Lebanon is heading, slowly and windingly, yet steadily, towards a change in its internal balances of power, with what such a change means in terms of reflecting the regional situation and the change taking place in its balances as well. Perhaps the most important manifestation of such a change is Hezbollah being able to eat away yet another share of its opponents at every major event that takes place in the country. Indeed, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri resulted in the “Memorandum of Understanding” between General Michel Aoun and Hezbollah, and turned the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) into Hezbollah's mirror image, after it had been its fiercest opponent in tactics and in strategy. And after the events of May 7, 2008, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Walid Jumblatt, began to turn towards détente and then alliance with Hezbollah, after the Druze leader had led the battle to “deconsecrate” this party, its Secretary-General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and its authority of reference in Iran. And with the crisis of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) facing the Saad Hariri government, Hezbollah has drawn Najib Mikati to its side and convinced him to head a new government, turning the Future Movement's electoral ally in Tripoli into a defender of Hezbollah's theory about the STL, with everything this means in terms of domestic repercussions. Aoun, Jumblatt and Mikati may each have their own motives and determining factors for moving from a position of political opposition to Hezbollah's politics to one of alliance with it. Yet the facts assert that such a shift reflects further weakening of the opposing party in Lebanon's balance of power, represented by the March 14 Alliance and its backbone, the Future Movement – if not at the level of popular representation, then at least at the level of the work of state institutions. It is at this level that manifestations of the change that has occurred in the Lebanese situation essentially appear, as both the legislative and executive branches of government have lost their constitutional frame of reference and become ruled by the political considerations of the party able to eat away at its opposition and holding an armed force, i.e. Hezbollah. This explains the difficulties that face the formation of Mikati's government, after the March 14 Alliance announced that it would not participate in it and that it was moving to the opposition. Indeed, within the folds of such difficulties lies a change in the role assigned to the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. This explains the disproportionate role demanded by Aoun in forming the government cabinet and in naming its members, at the expense of both the Prime Minister and the President. Indeed, the matter exceeds disdainful appetite to reach the constitutional role of the two most fundamental positions in the executive branch, and subsequently the fundamental basis of the constitution and the Taif Agreement, with all that this involves in terms of aggravating the crisis of relations between sects and confessions, as every victory for one confession or sect here would take place at the expense of another confession or sect there. And if Aoun's role holds a special flavor within such developments, in view of his clinging to the claim that he represents the Christians, such clinging targets exactly the constitutional role of Christian representation through the President of the Republic, as his clinging to having the final word in forming the government targets the constitutional role of Sunni representation through the Prime Minister. Thus the debate over the Special Tribunal falls within such a framework, as the party that rejects it and is driving towards the Lebanese state ceasing to deal with it is the same party which will benefit from the change in the internal constitutional balance. In fact, it might be very difficult to stop the Lebanese state dealing with the STL without making such a change, through which would pass the reconsideration of international commitments. Perhaps this explains this exceptional interest in the STL, rejecting or accepting it, from Hezbollah and its opponents equally, because everyone realizes that it will determine the path taken by the change in the Lebanese situation, after the process of eating away at it carried out by Hezbollah, and that it will be the final battle in the current confrontation.
