Syria has been present in Lebanon since before independence and after it. It has been present in the interlocking geography, in political orientations, in the economy, and in relations between families and political parties. What brings the two countries into a crisis from time to time is not such presence or such relations, but rather their lack or organization and codification. The responsibility for this falls on both sides, especially Damascus, which was afforded a rare historical opportunity for over thirty years, during its military and political presence in Lebanon, when it sufficed itself with placing a number of intelligence officers in charge of managing these relations. It is true that the two countries have ratified hundreds of agreements, in addition to the Treaty of Brotherhood and Friendship. Yet all of this has remained mere ink on paper, as none of it was implemented on the ground. Those officers had no strategic vision, but rather sufficed themselves with supporting this or that political leader, who would serve their own personal interests. Meanwhile, their influence waned and the army withdrew beyond the border, until we found yesterday's allies having become Damascus's worst enemies, and considering the withdrawal of its army to represent a second independence, without paying heed to the fact that they cannot negate geography. They then started looking for someone to follow, working by the maxim of the theorist of the Lebanese Front during the Civil War, Edouard Honein, who wrote: “the more Lebanon is independent, the more it is shaken; and the more it follows, the more it flourishes". They thus found their safe haven in Syria's enemies, at both the international and regional levels, and placed themselves in the service of plans greater than their ability to serve them. They thus seemed to flounder between one side and the other (Jumblatt is the best example), their only constant being their sect, whom they would drag along at their whim. What is happening in Tripoli today is not much different from what has been happening there throughout the past years. The city, and its surroundings, is divided between, on the one hand, Islamists who support the Syrian Revolution on a sectarian basis, and on the other, those who support the regime on a sectarian basis as well. That is Tripoli's state of affairs, and that of Lebanon, ever since the unity between Syria and Egypt in the 1950s, through the Civil War, and until today. And despite the fact that Tripoli is the second largest city in the country after Beirut, it has remained more like a city of the periphery for the ruling class. It is the most deprived and neglected of Lebanese cities. Neglect has turned it into the capital of Lebanese and non-Lebanese Jihadists. Its “civilian" politicians have been moved to the margins, and replaced by the leaders of neighborhoods and streets, who are under the illusion that they will save Syria from the rule of Assad and the “infidel" Baath Party. The thinkers among them believe that they will establish an emirate that will be the starting point for the Caliphate in the entire Middle East. Among them is Omar Bakri, who started his calling in London before leaving it to settle in Tripoli, among his peers in the calling, directing the Revolution and demanding the city's rights, and in particular the right to support Syrians in confronting their regime, and confronting the “usurpers" of power in Beirut. All of Lebanon is waiting for the outcome of the events in Syria. It is part of its internal game and its foreign relations. As for the players on its political stage, they are waiting for the explosion to come from Tripoli or elsewhere, so that they may return to their original practice of looking for someone to follow.
