or explicit condemnations. Syria would not have received Annan if it had succeeded in quelling the open-ended protests on its soil. The Russian position provided Syria with a lot of time and yet it could not manage to stop the protests. Instead, Syria sank deeper into its conflicts, and the sights of harrowing cruelty and the excessive use of force only multiplied. The most recent of such scenes have become a burden on the regime's allies. This was evident from the Security Council's condemnation of the Houla massacre. Russia was able to tone down the condemnation, but could not prevent it altogether. Annan's mission is based on two failures highlighted in the previous phase of the crisis: The failure of the regime to put down the protests, and the failure of the opposition to uproot the regime. The mission is also based on the failure of the Western powers and the Friends of Syria to replicate the Libyan intervention scenario in Syria, while some purport that there has been no desire to do so for a multitude of reasons. Because the world cannot remain silent or sit idly by, Annan's mission appeared as though it was an opportunity for those who wanted to wager on it, hide behind it or bide their time with it, pending developments, surprises or changes in the situation. The opposition, too, would not have accepted Annan's medicines, if it had believed that victory was imminent or around the corner. At first glance, Annan appears weak. Developments on the ground portend a long and bloody conflict, which bears all the hallmarks of a civil war. Divisions in the Security Council prevent a strong and united message to be sent out. The horrific Syrian scenes can attract foreign fighters to Syria. The recent days have confirmed the ability of the tension to crossover to neighbouring countries. Yet in another respect, Annan appears strong. He represents an urgent American, Russian and international need. He is strong because of the weakness of the two sides in the conflict and their inability to prevail. And he is strong because no one else has a solution, or even an attempt to achieve a solution. The various sides have welcomed Annan's mission but are deeply doubtful of it as well. Syria knows that the six-point plan is the equivalent of an international resolution aimed at introducing changes to the regime that existed prior to the protests. Today, the regime knows that it has fallen into the trap when it was forced to receive the UN monitors. The testimony of the head of the UN team following the massacre in Houla was very significant, despite the reservation in its wording. The implementation of Annan's points places the regime in front of one option, namely partnership and distribution of posts and powers, in conjunction with reining in the security services. Changes of this kind effectively lead to the establishment of a different regime. This is not to mention the fact that some of the countries that support Annan's mission want to push it in the direction of the Yemeni solution. The opposition, too, saw Annan's mission as a trap that gives more time to the regime and demands it to engage it in dialogue if it implements the other points. However, in the absence of other alternatives, the opposition has swallowed the bitter medicine that is Annan's plan and is biding its time. Syria is sinking deeper into its bloody conflict. The massacres and bombings give one the impression that backtracking has become extremely difficult, if not impossible. The losses incurred by the regime tempt it to pursue its current approach, which remains open to all dangerous possibilities. And the losses incurred by the opposition tempt it to seek full victory, no matter how costly that would be. From the standpoint of the dangers surrounding Syria and the region as a result of a conflict that has gone out of bounds, Annan is trying to curb suicidal tendencies and complete his international and regional umbrella, despite his awareness that Syria is neither Libya nor Yemen. The options are limited: Either Annan or civil war. Experience tells us that drinking the bitter medicine is much better than jumping out the window.
