One would be ignoring the reality by attributing the delay in forming the new Lebanese Cabinet to competition over shares of influence in the government and the various portfolios, and to the unrealistic expectations, by Lebanese standards, of some local players. Without ignoring these local factors, there are also reasons for not limiting the explanation of the hesitation, confusion and delay in completing the government formation to these reasons. It is illogical that the sponsors of the new Lebanese situation, namely Syria and Hezbollah (and behind it, Iran), are unable to settle the process of forming the government, after they managed to turn things upside down by bringing down the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Therefore, one must search for other reasons behind the confusion in forming the government, namely regional conditions and related developments since the beginning of January, when Najib Miqati was tasked with forming this government. The regional agenda that brought down the former Cabinet, and with it the Saudi-Syrian agreement over Lebanon, should be governing the appearance of the new government. The Syrian policy of modifying the formula in effect began in September, when Hariri resisted the attempt by Damascus to rein him in. He rejected being lured into requesting Damascus to cancel Syrian warrants issued against a number of his advisors and allies, over the so-called “false witness” issue, related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In doing so, he opposed Damascus' desire to facilitate the return of its mandate for running affairs in Lebanon and the details of local issues. Thus, Syria had to work to exclude Hariri, if he wanted to demonstrate a bit of independence from its agenda. As for the Iranians, the climate that accompanied the bringing down of Hariri was no less negative. Tehran discovered that Hariri resisted its demands when he responded negatively to them, in diplomatic fashion, during his visit last December to Iran. Iran had suggested that he cancel entry visas between the two countries, similar to an arrangement with Turkey, and approve military cooperation. Iran also hinted at the need to cement financial cooperation and banking facilities as part of a commercial cooperation agreement. Hariri thus opposed Iran's aspirations for official cover, which it had been hoping for thanks to its influence in Lebanon via Hezbollah. This would let Iran use Beirut as an alternative to other capitals in order to escape the impact of sanctions imposed on the country by the United Nations Security Council. This explains the view of Hezbollah's secretary general, reflecting what Damascus had implicitly expressed with the veto on Hariri when the Turkish and Qatari mediators approached Syria. Damascus and Hezbollah thought it would be easy to overturn the majority and create a new formula, which would exclude Hariri and his allies; meanwhile, several factors have constituted obstacles to this objective: 1-The Saudi leadership was angry at the collapse of the agreement between it and the Syrians over Lebanon. This anger has yet to subside over what happened, and it contradicts Syria's expectation that it could move beyond this anger, as a result of Damascus' belief that Riyadh would adapt itself to the new situation. Riyadh responded by sticking with Hariri and supporting him, without going as far as to sever ties with Damascus. Moreover, the mediating countries, particularly Turkey and Qatar, which failed to salvage what could be salvaged, did not hide from the Syrian leadership their displeasure over the ending of this agreement, and with it Hariri, and thus their solidarity with Riyadh. 2-Syria's calculations of taking it slow in its regional policies, required by the rolling wave of Arab revolutions and changes, have necessitated a “suspension” of the Cabinet issue in Lebanon. These transformations have an echo in Syria, as was later proven when the virus of popular demands for freedom and democracy reached the country. Iran's headstrong behavior has not aided Syria's go-slow approach. The negative response in the Arab world, from Egypt to Bahrain, to Tehran's attempt to exploit the changes to its advantage, came at a time in which the Syrian leadership requires a minimum of good ties and normalization with the new situation in Arab countries. This does not suit moving forcefully to defeat a segment of the Lebanese via the Cabinet formation, which can only be attributed to Syrian and Iranian influence, at a time of revolutions against oppression and injustice. Moreover, the escalating confrontation between Gulf countries and Iran has placed the events in Bahrain and Kuwait in the framework of this confrontation, which extends to what began in Beirut, as part of the Iranian agenda. 3-Local events have worked against the expectations by Hezbollah and Damascus they would be able to regain the initiative in the Sunni community, and against their wager on weakening Hariri. His ouster led to the record popular support at a rally on 13 March, and during his visit to the hometown of the prime minister-designate, Tripoli. Also, Hariri has completely left behind the soft position on Hezbollah's arms, which was required by his heading a national unity government. These arms, and their impact on the domestic political formula, have become a topic that imposes itself on the political scene, in parallel with the stance on Iranian intervention, by Lebanon, the Arab world, and the international community. A different Hariri has now appeared the domestic scene, and those striving to form the government should take into consideration his policy orientations amid the current regional situation.
