There will be no civil war in Lebanon, at least not in the near future. This is the result of the cold calculations and analyses conducted by the local forces that control the Lebanese politics. However, this does not negate the fact that several sides have tried to modify the power balances and ‘correct' some of the mistakes that have stained the sectarian equations in the past years. Last week's events fall in the context of what the business markets dub ‘profit-making.' Indeed, the Syrian regime is busy with the revolution, the economic siege, and its general crisis on one hand; and the cabinet formed by Syria's allies in Lebanon is confused by the extent of changes in the region, its failure to install agreement between its members, and the dismantlement of the state institutions, including the service, administrative and security institutions on the other hand. All this has given the oppositionists the impression that they can improve their positions. And just like the case of the markets, the ‘profit making' often comes along with a drop in the market indicators. Despite the imminent danger of the security chaos and deteriorating economic situation, this actually indicates that the situation that Bashar al-Assad and his allies wanted to establish in Lebanon has neared an end. The Hezbollah leadership asserted on several instances that it insists on preserving PM Najib Mikati's cabinet. Damascus is also sticking to this stand despite the severe criticism that the closest allies of the Syrian regime had directed at Mikati. Both Hezbollah and the Syrian regime know that it will be impossible to replace the present cabinet with one that is more responsive to their needs under the current local and international circumstances. Toppling the cabinet will be delayed until Hezbollah and the Syrian president see a need to this depending on the development of the Syrian revolution and on whether the regime will lose the cards that it is still holding. On the other hand, large Sunni opposition groups – especially those groups that do not belong to the Future movement – feel that the time has come to turn the May 7, 2008 page along with the political repercussions induced by the Doha accord. These sides believe that the Syrian revolution and the support of this revolution occupy a central position in their endeavor to tip the power balance that has been in strong favor for Hezbollah for years now. Many sides blame the party for insisting on dealing a blow to the Future movement and the position of Saad al-Hariri who represents a –relative – Sunni moderation, thus paving the way for much more radical factions within this sect. Others say that the party was quite aware of the meaning of its actions vis-à-vis Al-Hariri. Indeed, the Shi'i seclusion, growing arrogance and disregard of the common characteristics with more than half the Lebanese people, can only thrive in the face of a Sunni radicalism and seclusion. This does not mean that the Future movement and its leaders are acquitted from a long string of mistakes that they have made since 2005, including the lack of a reconciliatory vision with the Shi'i sect, the failure to comprehend the operative mechanisms of the Lebanese socio-politics, and the fact that a group of short-sighted persons controlled the movement in addition to the series of corruption scandals and arbitrary sackings from the movement's institutions in a country where political affairs intersect with economic and family matters. The Sunni political groups that are dubbed ‘Salafist' (we have reservations concerning the use of this term) are working to seize a space that is currently left uncontrolled. They are trying to benefit from the new givens and to self-impose as the representatives of the changes that are currently invading the Arab region. We will not be talking about the social and political nature of these groups at this point. However, one might say that the poor and middle classes within the Lebanese Sunni sect, namely dwelling in rural areas and in the Beiruti slums, want to at least make their voice heard once again by the Al-Hariri leadership; or to probably replace that leadership.
