The current leader of Sunnis in Lebanon believes that he will reap the benefits of the Arab Spring, particularly the results of the uprising in Syria. However, many signs indicate that this is a big delusion. Some supporters of Saad Hariri are citing the Islamic (Sunni) character of the Arab uprisings and the simultaneously active role of liberal currents in these uprisings. They are also talking about the beginning of dismantling the “axis of defiance”, and the accompanying decline in the rhetoric of Hizbullah, which is descending toward a psychotic level of tension and agitation. These elements, in their view, will serve the interest of the Future Movement of Hariri and renew and enshrine the leadership of Saad Hariri and his family over the Sunnis of Lebanon. This presumption springs from a one-sided reading of the situation. It is true that the Syrian regime has ended, or is about to. It is also true that the search for an alternative is on the table, and not the salvaging of a regime that has collapsed in political and economic terms. Moreover, Iran is facing domestic struggles between the supreme guide and the president, and the split in the conservative faction, which are profound; these rising problems exacerbate the danger of foreign threats and economic sanctions. Meanwhile, Hizbullah has lost its motivational strength, as its domestic and foreign policy boils down to talking about incidents in Qatif, Saudi Arabia. This behavior masks various desires and psychoses, and an excessive exploitation of the Christian political cover provided by the party's alliance with Michel Aoun, who is no less agitated for his part. However, all of the above factors do not automatically translate into more political capital for the Future Movement. The process of seeing losses by one side in the Lebanese sectarian political equation become victories for another side, and vice versa, requires the existence of mechanisms for this purpose. I argue that the Future Movement has experienced blows and setbacks, such that it is has been rendered unable to benefit from the changes currently underway, and particularly those that will soon impact the region. In the last seven years, with the ascent of Saad Hariri as the leader of Lebanon's Sunnis, Hariri's leadership has demonstrated an amazing level of incompetence, especially in its failure to learn from mistakes or take in the wider picture at the regional and international levels. This is irrespective that the recent past has seen a fierce conflict between domestic rivals, and pressures exerted by the Syrian authorities; true leaders appear in times of crisis, and not periods of political ease. While this column is insufficiently long to provide an inventory of Hariri's actions, in discussing the recent Arab uprisings one should mention what appears to be a central error committed by the former prime minister, namely the attempt to revive sectarian sentiment among Lebanon's Sunnis. If one reviews the history of this sect, and its geographical presence and demographic situation, one realizes that the Sunnis are diametrically opposed to the logic of sectarian polarization, regional provincialism, and amassing strength inside closed "ghettoes." This has led, at least since the establishment of Greater Lebanon, to the Sunnis' playing significant roles in the formation of a Lebanese "nation," through the openness of sectarian groups to each other, and efforts to address the other. These roles have been played by politicians from Riad Solh to Rafiq al-Hariri (with a number of reservations, naturally). Needless to say, the awkward, disjointed rhetoric of Saad Hariri, inspired by a paternalistic tone, cannot be addressed to the Lebanese in general; it has turned inward, toward sectarian isolation, constituting a departure from the traditional openness. Thus, the policies of the Future Movement appear to be that of swimming in a small pond, while the Arab uprisings are raging in a large sea. Most likely, the change coming to the region will affect Lebanon as well, but not in the way Hariri wishes.
