There is a feeling among some who have long feared Sunni-Shiite sectarian struggle, which has escalated in recent years, particularly after the American occupation of Iraq, Iran's expanded list of negotiating cards in the region, and the growth of fundamentalism based on the ideas of al-Qaida, that an opportunity has begun to appear on the horizon. This opportunity will lead to setting down a path to reduce this conflict, which has become bloody in many cases, especially in Iraq, where it as taken the lives of thousands of innocents, due to blind fanaticism and sick delusions. This feeling stems from a number of phenomena and factors that have become prominent recently, as a result of many political transformations, which require further observation and follow-up. These indications are led by the results of parliamentary elections in Iraq, which were accompanied by the largest-ever participation by the Sunni community in the voting. This indicates the policy of incorporation in the political process is winning out, as the Sunni community is allied with Shiite figures with whom it shares a political program, led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (a Shiite). This alliance is based on differences with other competing lists, in terms of their vision for the state, and partnership in this state, as well as Iraq's foreign relations, regionally and internationally, instead of a difference about the sectarian identity of the ruler. The results of these elections highlighted the mixed political bloc running as the Iraqiya slate, which picked up slightly more seats than the other three big blocs, namely the National Alliance, the State of Law and the Kurdish Alliance. These groups were closer to sectarian and ethnic purity, as a result of the struggles of the last few years. However, the election results, the need of any group for alliances in order to form the next government, and the absence of harmony in some alliances, have prompted each bloc – including the State of Law slate of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki – to talk about the need for partnership by all elements of Iraq's political society in the next Cabinet. Even though the Iraqi elections and their aftermath have seen deadly explosions, and even though Tehran sponsors cooperation among its allies to confront the return of Allawi to the prime minister's seat, the latter and his allies can build on the achievement of a political benefit that they hope to further develop. This is, as Allawi says, involved working to end the political sectarian system of rule in exchange for a formula of rule and political life in Iraq. This is something that should be wagered on, even though it will be tested soon. The important thing is for other political forces to deal with this political moment in Iraq with rationality; they should not combat it. They should get in line with the new “language” that has been imposed by the election results, and avoid the pitfalls of dismembering Iraq, which many parties have worked for. The course of events in Lebanon represents another element that prompts us to observe whether the wave of sectarian struggle in the region is headed for retreat or has achieved its ends. Efforts have been made in the last two years to treat the repercussions of the events of 7 May 2008, which saw the climax of sectarian strife, and there are steps that should be continued at the popular level between the principal groups involved in the streets, neighborhoods and mixed regions. Despite all of this, the reconciliations that have taken place at the political level, pre-dating the last round of parliamentary elections and after the polls, have modified the atmosphere of sectarian mobilization that has prevailed over the last four years. Moreover, the policy followed by Prime Minister Saad Hariri in dealing with Israeli threats against Hizbullah and Lebanon has helped abort domestic division over another dispute. As Hariri has said repeatedly, “It is better for the country to be destroyed by Israel than fall apart at our own hands, due to our disputes.” Many see the other side, i.e. Hizbullah, as capable of doing more than it has done up to now to contain sectarian mobilization and polarization in Lebanon. The other day, Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, discussed the matter of leaks about his party being accused in the investigation by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Nasrallah said if the accusations about Hizbullah involvement were meant to cause strife, then no leader will be dragged into this strife, but will rather prevent it from taking place. This represents a preemptive strike against any attempt to renew the struggle in Lebanon on a sectarian basis. Among the factors that we can build on in wagering on a containment of the regional dimensions to the sectarian struggle is the mere discussion of the proposal to create a group of “good neighbor” states, at the level of the Arab Summit, to hold dialogue between Arab leaders and the leaders of Turkey and Iran, and other countries, not to mention the Turkish role in rejecting sanctions on Iran.
